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International Journal of Quantum Information

Single-state semi-quantum key distribution protocol and its security proof

Zhang Wei, Daowen Qiu, Paulo Mateus

Published Jun 1, 2020• 18 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Semi-quantum key distribution (SQKD) can share secret keys by using less quantum resource than its fully quantum counterparts, and this likely makes SQKD become more practical and realizable. In this paper, we present a new SQKD protocol by introducing the idea of B92 protocol in fully quantum cryptography into SQKD. In this protocol, the sender Alice just sends one quantum state to the classical Bob and Bob just prepares a fixed state in the preparation process. It is much simpler than the existing SQKD and potentially much easier to be implemented. It can be seen as a semi-quantum version of B92 protocol, compared to the protocol BKM07 as the semi-quantum version of BB84 in fully quantum cryptography. We verify that it is more efficient than the existing single-state SQKD protocols by introducing an efficiency parameter. Specifically, we prove it is secure against a restricted collective attack by computing a lower bound of the key rate in the asymptotic scenario. Then we can find a threshold value of errors such that for all error rates less than this value, the secure key can be definitely established between the legitimate users definitely. We make an illustration of how to compute the threshold value in case the reverse channel is a depolarizing one with parameter [Formula: see text]. Though the threshold value is a little smaller than those of some existing SQKD protocols, it can be comparable to the B92 protocol in fully quantum cryptography.

