Remote distribution of secret keys is a challenging task in quantum cryptography. A significant step in this direction is the measurement-device independence quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD). For two remote (or independent) parties Alice and Bob who initially no share secret information, the MDI-QKD enables them to share a secret key by the measurement of an untrusted relay. Unfortunately, the MDI-QKD yields the assumption that the devices of both Alice and Bob have to be trusted. Here, we show that QKD between two independent parties can also be realized even if the device of either Alice or Bob is untrusted. We tackle the problem by resorting to the recently developed one-sided device-independent QKD protocol. We derive conditions on the extracted secret key to be unconditionally secure against arbitary attacks in the limit of asymptotic keys. In the presence of Gaussian states and measurements, we theoretically demonstrate our scheme is feasible, which could be an attractive candidate for long distance secret communication.
Remote distribution of secret keys is a challenging task in quantum cryptography. A significant step in this direction is the measurement-device independence quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD). For two remote (or independent) parties Alice and Bob who initially no share secret information, the MDI-QKD enables them to share a secret key by the measurement of an untrusted relay. Unfortunately, the MDI-QKD yields the assumption that the devices of both Alice and Bob have to be trusted. Here, we show that QKD between two independent parties can also be realized even if the device of either Alice or Bob is untrusted. We tackle the problem by resorting to the recently developed one-sided device-independent QKD protocol. We derive conditions on the extracted secret key to be unconditionally secure against arbitary attacks in the limit of asymptotic keys. In the presence of Gaussian states and measurements, we theoretically demonstrate our scheme is feasible, which could be an attractive candidate for long distance secret communication.
Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) protocol was proposed to remove all the detector side channel attacks, while its security relies on the trusted encoding systems. Here we propose a one-sided MDI-QKD (1SMDI-QKD) protocol, which enjoys detection loophole-free advantage, and at the same time weakens the state preparation assumption in MDI-QKD. The 1SMDI-QKD can be regarded as a modified MDI-QKD, in which Bob's encoding system is trusted, while Alice's is uncharacterized. For the practical implementation, we also provide a scheme by utilizing coherent light source with an analytical two decoy state estimation method. Simulation with realistic experimental parameters shows that the protocol has a promising performance, and thus can be applied to practical QKD applications.
Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI QKD) is an efficient way to share secrets using untrusted measurement devices. However, the assumption on the characterizations of encoding states is still necessary in this promising protocol, which may lead to unnecessary complexity and potential loopholes in realistic implementations. Here, by using the mismatched-basis statistics, we present the first proof-of-principle experiment of MDI QKD with uncharacterized encoding sources. In this demonstration, the encoded states are only required to be constrained in a two-dimensional Hilbert space, and two distant parties (Alice and Bob) are resistant to state preparation flaws even if they have no idea about the detailed information of their encoding states. The positive final secure key rates of our system exhibit the feasibility of this novel protocol, and demonstrate its value for the application of secure communication with uncharacterized devices.
Abstract Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a technique enabling provable secure communication but faces challenges in device characterisation, posing potential security risks. Device-independent (DI) QKD protocols overcome this issue by making minimal device assumptions but are limited in distance because they require high detection efficiencies, which refer to the ability of the experimental setup to detect quantum states. It is thus desirable to find QKD protocols that are based on realistic assumptions on the devices as well as implementable over long distances. In this work, we consider a one-sided DI QKD scheme with two measurements per party and show that it is secure against coherent attacks up to detection efficiencies greater than 50.1% specifically on the untrusted side. This is almost the theoretical limit achievable for protocols with two untrusted measurements. Interestingly, we also show that, by placing the source of states close to the untrusted side, our protocol is secure over distances comparable to standard QKD protocols.
The security of practical quantum key distribution (QKD) systems is fundamentally constrained by vulnerabilities of single-photon detectors. Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) was proposed to remove this limitation by allowing all measurements to be performed by a completely untrusted party, under the assumption that the measurement node can be treated as adversarial but does not compromise the security guarantees of the protocol.
Here we show that this assumption is insufficient under realistic adversarial control of the measurement device. We present an attack in which an adversary exploits active control of the measurement node (Charlie) to obtain significant information about the secret key. The attack enables recovery of up to 70\% of the sifted key while introducing only 5.6\% quantum bit error rate. Unlike previously reported attacks targeting specific implementations of MDI-QKD, our results demonstrate a limitation of the standard security model underlying the protocol.
These findings indicate that additional constraints on the measurement-device independence assumption, or refined security analyses incorporating stronger adversarial capabilities, are required to ensure the security of MDI-QKD in realistic scenarios.
Measurement-device-independent quantum cryptographic conferencing (MDI-QCC) protocol puts MDI quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) forwards to multi-party applications, and suggests a significant framework for practical multi-party quantum communication. In order to mitigate the experimental complexity of MDI-QCC and remove the key assumption (the sources are trusted) in MDI-QCC, we extend the framework of MDI-QKD with an untrusted source to MDI-QCC and give the rigorous security analysis of MDI-QCC with an untrusted source. What is more, in the security analysis we clearly provide a rigorous analytical method for parameters’ estimation, which with simple modifications can be applied to not only MDI-QKD with an untrusted source but also arbitrary multi-party communication protocol with an untrusted source. The simulation results show that at reasonable distances the asymptotic key rates for the two cases (with trusted and untrusted sources) almost overlap, which indicates the feasibility of our protocol.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) enables two legitimate parties to share a secret key even in the presence of an eavesdropper. The unconditional security of QKD is based on the fundamental laws of quantum physics. Original security proofs of QKD are based on a few assumptions, e.g., perfect single photon sources and perfect single-photon detectors. However, practical implementations of QKD systems do not fully comply with such assumptions due to technical limitations. The gap between theory and implementations leads to security loopholes in most QKD systems, and several attacks have been launched on sophisticated QKD systems. Particularly, the detectors have been found to be the most vulnerable part of QKD. Much effort has been put to build side-channel-free QKD systems. Solutions such as security patches and device-independent QKD have been proposed. However, the former are normally ad-hoc, and cannot close unidentified loopholes. The latter, while having the advantages of removing all assumptions on devices, is impractical to implement today. Measurement-device-independent QKD (MDI-QKD) turns out to be a promising solution to the security problem of QKD. In MDI-QKD, all security loopholes, including those yet-to-be discovered, have been removed from the detectors, the most critical part in QKD. In this thesis, we investigate issues related to the practical implementation and security of MDI-QKD. We first present a demonstration of polarization-encoding MDI-QKD. Taking finite key effect into account, we achieve a secret key rate of 0.005 bit per second (bps) over 10 km spooled telecom fiber, and a 1600-bit key is distributed. This work, together with other demonstrations, shows the practicality of MDI-QKD. Next we investigate a critical assumption of MDI-QKD: perfect state preparation. We apply the loss-tolerant QKD protocol and adapt it to MDI-QKD to quantify information leakage due to imperfect state preparation. We then present an experimental demonstration of MDI-QKD over 10 km and 40 km of spooled fiber, which for the first time considers the impact of inaccurate polarization state preparation on the secret key rate. This would not have been possible under previous security proofs, given the same amount of state preparation flaws.