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IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT)

Active Covert Sensing

Mehrdad Tahmasbi, Matthieu R. Bloch

Published Jun 1, 2020• 12 citations
Publisher

Abstract

We formalize the problem of active covert sensing, in which a legitimate user wants to not only sense an unknown parameter but also remain undetectable from an adversary by actively controlling the actions that generate observations. We characterize the optimal achievable error exponent when the actions of the legitimate user do not depend on the past observations. When the actions are allowed to depend on the past observations, we provide an example showing the benefits of adaptivity.

DOI
10.1109/isit44484.2020.9174220

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We formalize the problem of active covert sensing, in which a legitimate user wants to not only sense an unknown parameter but also remain undetectable from an adversary by actively controlling the actions that generate observations. We characterize the optimal achievable error exponent when the actions of the legitimate user do not depend on the past observations. When the actions are allowed to depend on the past observations, we provide an example showing the benefits of adaptivity.
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We investigate the problem of covert and secret key generation over a state-dependent discrete memoryless channel with one-way public discussion in which an adversary, the warden, may arbitrarily choose the channel state. We develop an adaptive protocol that, under conditions that we explicitly specify, not only allows the transmitter and the legitimate receiver to exchange a secret key but also conceals from the active warden whether the protocol is being run. When specialized to passive adversaries that do not control the channel state, we partially characterize the covert secret key capacity. In particular, the covert secret key capacity is sometimes equal to the covert capacity of the channel, so that secrecy comes “for free.”
We analyze the problem of secure communication over a wiretap channel with an active adversary, in which the legitimate transmitter has the opportunity to sense and learn the adversary's actions. Specifically, the adversary has the ability to switch between two channels and to observe the corresponding output at every channel use; the encoder, however, has causal access to observations impacted by adversary's actions. We develop a joint learning/transmission scheme in which the legitimate users learn and adapt to the adversary's actions. For some channel models, we show that the achievable rates, which we define precisely, are arbitrarily close to those obtained with hindsight, had the transmitter known the actions ahead of time. This suggests that there is much to exploit and gain in physical-layer security by monitoring the environment.
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Secure communication over a wiretap channel is investigated, in which an active adversary modifies the state of the channel and the legitimate transmitter has the opportunity to sense and learn the adversary's actions. The adversary has the ability to switch the channel state and observe the corresponding output at every channel use while the encoder has causal access to observations that depend on the adversary's actions. A joint learning/transmission scheme is developed in which the legitimate users learn and adapt to the adversary's actions. For some channel models, it is shown that the achievable rates, defined precisely for the problem, are arbitrarily close to those obtained with hindsight, had the transmitter known the actions ahead of time. This initial study suggests that there is much to exploit and gain in physical-layer security by learning the adversary, e.g., monitoring the environment.
We propose a scheme for covert active sensing using floodlight illumination from a terahertz-bandwidth amplified spontaneous emission (ASE) source and heterodyne detection. We evaluate the quantum-estimation-theoretic performance limit of covert sensing, wherein a transmitter's attempt to sense a target phase is kept undetectable to a quantum-equipped passive adversary, by hiding the signal photons under the thermal noise floor. Despite the quantum state of each mode of the ASE source being mixed (thermal), and hence inferior compared to the pure coherent state of a laser mode, the thousand-times-higher optical bandwidth of the ASE source results in achieving a substantially superior performance compared to a narrow-band laser source by allowing the probe light to be spread over many more orthogonal temporal modes within a given integration time. Even though our analysis is restricted to single-mode phase sensing, this system could be applicable or extendible for various practical optical sensing applications.