Crowdsourcing has been emerging as a valid problem-solving model that harnesses a large group of contributors to solve a complicated task. However, existing crowdsourcing platforms or systems could suffer from task allocation and quality control problems. In this article, we first prove that there exist two dilemmas while tackling the above issues by using a game-theoretic approach. To overcome this challenge, we are focusing on exploiting quantum crowdsourcing schemes in which the welfare of requestor or worker can be maximized since quantum players share the extended strategy space, and the introduction of entanglement offers a new method of depicting fine-grained relations between players. Specifically, we propose a quantum game model for quota-oriented crowdsourcing game to address dilemmas in task allocation. The result indicates the dilemma based on classical strategy will disappear with the increment of entanglement degree. While in the quality-oriented crowdsourcing game, we adopt a density matrix approach to calculate the optimal payoffs of both sides, which demonstrates the superiority of our quantum strategy. Moreover, our quantum scheme is generic since it is compatible with the schemes from a classical perspective. Hence, our noteworthy quantum crowdsourcing schemes offer a promising alternative route for tackling dilemmas in crowdsourcing scenarios.
Crowdsourcing has been emerging as a valid problem-solving model that harnesses a large group of contributors to solve a complicated task. However, existing crowdsourcing platforms or systems could suffer from task allocation and quality control problems. In this article, we first prove that there exist two dilemmas while tackling the above issues by using a game-theoretic approach. To overcome this challenge, we are focusing on exploiting quantum crowdsourcing schemes in which the welfare of requestor or worker can be maximized since quantum players share the extended strategy space, and the introduction of entanglement offers a new method of depicting fine-grained relations between players. Specifically, we propose a quantum game model for quota-oriented crowdsourcing game to address dilemmas in task allocation. The result indicates the dilemma based on classical strategy will disappear with the increment of entanglement degree. While in the quality-oriented crowdsourcing game, we adopt a density matrix approach to calculate the optimal payoffs of both sides, which demonstrates the superiority of our quantum strategy. Moreover, our quantum scheme is generic since it is compatible with the schemes from a classical perspective. Hence, our noteworthy quantum crowdsourcing schemes offer a promising alternative route for tackling dilemmas in crowdsourcing scenarios.
The volunteer's dilemma is a well-known game in game theory that models the conflict players face when deciding whether to volunteer for a collective benefit, knowing that volunteering incurs a personal cost. In this work we introduce a quantum variant of the classical volunteer's dilemma, generalizing it by allowing players to utilize quantum strategies. Employing the Eisert-Wilkens-Lewenstein quantization framework, we analyze a multiplayer quantum volunteer's dilemma scenario with an arbitrary number of players, where the cost of volunteering is shared equally among the volunteers. We derive analytical expressions for the players' expected payoffs and demonstrate the quantum game's advantage over the classical game. In particular, we prove that the quantum volunteer's dilemma possesses symmetric Nash equilibria with larger expected payoffs compared to the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium of the classical game, wherein players use mixed strategies. Furthermore, we show that the quantum Nash equilibria we identify are Pareto optimal. Our findings reveal distinct dynamics in volunteer's dilemma scenarios when players adhere to quantum rules, underscoring a strategic advantage of decision making in quantum settings.
A well-known model in game theory, the Volunteer's Dilemma describes a group of n players who decide whether to volunteer for a collective benefit at a personal cost, or to abstain and risk forfeiting the benefit altogether. A quantum version of this dilemma, developed within the Eisert-Wilkens-Lewenstein framework, allows each player to manipulate one qubit of a shared entangled state, leading to symmetric Nash equilibria with higher expected payoffs than in the classical game. Existing analyses, however, assume maximal entanglement, which is experimentally demanding for hardware-constrained quantum systems. Within the same framework, we introduce a generalized Quantum Volunteer's Dilemma with a tunable entanglement parameter γ and study the extent to which equilibrium behavior depends on the level of entanglement. We derive explicit conditions relating γ, the number of players, and the players' strategies under which symmetric Nash equilibria exist, focusing on two canonical strategy profiles: one for 2≤n≤9, and one for even n. We find that maximal entanglement is not required to sustain symmetric equilibria. Instead, equilibrium behavior persists above a threshold value, which we compute analytically in both cases. We also demonstrate that the threshold value directly depends on system size.
