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J. Inf. Hiding Multim. Signal Process.

A Novel Three-party Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol Based on Secret Sharing.

Yan‐Jun Liu, Chin‐Chen Chang, Chin‐Yu Sun

Published Jan 1, 2016• 0 citations
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Authenticated key exchange protocols have an important role for building secure communications amongst two or more entities over the networks. Two party authenticated key exchange protocols where each pair of parties must share a secret with each other; a three-party protocol does not cause any key management problem for the parties. In this paper, an extension of two-party key exchange protocol, which is based on Diffie-Hellman key exchange. is proposed. In this protocol each user exchanges secret key with server then each user uses this secret key to exchange session key with each other. The efficiency and the security analysis of this new key exchange protocol are proven in this paper.

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Summary Authenticated key exchange protocols represent an important cryptographic mechanism that enables several parties to communicate securely over an open network. Elashry, Mu, and Susilo proposed an identity‐based authenticated key exchange (IBAKE) protocol where different parties establish secure communication by means of their public identities.The authors also introduced a new security notion for IBAKE protocols called resiliency, that is, if the secret shared key is compromised, the entities can generate another shared secret key without establishing a new session between them. They then claimed that their IBAKE protocol satisfies this security notion. We analyze the security of their protocol and prove that it has a major security flaw, which renders it insecure against an impersonation attack. We also disprove the resiliency property of their scheme by proposing an attack where an adversary can compute any shared secret key if just one secret bit is leaked.

arXiv:1611.07299•International Journal of Communication Systems•Dec 11, 2017•11 citations
Authenticated key exchange protocols have an important role for building secure communications amongst two or more entities over the networks. Two party authenticated key exchange protocols where each pair of parties must share a secret with each other; a three-party protocol does not cause any key management problem for the parties. In this paper, an extension of two-party key exchange protocol, which is based on Diffie-Hellman key exchange. is proposed. In this protocol each user exchanges secret key with server then each user uses this secret key to exchange session key with each other. The efficiency and the security analysis of this new key exchange protocol are proven in this paper.
Key exchange protocols enable two parties to communicate securely over an untrusted network by exchanging a shared secret among them.Authentication and privacy are the two primary objectives of network security where privacy ensures that transmitted messages cannot eavesdrop.On the other hand, authentication assures that no unauthorized user can gain access maliciously.These two goals can be achieved simultaneously, using authenticated key exchange scheme where two or more parties can share a common secret to transmit a message securely in an open network.Abundant work has been done in 3PAKErelevant to password-based authentication, traditional public key cryptosystem (PKC) and without server's public key Research
Summary Authenticated key exchange protocols represent an important cryptographic mechanism that enables several parties to communicate securely over an open network. Elashry, Mu, and Susilo proposed an identity‐based authenticated key exchange (IBAKE) protocol where different parties establish secure communication by means of their public identities.The authors also introduced a new security notion for IBAKE protocols called resiliency, that is, if the secret shared key is compromised, the entities can generate another shared secret key without establishing a new session between them. They then claimed that their IBAKE protocol satisfies this security notion. We analyze the security of their protocol and prove that it has a major security flaw, which renders it insecure against an impersonation attack. We also disprove the resiliency property of their scheme by proposing an attack where an adversary can compute any shared secret key if just one secret bit is leaked.