Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

Physics Today

Interpreting the quantum world, by Jeffrey Bub

Richard Healey

Published Aug 1, 1998• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Related papers

Interpreting the Quantum World

Asher Peres

This is an "Essay-Review" of a book with the same title, by Jeffrey Bub (Cambridge University Press, 1997).

arXiv:quant-ph/9711003•Nov 5, 1997•2 citations

Interpreting the Quantum World

Kaj Börge Hansen

Lychnos•Jan 1, 2001•1 citation

A short technical comment on Bub's There is No Quantum World (arXiv:2512.18400v2) and a brief remark on related Grangier's reply (arXiv:2512.22965v1)

Krzysztof Sienicki

This note is a friendly technical check of Jeffrey Bub's There is No Quantum World (arXiv:2512.18400v2). I flag one unambiguous mathematical slip (a cardinality identity that implicitly assumes the Continuum Hypothesis) and then point out a few places where the discussion of infinite tensor products, ``sectorization,'' and measurement updates would benefit from sharper wording. Nothing here is meant as a critique of Bub's interpretive goals; the aim is simply to separate what is mathematically forced from what depends on choices of algebra, representation, or philosophical stance. I end with a short remark on Philippe Grangier's reply (arXiv:2512.22965v1).

quant-pharXiv:2512.24198•Dec 31, 2025•0 citations

Interpreting the Quantum World

Jeffrey Bub

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science•Jan 1, 1998•0 citations

Comment on "There is No Quantum World" by Jeffrey Bub

Philippe Grangier

In a recent preprint [1] Jeffrey Bub presents a discussion of neo-Bohrian interpretations of quantum mechanics, and also of von Neumann's work on infinite tensor products [2]. He rightfully writes that this work provides a theoretical framework that deflates the measurement problem and justifies Bohr's insistence on the primacy of classical concepts. But then he rejects these ideas, on the basis that the infinity limit is "never reached for any real system composed of a finite number of elementary systems". In this note we present opposite views on two major points: first, admitting mathematical infinities in a physical theory is not a problem, if properly done; second, the critics of [3,4,5] comes with a major misunderstanding of these papers: they don't ask about "the significance of the transition from classical to quantum mechanics", but they start from a physical ontology where classical and quantum physics need each other from the beginning. This is because they postulate that a microscopic physical object (or degree of freedom) always appears as a quantum system, within a classical context. Here we argue why this (neo-Bohrian) position makes sense.

quant-pharXiv:2512.22965•Dec 30, 2025•0 citations

The quantum worldview

Routledge eBooks•Oct 12, 2012•0 citations
This note is a friendly technical check of Jeffrey Bub's There is No Quantum World (arXiv:2512.18400v2). I flag one unambiguous mathematical slip (a cardinality identity that implicitly assumes the Continuum Hypothesis) and then point out a few places where the discussion of infinite tensor products, ``sectorization,'' and measurement updates would benefit from sharper wording. Nothing here is meant as a critique of Bub's interpretive goals; the aim is simply to separate what is mathematically forced from what depends on choices of algebra, representation, or philosophical stance. I end with a short remark on Philippe Grangier's reply (arXiv:2512.22965v1).
In a recent preprint [1] Jeffrey Bub presents a discussion of neo-Bohrian interpretations of quantum mechanics, and also of von Neumann's work on infinite tensor products [2]. He rightfully writes that this work provides a theoretical framework that deflates the measurement problem and justifies Bohr's insistence on the primacy of classical concepts. But then he rejects these ideas, on the basis that the infinity limit is "never reached for any real system composed of a finite number of elementary systems". In this note we present opposite views on two major points: first, admitting mathematical infinities in a physical theory is not a problem, if properly done; second, the critics of [3,4,5] comes with a major misunderstanding of these papers: they don't ask about "the significance of the transition from classical to quantum mechanics", but they start from a physical ontology where classical and quantum physics need each other from the beginning. This is because they postulate that a microscopic physical object (or degree of freedom) always appears as a quantum system, within a classical context. Here we argue why this (neo-Bohrian) position makes sense.