Quantum game theory is a multidisciplinary field which combines quantum mechanics with game theory by introducing non-classical resources such as entanglement, quantum operations and quantum measurement. By transferring two-player two-strategy (2 × 2) dilemma containing classical games into the quantum realm, dilemmas can be resolved in quantum pure strategies if entanglement is distributed between the players who use quantum operations. Moreover, players receive the highest sum of payoffs available in the game, which are otherwise impossible in classical pure strategies. Encouraged by the observation of rich dynamics of physical systems with many interacting parties and the power of entanglement in quantum versions of 2 × 2 games, it became generally accepted that quantum versions can be easily extended to N -player situations by simply allowing N -partite entangled states. In this article, however, we show that this is not generally true because the reproducibility of classical tasks in the quantum domain imposes limitations on the type of entanglement and quantum operators. We propose a benchmark for the evaluation of quantum and classical versions of games, and derive the necessary and sufficient conditions for a physical realization. We give examples of entangled states that can and cannot be used, and the characteristics of quantum operators used as strategies.
Classical game theory is a powerful tool focusing on optimized resource distribution, allocation, and sharing in classical wired and wireless networks. As quantum networks are emerging as a means of providing true connectivity between quantum computers, it is imperative and crucial to exploit game theory for addressing challenges such as entanglement distribution and access, routing, topology extraction, and inference. Quantum networks provide the promising opportunity of employing quantum games owing to their inherent capability of generating and sharing quantum states. In addition, quantum games offer enhanced payoffs and winning probabilities, new strategies, and equilibria, which are unimaginable in classical games. Employing quantum game theory to solve fundamental challenges in quantum networks opens a new fundamental research direction necessitating inter-disciplinary efforts. In this article, we introduce a novel game-the-oretical framework for exploiting quantum strategies to solve – as an archetypal example – one of the key functionalities of a quantum network, namely, entanglement distribution. We compare quantum strategies with classical ones by showing the quantum advantages in terms of link fidelity improvement and latency decrease in communication. In the future, we will generalize our game framework to optimize entanglement distribution and access over any quantum network topology. We will also explore how quantum games can be leveraged to address other challenges like routing, optimization of quantum operations, and topology design.
The peer-to-peer transmission is a mainstream in challenged network environments. Yet, the free rider phenomenon in peer-to peer transmissions presses a need for incentive mechanisms to stimulate contributions of data transmission. As a result, it is imperative to answer the questions: whether and to what extent an incentive mechanism can invoke such contributions? To answer these questions, we employ an n-player continuous quantum game model to analyze extrinsic incentive mechanisms (promoting cooperative behaviors by offering rewards), and use the quantum prisoner's dilemma model to analyze intrinsic incentive mechanisms (encouraging reciprocal cooperation by exploiting internal bounds). To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to analyze incentive mechanisms for peer-to-peer transmissions from a quantum game perspective. Such a perspective is adopted because the extended strategy space in the quantum game broadens the range for searching optimal strategies and the introduction of entanglement makes the proposed analytical frameworks more practical due to the consideration of the peers' relationships in decision-making. Our proposed quantum game-based analytical frameworks are generic because they are compatible with classic game-based schemes. Our analytical results can provide straightforward insights on evaluating the potential of incentive mechanisms and can serve as important references for designing new incentive mechanisms.
A quantized version of the prisoner’s dilemma game based on the Marinatto–Weber quantization scheme is introduced. A four-qubit-basis initial entangled quantum state is assumed. Two domains for Nash equilibria are observed in terms of the degree of entanglement of the game. Each Nash equilibrium point is found to be Pareto optimal in its corresponding domain. Therefore, there is a unique solution to the game dilemma in each domain of the entanglement parameter. The maximally entangled limit is studied, and the players’ payoffs are found to equal the average of the payoff matrix independently of their choices. Consequently, any combination of players’ choices is a solution to the dilemma of the game. The nonentangled limits are also studied and found to coincide with the classical mixed-strategy game. Our results are equivalent to those of the noisy schemes of the quantum prisoner’s dilemma game. In our scheme, entanglement can be interpreted as a noise.