The Consequences for Metaphysics of Quantum-Mechanics

Craig Callender

Jonas R. Becker Arenhart

Two entities are weakly discernible when an irreflexive and symmetric relation holds between them. That weak discernibility holds in quantum mechanics is fairly uncontroversial nowadays. The ontological consequences of weak discernibility, however, are far from clear. Part of the literature seems to imply that weak discernibility points to a definite metaphysics to quantum mechanics. In this paper we shall discuss the metaphysical contribution of weak discernibility to quantum mechanics and argue that, contrary to part of current literature, it does not provide for a fully naturalistic determination of metaphysics. Underdetermination of the metaphysics still plagues the way of the naturalist.

Peter J. Lewis

Abstract The foundations of quantum mechanics are so contested that it yields few definitive answers to metaphysical questions. So the best we can do is to lay out the various possibilities. The six possibilities considered are as follows: Bohm’s hidden variable theory, particle-only hidden variable theories, the GRW spontaneous collapse theory, spontaneous collapse theories with added three-dimensional ontology, the “flashy” spontaneous collapse theory, and the many-worlds theory. The metaphysical consequences of each of these theories are summarized. Even if quantum mechanics does not settle many ontological questions, it shifts the debate in interesting and fruitful ways. Furthermore, the metaphysical consequences may in some cases reflect back on the tenability of the theories themselves.

Tofigh Allahviranloo, Sovan Samanta, Prasenjit Mandal +1 more

Raoni Wohnrath Arroyo, Renato Semaniuc Valvassori

This article proposes a reading of quantum metaphysical indeterminacy from the perspective of Parsons’ Nuclear Meinongianism. In doing so, we identify a fundamental incompatibility between a key feature of Parsons’ theory and standard quantum mechanics. Our approach interprets quantum indeterminacy as property incompleteness. However, this move, when combined with Parsons’ framework, leads to what we term the “Incompleteness-Entails-Nonexistence Principle” (IENP), which implausibly entails the nonexistence of quantum objects. For Meinongianism to be a suitable tool for the metaphysics of quantum mechanics, this principle must be addressed. We argue for dropping the IENP and discuss the resulting metaphysical and metametaphysical consequences.