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Mind & Society

Free will in the clustered-minds multiverse, and some comments on S. Sarasvathy’s ‘choice matters’

Christian D. Schade

Published Jul 31, 2020• 1 citation
Publisher

Abstract

Abstract This paper sketches a new version of the multiverse interpretation of quantum mechanics, the clustered-minds multiverse, that has been presented in detail elsewhere (Schade 2018, Springer, New York). It briefly shows why it grants us with free will and reflects upon the (im-)possibilty of singular-universe explanations of free will (e.g., Laskey 2018, J Cogn Sci 19–2:125–163). It also critically comments upon S. Sarasvathy's 'choice matters,' one of the other contributions to this mini symposium.

DOI
10.1007/s11299-020-00241-5

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Abstract This paper sketches a new version of the multiverse interpretation of quantum mechanics, the clustered-minds multiverse, that has been presented in detail elsewhere (Schade 2018, Springer, New York). It briefly shows why it grants us with free will and reflects upon the (im-)possibilty of singular-universe explanations of free will (e.g., Laskey 2018, J Cogn Sci 19–2:125–163). It also critically comments upon S. Sarasvathy's 'choice matters,' one of the other contributions to this mini symposium.
The modern version of the wave-function collapse in quantum mechanics is based on decoherence and leads to the multiverse interpretation of quantum mechanics. The decoherence causes the universe to develop an emergent branching structure. One can interpret the branching structure either as a tree structure or as parallel different histories. Time is not continuous since there are no measurable continuous in quantum physics. Notion of continuous range of possible values of time is just an idealization. The same goes with the direction of time that is a prior assumption based on the branching structure of the multiverse. The multiverse does not exist in external space nor time since there is nothing more beside it. The observer's mind should be not in a superposition with himself. Because of this, in the Many-minds interpretations it is argued that the distinction between worlds should be made at the level of the individual observer. The human bodies are in a superposition, but the minds have definite states that are never in superposition. All possible lives, personalities that do not violate the laws of physics are facts since they represent a valid history in the multiverse. We are one of this possible personalities. Our choices are defined by our personality explained to us by our mind, our consciousness is the unchangeable part of us. It is nonphysical and it senses the world. It does not interact with the brain in the other way beside it.
Since quantum mechanics (QM) was formulated, many voices have claimed this to be the basis of free will in the human beings. Basically, they argue that free will is possible because there is an ontological indeterminism in the natural laws, and that the mind is responsible for the wave function collapse of matter, which leads to a choice among the different possibilities for the body. However, I defend the opposite thesis, that free will cannot be defended in terms of QM. First, because indeterminism does not imply free will, it is merely a necessary condition but not enough to defend it. Second, because all considerations about an autonomous mind sending orders to the body is against our scientific knowledge about human beings; in particular, neither neurological nor evolutionary theory can admit dualism. The quantum theory of measurement can be interpreted without the intervention of human minds, but other fields of science cannot contemplate the mentalist scenario, so it is concluded that QM has nothing to say about the mind or free will, and its scientific explanation is more related to biology than to physics. A fatalistic or materialist view, which denies the possibility of a free will, makes much more sense in scientific terms.
There are several important philosophical problems to which quantum mechanics is often said to have made significant contributions: Determinism: quantum theory has been taken to refute determinism;Free Will: in turn, this is thought to open the door to free will;The mind-body problem: relatedly, it is sometimes said to shed light on consciousness;Idealism: more radically, quantum theory is assumed to have refuted realism and to have placed the observer at the centre of the world;Reductionism: even granting realism, it has been claimed that quantum theory undermines reductionism.Our main thesis in this paper is that none of this is either necessary or desirable. By adopting the de Broglie–Bohm theory (or Bohmian mechanics), one can straightforwardly account for quantum phenomena without endorsing any of these claims.