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World Symposium on Communication Engineering (WSCE)

Double Layers Quantum Key Distribution with Ability to Against PNS Attacks

Thanawat Phattaraworamet, Phichai Youplao

Published Dec 1, 2019• 2 citations
Publisher

Abstract

This paper presents a modified quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol with its advantage ability to against the photon number splitting (PNS) strategy. As a result of the proposed protocol with the specified parameters of k = 1024 bits, y = 10 bits, and the round repeating of n = 10, the eavesdropper can achieve the correct information with a probability of only 1.97×10-31. Moreover, the proposed protocol allows each the photon pulse can consist of a few of photons, which is valuable to the maximize photon number of μ=1 and resulting in a significant higher useful bit rate. From the simulation results, the obtained useful bits rates for each the photon pulse of 800 nm, 1300 nm, and 1550 nm, are approximately of 242.2 kbit/s, 7.4 Mbit/s, and 119.8 kBit/s, can be achieved at the distances of 20 km, 60 km, and 120 km, respectively. The QKD system parameters for each the considered wavelength are specified as: the photon pulses rate of 1 GHz and 10 GHz, the photon number of μ=0.1 and 1.0, The attenuations of 2.0, 0.35, and 0.25 dB/km, the detector efficiencies of 50%, 20%, and 10%, with the dark count probabilities of 10-7, 10-5, and 10-5, respectively. The potential of using such the proposed protocol with a double layers QKD system is performed and discussed.

