In this paper, we pick some less well-known contributions of great minds to the history of ideas from the proceedings of the Solvay Conferences. We hope to show there was nothing inevitable about the new physics winning out. In fact, we suggest modern-day physicists may usefully go back to some of the old ideas – most notably the idea that elementary particles do have some shape and size – and that they should, perhaps, try somewhat harder to explain intrinsic properties of these particles, such as angular momentum and their magnetic moment, in terms of classical physics. The contributions which we discuss are those of Ernest Rutherford, Joseph Larmor, Hendrik Antoon Lorentz and Louis de Broglie.
In this paper, we pick some less well-known contributions of great minds to the history of ideas from the proceedings of the Solvay Conferences. We hope to show there was nothing inevitable about the new physics winning out. In fact, we suggest modern-day physicists may usefully go back to some of the old ideas – most notably the idea that elementary particles do have some shape and size – and that they should, perhaps, try somewhat harder to explain intrinsic properties of these particles, such as angular momentum and their magnetic moment, in terms of classical physics. The contributions which we discuss are those of Ernest Rutherford, Joseph Larmor, Hendrik Antoon Lorentz and Louis de Broglie.
The 1927 Solvay conference was perhaps the most important in the history of quantum theory. Contrary to popular belief, questions of interpretation were not settled at this conference. Instead, a range of sharply conflicting views were extensively discussed, including de Broglie's pilot-wave theory (which de Broglie presented for a many-body system), Born and Heisenberg's 'quantum mechanics' (which apparently lacked wave function collapse or fundamental time evolution), and Schrödinger's wave mechanics. Today, there is no longer a dominant interpretation of quantum theory, so it is important to re-evaluate the historical sources and keep the debate open. This book contains a complete translation of the original proceedings, with essays on the three main interpretations presented, and a detailed analysis of the lectures and discussions in the light of current research. This book will be of interest to graduate students and researchers in physics and in the history and philosophy of quantum theory.
Most students of science and engineering know that every elementary particle, such as electrons, neutrons, photons, neutrinos, etc., has a quantum mechanical property called “spin” which can be measured (perhaps not easily, but at least in principle) and has a quantized value, including zero. The vast majority of these students mentally visualize spin as the angular momentum associated with the elementary particle spinning or rotating about its own axis (like a top or a planetary object). This mental picture, although convenient and comforting, is actually somewhat crude and certainly incomplete. Landau and Lifshitz, in their classic textbook on quantum mechanics [1], wrote “[the spin] property of elementary particles is peculiar to quantum theory.. [It] has no classical interpretation... It would be wholly meaningless to imagine the ‘intrinsic’ angular momentum of an elementary particle as being the result of its rotation about its own axis”.
Capsule history of quantum mechanics Starting in the seventeenth century, and continuing to the present day, physicists developed a body of ideas that describe much about the world around us: the motion of a cannonball, the orbit of a planet, the working of an engine, the crack of a baseball bat. This body of ideas is called classical mechanics . In 1905, Albert Einstein realized that these ideas didn't apply to objects moving at high speeds (that is, at speeds near the speed of light) and he developed an alternative body of ideas called relativistic mechanics . Classical mechanics is wrong in principle, but it is a good approximation to relativistic mechanics when applied to objects moving at low speeds. At about the same time, several experiments led physicists to realize that the classical ideas also didn't apply to very small objects, such as atoms. Over the period 1900–1927 a number of physicists (Planck, Bohr, Einstein, Heisenberg, de Broglie, Schrödinger, and others) developed an alternative quantum mechanics . Classical mechanics is wrong in principle, but it is a good approximation to quantum mechanics when applied to large objects. What is the nature of quantum mechanics? I'm not going to spend any time on the history of quantum mechanics, which is convoluted and fascinating. Instead, I will focus on the ideas developed at the end. What sort of ideas required twenty-eight years of development from this stellar group of scientists? Einstein's theory of relativity is often (and correctly) described as strange and counterintuitive.
The founding fathers of quantum mechanics had already perceived the essence of the difficulties of quantum mechanics; today, after almost a century, the discussions are still lively and, if some very interesting new aspects have emerged, at a deeper level the questions have not changed so much. What is more recent, nevertheless, is a general change of attitude among physicists: until about 1970 or 1980, most physicists thought that the essential questions had been settled, and that “Bohr was right and proved his opponents to be wrong”. This was probably a consequence of the famous discussions between Bohr, Einstein, Schrödinger, Heisenberg, Pauli, de Broglie, and others (in particular at the Solvay meetings [1–3], where Bohr's point of view had successfully resisted Einstein's extremely clever attacks). The majority of physicists did not know the details of the arguments. They nevertheless thought that the standard “Copenhagen interpretation” had clearly emerged from the infancy of quantum mechanics as the only sensible attitude for good scientists. This interpretation includes the idea that modern physics must contain indeterminacy as an essential ingredient: it is fundamentally impossible to predict the outcome of single microscopical events; it is impossible to go beyond the formalism of the wave function (or its generalization, the state vector ∣ψ) and complete it.
