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Identity Based Authenticated Key Agreement Protocols from Pairings.

Liqun Chen, Caroline Kudla

Published Jan 1, 2002• 14 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

Abstract. We investigate a number of issues related to identity based authenticated key agreement protocols using the Weil or Tate pairings. These issues include how to make protocols efficient; how to avoid key escrow by a Trust Authority (TA) who issues identity based private keys for users, and how to allow users to use different Trusted Authorities. We describe a few authenticated key agreement (AK) protocols and AK with key confirmation (AKC) protocols which are modified from Smart’s AK protocol [Sm02]. We study the security of these protocols heuristically and using provable security methods. In addition, we prove that our AK protocol is immune to key compromise impersonation attacks, and we also show that our second protocol has the TA forward secrecy property (which we define to mean that the compromise of the TA’s private key will not compromise previously established session keys). We also show that this TA forward secrecy property implies that the protocol has the perfect forward secrecy property. 1

Related papers

Escrow-free certificate-based authenticated key agreement protocol from pairings

Shengbao Wang, Zhenfu Cao

Key agreement protocols are essential for secure communications. In this paper, to solve the inherent key escrow problem of identity-based cryptography, an escrow-free certificate-based authenticated key agreement (CB-AK) protocol with perfect forward secrecy is proposed. Our protocol makes use of pairings on elliptic curves. The protocol is described and its properties are discussed though comparison with Smart’s protocol.

Wuhan University Journal of Natural Sciences•Jan 1, 2007•13 citations

A Secure ID-Based Explicit Authenticated Key Agreement Protocol without Key Escrow

Mengbo Hou, Qiuliang Xu

Key agreement protocols are essential for secure communications in open and distributed environments. Identity-based cryptography has become extremely fashionable in the last few years for its special advantages. In this paper, we point out some flaw in the scheme proposed by Wang et al., then we present a two-party identity-based explicit authenticated key agreement protocol with key confirmation, which was inspired on a new identity-based encryption scheme first proposed by Gentry and can be used properly in the escrowless mode. The scheme captures the attributes of known-key secrecy, key-compromise impersonation resilience, unknown key-share resilience, perfect forward secrecy, and no-key control. Especially, the scheme captures the PKG forward secrecy property. The PKG still could not recover all the userspsila past session keys even he knows the long-term private keys of all users.

International Conference on Information Assurance and Security (IAS)•Jan 1, 2009•1 citation

Cryptanalysis on Identity-based Authenticated Key Agreement Protocols from Pairings

Mengbo Hou, Qiuliang Xu, Shanqing Guo +1 more

Abstract—Two-party authenticated key agreement protocol is used to authenticate entities and establish session keys in an open network in order to provide secure communications between two parties. Several security attributes are highly desired for such protocols, such as perfect forward secrecy (the corruption of long-term keys of all the entities should not compromise any session key), PKG forward secrecy (the corruption of the PKG's master key in the ID-based system should not compromise the established session keys), and known session-key specific temporary information secrecy (The exposure of private temporary information should not compromise the secrecy of generated session keys). In 2005, Choie et al. proposed three identity-based authenticated key agreement protocols from pairings. Our analysis shows that they all didn't provide protection against known session-key specific temporary information attack and some of them are vulnerable against man-in-the-middle attack, such as the key replicating attack. We analyze some of the attacks under the BR93 security model. Index Terms—key agreement protocol, known session-key specific temporary information secrecy, key replicating attack, security model I.