DOI
10.1142/s0219749920500136

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•Aug 31, 2022•0 citations
Semi-quantum key distribution (SQKD) can share secret keys by using less quantum resource than its fully quantum counterparts, and this likely makes SQKD become more practical and realizable. In this paper, we present a new SQKD protocol by introducing the idea of B92 protocol in fully quantum cryptography into SQKD. In this protocol, the sender Alice just sends one quantum state to the classical Bob and Bob just prepares a fixed state in the preparation process. It is much simpler than the existing SQKD and potentially much easier to be implemented. It can be seen as a semi-quantum version of B92 protocol, compared to the protocol BKM07 as the semi-quantum version of BB84 in fully quantum cryptography. We verify that it is more efficient than the existing single-state SQKD protocols by introducing an efficiency parameter. Specifically, we prove it is secure against a restricted collective attack by computing a lower bound of the key rate in the asymptotic scenario. Then we can find a threshold value of errors such that for all error rates less than this value, the secure key can be definitely established between the legitimate users definitely. We make an illustration of how to compute the threshold value in case the reverse channel is a depolarizing one with parameter [Formula: see text]. Though the threshold value is a little smaller than those of some existing SQKD protocols, it can be comparable to the B92 protocol in fully quantum cryptography.
Semi-quantum key distribution (SQKD) can share secret keys by using less quantum resource than its fully quantum counterparts, and this likely makes SQKD become more practical and realizable. In this paper, we present a new SQKD protocol by introducing the idea of B92 into semi-quantum key distribution and prove its unconditional security. In this protocol, the sender Alice just sends one qubit to the classical Bob and Bob just prepares one state in the preparation process. Indeed the classical user's measurement is not necessary either. This protocol can reduce some quantum communication and make it easier to be implemented. It can be seen as the semi-quantum version of B92 protocol, comparing to the protocol BKM2007 as the semi-quantum version of BB84 in fully quantum cryptography. We verify it has higher key rate and therefore is more efficient. Specifically we prove it is unconditionally secure by computing a lower bound of the key rate in the asymptotic scenario from information theory aspect. Then we can find a threshold value of errors such that for all error rates less than this value, the secure key can be established between the legitimate users definitely. We make an illustration of how to compute the threshold value in case of the reverse channel is a depolarizing one with parameter ppp. Though the threshold value is a little smaller than those of some existed SQKD protocols, it can be comparable to the B92 protocol in fully quantum cryptography.
Unlike purely classical communication, unconditionally secure key distribution is possible if Alice and Bob are both equipped with quantum hardware. The degree to which a protocol needs to be quantum is not only an interesting theoretical question, but also important for practical implementations. Indeed, one may wish to construct cheaper devices, or compensate for device malfunction. In this sense, studying limited resource QKD protocols is an important problem. One direction to studying this is the semi-quantum model introduced by Boyer et al. in 2007 (PRL 99 140501). Several provably secure semi-quantum protocols were put forth. However, most of these protocols were proven secure in the perfect qubit scenario and not necessarily against practical attacks. Only recently, starting with seminal work of Boyer, Katz, Liss, and Mor in (PRA 96 062335) has research in the field of semi-quantum cryptography considered practical devices and imperfections, such as multi photon sources and imperfect detectors. In this work, we present a new SQKD protocol based on an Extended B92 protocol which is able to counter certain practical attacks. Furthermore, the techniques we use may see broad application to other limited-resource (S)QKD protocols.
Most prior semi-quantum key distribution (SQKD) protocols are designed in the context of qubits. In this paper, we proposed an SQKD protocol using ([Formula: see text]+1) quantum states in two mutually unbiased bases in the context of qudits without invoking the classical party’s measurement capability. It not only decreases the quantum states sent by quantum party by half, but also improves the efficiency of key rate than qubits do. To prove the security of present protocol, we first illustrate that the present protocol is completely robust, and then prove its unconditional security from information theoretical perspective by computing its key rate and noise tolerance against cloning-based individual attack. The unconditional security proof demonstrates that the higher dimension of quantum system is, the higher key rate can be obtained and the higher noise tolerance is allowed in depolarization channel.
Semi-quantum key distribution (SQKD) is an important research issue which allows one quantum participant equipped with advanced quantum devices to distribute a shared secret key securely with one classical user who has restricted capabilities. In this paper, we propose a SQKD protocol which allows one quantum user to distribute two different private secret keys to two classical users respectively at the same time. Alice distributes two particle sequences from Bell states to Bob and Charlie respectively. Once the particles have been processed and returned, Alice can simultaneously detect reflected particles by Bob and Charlie based on Bell-state measurement and generate two different raw keys. To enable more participants in sharing keys, this protocol can be extended to the m + 1 party communication scheme by employing m-particle GHZ state. In large-scale communication networks, this extended model significantly reduces the complexity of communication compared to the traditional SQKD scheme. Security analyses show that the presented protocol is free from several general attacks, such as the entangle-measure attack, the modification attack, the double CNOT attack, and so on.
Semiquantum key distribution protocols are designed to allow two parties to establish a shared secret key, secure against an all-powerful adversary, even when one of the users is restricted to measuring and preparing quantum states in one single basis. While interesting from a theoretical standpoint, these protocols have the disadvantage that a two-way quantum communication channel is necessary which generally limits their theoretical efficiency and noise tolerance. In this paper, we construct a semiquantum key distribution (SQKD) protocol which actually takes advantage of this necessary two-way channel, and, after performing an information theoretic security analysis against collective attacks, we show it is able to tolerate a channel noise level higher than any prior SQKD protocol to date. We also compare the noise tolerance of our protocol to other two-way fully quantum protocols, along with BB84 with classical advantage distillation. We also comment on some practical issues involving semiquantum key distribution (in particular, concerning the potential complexity in physical implementation of our protocol as compared with other standard QKD protocols). Finally, we develop techniques that can be applied to the security analysis of other (S)QKD protocols reliant on a two-way quantum communication channel.
The counter-intuitive features of quantum mechanics make it possible to solve problems and perform tasks that are beyond the abilities of non-quantum (classical) computers and communication devices. The field of quantum information processing studies how we can achieve such improvements by representing information as quantum states.One of the early achievements of quantum information processing is the development of quantum key distribution (QKD). QKD protocols allow two participants (Alice and Bob) to achieve the classically-impossible task of generating a secret shared key even if their adversary is computationally unlimited.Unfortunately, the security promises of QKD are true only in theory; practical implementations of QKD deviate from the theoretical protocols, and many of these deviations give rise to practical attacks. In this research thesis, we study the security properties of various QKD protocols in many practical settings:First, we study practical security of semiquantum key distribution (SQKD) protocols, where either Alice or Bob is non-quantum (classical). Following practical security problems in previous SQKD protocols, we suggest a new SQKD protocol (the "Mirror protocol") which can be securely implemented, and we prove it robust and secure against a wide range of attacks (the "uniform collective attacks").Then, we study "composable security" of the first QKD protocol created by Bennett and Brassard (BB84). BB84 has its unconditional security proved against adversaries performing the most general attacks in a theoretical (idealized) setting; however, some security approaches do not prove "composable security", which requires the secret key to remain secret even when Alice and Bob actually use it for cryptographic purposes. We generalize an algebraic security approach for BB84, making it prove composable security of BB84 (and many variants of BB84) against the most general attacks.Finally, we analyze an important practical attack (named "Bright Illumination"), showing how it can be modeled as a theoretical "Reversed-Space" attack.Overall, all results aim to enhance our understanding on how to bridge the gap between theory and practice in various sub-fields of QKD, and they may help solve a major open problem in the field of QKD: constructing a realistic QKD implementation that can be proved truly and unconditionally secure against any possible attack.