The difficulties of the old quantum theory were largely dispelled by the development of quantum mechanics in the 1920s. First Heisenberg (1925) developed the rather abstract matrix mechanics and soon after Schro¨dinger (1926; see also Eckart, 1926) developed the physically more appealing wave mechanics. Subsequently he showed them to be mathematically equivalent. The physicists were greatly relieved; now they had once again a mathematical formalism that enabled the results of experiments to be calculated. It was possible to move forward. It is certainly a very elegant and indeed beautiful formalism, and does enable the results of many physical measurements to be calculated with great accuracy. It is used daily by atomic and nuclear physicists; there is no other way to make calculations. From the earliest days there has been intense debate about the interpretation of quantum mechanics, and it shows no signs of being settled; if anything it is becoming more intense over the years. As Penrose has remarked, no one understands quantum mechanics. Feynman (1967; see also Sykes, 1994) also admitted that ‘nobody understands quantum mechanics’, and Einstein once remarked: ‘I have thought a hundred times as much about the quantum problems as I have about general relativity theory’ (Pais, 1994, p. 57). It should therefore be evident that the most that can be done here is to try to show where the real difficulties lie, and how the failure to recognize that quantum mechanics is an essentially statistical theory has led to a series of confusing quantum paradoxes. It is just these paradoxes that have often been used to support theological speculations. It is useful to ask what ‘understanding quantum mechanics’ actually means. Certainly it means being able to calculate the results of many measurements. The same applies to Newton’s theory of gravitation, which we understand in the sense that we can use it as a basis of calculation, although we do not really understand the gravitational force itself. Very often, especially in modern physics, the mathematical formalism does not give us the sort of intuitive physical feeling for what is going on that we often obtain from classical mechanics. Perhaps we can never achieve more than this for quantum mechanics. In classical mechanics we can assume that a property that is measured objectively exists prior to the interaction of the measuring apparatus with the observed system. Quantum mechanics, however, ‘is incompatible with the proposition that measurement discovers some unknown but pre-existing property’ (Peres, 1997, p. 14). There is an important distinction between mysteries and absurdities. We may be forced to live with mysteries, but there is no reason why we should put up with absurdities such as the wave-particle duality, tunnelling through potential barriers, acausal events and the collapse of the wave function. These are the quantum paradoxes that will be discussed later on. They arise within the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics and are solved by other interpretations. These alternative interpretations enable us to make conjectures about what is going on, even though we cannot understand it in detail. This is acceptable and a stimulus to further research. It is certainly difficult enough to understand quantum mechanics, but there is no need to try to visualize logical absurdities in the effort to do so. Quantum mechanics is a mathematical formalism that makes it possible to calculate the results of some experiments. Anything more than this, such as questions about the interpretation of what is measured and whether it tells us what is actually going on in the system being studied, belongs to philosophy. Thus we are concerned here with what is essentially a philosophical debate; if it were just a matter of physics the debate would have been settled long ago. One of the difficulties is that it invokes the results of experiments and uses the language of quantum mechanics. Inevitably this language uses philosophical terms and then it is easy to give the impression that the philosophical propositions are in some way entailed by the physical results. These in turn can influence theological thinking. In order to be quite clear which arguments are justified and which are not, it is essential to separate the three levels of discourse: physical, philosophical and theological. Our task is to relate these together, and this immediately raises the traditional problems of the philosophy of science, including the relation of experiment to theory, and of theory to explanation. We begin by discussing experiments, distinguishing between those that are real and those that are imaginary.
Abstract This conference was lauded by Heisenberg as, “officially, the completion of the quantum theory,” while Langevin remarked it was, “where the confusion of ideas reached its peak.” The conference was held just as the theory had reached maturity, only two years after Heisenberg’s matrix mechanics was invented. De Broglie argued for his pilot wave theory, which was shot down by Pauli using an incorrect argument and in later years was re-introduced as the de Broglie–Bohm theory. Heisenberg and Dirac debated the meaning of superposition and the “collapse” of the wave function. Bohr and Einstein engaged in their legendary debate. In the conference proceedings, we see the main contributors to the new theory attempt to come to terms with its enigmas.