Journal of Networks•Jun 16, 2010•8 citations

Perfect Forward Secure Identity-Based Authenticated Key Agreement Protocol in the Escrow Mode

Shengbao Wang, Zhenfu Cao, Zhaohui Cheng +1 more

Abstract. There are several essential features in key agreement protocols such as key escrow (essential when confidentiality, audit trail and legal interception are required) and perfect forward secrecy (i.e., the security of a session key established between two or more entities is guaranteed even when the private keys of the entities are compromised). Majority of the existing escrowable identity-based key agreement protocols, however, only provide partial forward secrecy. Therefore, such protocols are unsuitable for real-word applications that require a stronger sense of forward secrecy — perfect forward secrecy. In this paper, we propose an efficient perfect forward secure identity-based key agreement protocol in the escrow mode. We prove the security of our protocol in the random oracle model, assuming the intractability of the Gap Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (GBDH) problem. Security proofs are invaluable tools in assuring protocol implementers about the security properties of protocols. We note, however, that many existing security proofs of previously published identity-based protocols entail lengthy and complicated mathematical proofs. In this paper, our proof adopts a modular approach and, hence, simpler to follow.

•Feb 7, 2008•1 citation

A secure two-party key agreement protocol with key escrow and perfect forward secrecy

Mengbo Hou, Qiuliang Xu

To provide secure communications in open and distributed environments, authenticated key agreement protocol is an important primitive for establishing session key. So far, great deals of identity-based protocols have been proposed to provide robust mutual authentication and key establishment in two-party setting. Majority of the existing escrowable identitybased key agreement protocols, however, only provide partial forward secrecy. Therefore, such protocols are unsuitable for real-world applications that require a stronger sense of forward secrecy -- perfect forward secrecy. In this paper, we present a secure two-party identity-based authenticated key agreement protocol, which was inspired on an identity-based encryption scheme first proposed by Gentry (Eurocrypt'06). The proposed protocol achieves most of the required security attributes and can be used properly in the escrow mode. We show that the scheme achieves the attributes of known-key secrecy, key-compromise impersonation resilience, unknown key-share resilience and no key control. In addition, it captures the perfect forward secrecy attribute.

IEEE International Conference on Anti-counterfeiting, Security, and Identification (ASID)•Aug 1, 2009•1 citation

A Two-party certificateless authenticated key agreement protocol without pairing

Mengbo Hou, Qiuliang Xu

Authenticated key agreement (AK) protocol is crucial in providing data confidentiality and integrity for subsequent communications among two or more parties over a public network. Certificateless public key cryptography (CL-PKC) combines the advantage of the identity-based public key cryptography (ID-PKC) and the traditional public key cryptography (PKC). Unfortunately, construction of CL-PKC and AK protocols has so far depended on the use of identity-based encryption, which results in the bilinear pairing-based schemes that need costly operations. We present a secure certificateless authenticated key agreement protocol without paring, based on the certificateless encryption scheme proposed by J. Baek et al. It shows that the newly proposed scheme is of nice efficiency and practical. Moreover, it provides perfect forward secrecy, PKG forward secrecy and almost all the other known security attributes, such as known-key secrecy, key-compromise impersonation resilience, unknown key-share resilience, known session-specific temporary information security, message independence and no key control.

