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Lecture notes in computer science

Determining the Core Primitive for Optimally Secure Ratcheting

Fatih Balli, Paul Rösler, Serge Vaudenay B

Published Jan 1, 2020• 31 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-3-030-64840-4_21

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In the application of traditional cryptography,people always assume that the endpoints are secure and the adversary is on the communication channel.However,the prevalence of malware and system vulnerabilities makes endpoint compromise a se-rious and immediate threat.For example,it is vulnerable to various attacks such as memory content being destroyed by viruses,randomness generator being corrupted,etc.What's worse,protocol sessions usually have a long lifetime,so they need to store session-related secret information for a long time.In this situation,it becomes essential to design high-strength security protocols even in the setting where the memory contents and intermediate values of computation (including the randomness) can be exposed.Ratchet key exchange is a basic tool to solve this problem.In this paper,we overview the definition,model and construction of ratchet key exchange,including unidirectional ratcheted key exchange,sesquidirectional ratcheted key exchange and bidirectionalratcheted key exchange,and prospect the future development of ratchet key exchange.
Signal is a new security protocol and accompanying app that provides end-to-end encryption for instant messaging. The core protocol has recently been adopted by WhatsApp, Facebook Messenger, and Google Allo among many others, the first two of these have at least 1 billion active users. Signal includes several uncommon security properties (such as "future secrecy" or "post-compromise security"), enabled by a novel technique called ratcheting in which session keys are updated with every message sent. Despite its importance and novelty, there has been little to no academic analysis of the Signal protocol. We conduct the first security analysis of Signal's key agreement and double ratchet as a multi-stage key exchange protocol. We extract from the implementation a formal description of the abstract protocol, and define a security model which can capture the "ratcheting" key update structure. We then prove the security of Signal's core in our model, demonstrating several standard security properties. We have found no major flaws in the design, and hope that our presentation and results can serve as a starting point for other analyses of this widely adopted protocol.