IEEE International Conference on Computer Science and Information Technology•Jan 1, 2009•36 citations
Abstract. We investigate a number of issues related to identity based authenticated key agreement protocols using the Weil or Tate pairings. These issues include how to make protocols efficient; how to avoid key escrow by a Trust Authority (TA) who issues identity based private keys for users, and how to allow users to use different Trusted Authorities. We describe a few authenticated key agreement (AK) protocols and AK with key confirmation (AKC) protocols which are modified from Smart’s AK protocol [Sm02]. We study the security of these protocols heuristically and using provable security methods. In addition, we prove that our AK protocol is immune to key compromise impersonation attacks, and we also show that our second protocol has the TA forward secrecy property (which we define to mean that the compromise of the TA’s private key will not compromise previously established session keys). We also show that this TA forward secrecy property implies that the protocol has the perfect forward secrecy property. 1
Key agreement protocols are essential for secure communications in open and distributed environments. Identity-based cryptography has become extremely fashionable in the last few years for its special advantages. In this paper, we point out some flaw in the scheme proposed by Wang et al., then we present a two-party identity-based explicit authenticated key agreement protocol with key confirmation, which was inspired on a new identity-based encryption scheme first proposed by Gentry and can be used properly in the escrowless mode. The scheme captures the attributes of known-key secrecy, key-compromise impersonation resilience, unknown key-share resilience, perfect forward secrecy, and no-key control. Especially, the scheme captures the PKG forward secrecy property. The PKG still could not recover all the userspsila past session keys even he knows the long-term private keys of all users.
Abstract—Two-party authenticated key agreement protocol is used to authenticate entities and establish session keys in an open network in order to provide secure communications between two parties. Several security attributes are highly desired for such protocols, such as perfect forward secrecy (the corruption of long-term keys of all the entities should not compromise any session key), PKG forward secrecy (the corruption of the PKG's master key in the ID-based system should not compromise the established session keys), and known session-key specific temporary information secrecy (The exposure of private temporary information should not compromise the secrecy of generated session keys). In 2005, Choie et al. proposed three identity-based authenticated key agreement protocols from pairings. Our analysis shows that they all didn't provide protection against known session-key specific temporary information attack and some of them are vulnerable against man-in-the-middle attack, such as the key replicating attack. We analyze some of the attacks under the BR93 security model. Index Terms—key agreement protocol, known session-key specific temporary information secrecy, key replicating attack, security model I.
Abstract. There are several essential features in key agreement protocols such as key escrow (essential when confidentiality, audit trail and legal interception are required) and perfect forward secrecy (i.e., the security of a session key established between two or more entities is guaranteed even when the private keys of the entities are compromised). Majority of the existing escrowable identity-based key agreement protocols, however, only provide partial forward secrecy. Therefore, such protocols are unsuitable for real-word applications that require a stronger sense of forward secrecy — perfect forward secrecy. In this paper, we propose an efficient perfect forward secure identity-based key agreement protocol in the escrow mode. We prove the security of our protocol in the random oracle model, assuming the intractability of the Gap Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (GBDH) problem. Security proofs are invaluable tools in assuring protocol implementers about the security properties of protocols. We note, however, that many existing security proofs of previously published identity-based protocols entail lengthy and complicated mathematical proofs. In this paper, our proof adopts a modular approach and, hence, simpler to follow.
To provide secure communications in open and distributed environments, authenticated key agreement protocol is an important primitive for establishing session key. So far, great deals of identity-based protocols have been proposed to provide robust mutual authentication and key establishment in two-party setting. Majority of the existing escrowable identitybased key agreement protocols, however, only provide partial forward secrecy. Therefore, such protocols are unsuitable for real-world applications that require a stronger sense of forward secrecy -- perfect forward secrecy. In this paper, we present a secure two-party identity-based authenticated key agreement protocol, which was inspired on an identity-based encryption scheme first proposed by Gentry (Eurocrypt'06). The proposed protocol achieves most of the required security attributes and can be used properly in the escrow mode. We show that the scheme achieves the attributes of known-key secrecy, key-compromise impersonation resilience, unknown key-share resilience and no key control. In addition, it captures the perfect forward secrecy attribute.
Authenticated key agreement (AK) protocol is crucial in providing data confidentiality and integrity for subsequent communications among two or more parties over a public network. Certificateless public key cryptography (CL-PKC) combines the advantage of the identity-based public key cryptography (ID-PKC) and the traditional public key cryptography (PKC). Unfortunately, construction of CL-PKC and AK protocols has so far depended on the use of identity-based encryption, which results in the bilinear pairing-based schemes that need costly operations. We present a secure certificateless authenticated key agreement protocol without paring, based on the certificateless encryption scheme proposed by J. Baek et al. It shows that the newly proposed scheme is of nice efficiency and practical. Moreover, it provides perfect forward secrecy, PKG forward secrecy and almost all the other known security attributes, such as known-key secrecy, key-compromise impersonation resilience, unknown key-share resilience, known session-specific temporary information security, message independence and no key control.