DOI
10.1109/wsce49000.2019.9041023

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This paper presents a modified quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol with its advantage ability to against the photon number splitting (PNS) strategy. As a result of the proposed protocol with the specified parameters of k = 1024 bits, y = 10 bits, and the round repeating of n = 10, the eavesdropper can achieve the correct information with a probability of only 1.97×10-31. Moreover, the proposed protocol allows each the photon pulse can consist of a few of photons, which is valuable to the maximize photon number of μ=1 and resulting in a significant higher useful bit rate. From the simulation results, the obtained useful bits rates for each the photon pulse of 800 nm, 1300 nm, and 1550 nm, are approximately of 242.2 kbit/s, 7.4 Mbit/s, and 119.8 kBit/s, can be achieved at the distances of 20 km, 60 km, and 120 km, respectively. The QKD system parameters for each the considered wavelength are specified as: the photon pulses rate of 1 GHz and 10 GHz, the photon number of μ=0.1 and 1.0, The attenuations of 2.0, 0.35, and 0.25 dB/km, the detector efficiencies of 50%, 20%, and 10%, with the dark count probabilities of 10-7, 10-5, and 10-5, respectively. The potential of using such the proposed protocol with a double layers QKD system is performed and discussed.
This paper introduces a modified quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol based on card-shuffling, designed to enhance security against eavesdropper photon number splitting (PNS) strategies. The proposed technique accommodates light pulses with few photons, substantially augmenting the effectiveness and reliability of QKD. It can be implemented as multi-photon-lane systems, enabling concurrent key distribution to multiple users or amalgamation of key data to amplify individual use r key rates. The study assesses the proposed technique utilizing three well-established polarization-encrypted QKD protocols, BB84, B92, and SSP99, and simulations utilizing 4-photon lane systems with wavelengths of 800 nm, 1300 nm, and 1550 nm. The findings, encompassing correlations such as useful key rate, maximum key distribution distance, quantum bit error rate, and photon number probability, are analyzed and compared under different conditions. The outcomes reveal that combining the technique with BB84-based systems employing 1300 nm light pulses and a photon number probability of 1.0 attains a maximum QKD effectiveness of 12.34 Gbit-km/s. Moreover, the effectiveness can be increased to 49.36 Gbit-km/s by implementing the proposed 4-photon-lane system as the serial key-combining scheme. The potential of using multi-photon-lane implementations alongside the proposed technique to enhance the effectiveness and reliability of QKD is theoretically investigated and discussed.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is an innovative technology, which exploits the laws of quantum mechanics to generate and distribute unconditionally secure shared cryptographic keying material between two geographically separated parties. The unique nature of QKD that ensures eavesdropping on the key distribution channel necessarily introduces detectable errors and shows promise for high-security environments, such as banking, government, and military. However, QKD systems are vulnerable to advanced theoretical and experimental attacks. In this paper, the photon number splitting (PNS) attack is studied in a specialized QKD modeling and simulation framework. First, a detailed treatment of the PNS attack is provided with emphasis on practical considerations, such as performance limitations and realistic sources of error. Second, ideal and non-ideal variations of the PNS attack are studied to measure the eavesdropper's information gain on the QKD-generated secret key bits and examine the detectability of PNS attacks with respect to both quantum bit error rate and the decoy state protocol. Finally, this paper provides a repeatable methodology for efficiently studying advanced attacks, both realized and notional, against QKD systems and more generally quantum communication protocols.
In the last ten years, quantum computing has made substantial progress, presenting a strong challenge to traditional encryption methods that depend on solving discrete algorithmic problems. With the advent of the quantum era, conventional encryption methods are becoming more susceptible to attacks. This paper investigates possible attacks that exploit vulnerabilities in quantum cryptography, specifically investigating weaknesses in quantum key distribution (QKD) systems. The text thoroughly explores advanced attack strategies of photon number splitting highlight the existing vulnerabilities. The goal is to highlight the need for strong safeguards to protect against these threats, which requires continuous research and development to improve the robustness of quantum cryptography algorithms. The experimental investigation includes analyzing crucial parameters, including quantum channel length, loss, QKD protocol, quantum bit error rate (QBER), signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), as well as attack parameters such as probability of photon number splitting (PNS), eavesdropper distance, and detection efficiency. The evaluation includes performance indicators such as secure key rate, quantum bit error rate (QBER) vs distance, vulnerability to photon number splitting (PNS) attacks, and the influence on the pace of key generation.
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is one of the most promising technologies that enable theoretically unbreakable secure communications in this highly advanced information security era. This work provides a comparative analysis of QKD protocols such as BB84, Coherent One-Way (COW), and Differential Phase-Shift (DPS) against eavesdropping attacks e.g., Photon Number Splitting (PNS) attack. It employs a realistic approach to simulations such as using weak coherent pulse (WCP) sources. This work also explores qubit generation and the whole key distribution process in non-ideal conditions. Detailed algorithms have been discussed that simulate the encoding, transmission, and decoding process for every protocol, as well as simulating PNS attacks where an eavesdropper removes photons to gain key information without any detectable errors. Statistical metrics, such as Visibility and the information gain, are used to quantify the impact of these attacks. Future work aspects may include the extension of the simulation to incorporate additional parameters such as channel noise, fiber attenuation, detector dark counts, etc. to provide a realistic analysis to compare various QKD protocols.
A photon-number-splitting (PNS) attack against differential-phase-shift (DPS) quantum key distribution (QKD) is described. In the conventional 1984 Bennett-Brassard protocol, using weak laser light, the PNS attacks, which involve installing a lossless transmission line and blocking pulses from which extra photons cannot be picked up, impose a limit on the transmission distance. In contrast, use of a coherent pulse train in DPS QKD prevents the PNS attack and removes the distance limitation imposed by it. We carried out a DPS QKD experiment that simulated the situation where some pulses are blocked. The result showed that extra bit errors are induced in an eavesdropped condition, indicating the robustness of DPS QKD against PNS attacks.
Physical implementations of quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols, like the Bennett-Brassard (BB84), are forced to use attenuated coherent quantum states, because the sources of single photon states are not functional yet for QKD applications. However, when using attenuated coherent states, the relatively high rate of multi-photonic pulses introduces vulnerabilities that can be exploited by the photon number splitting (PNS) attack to brake the quantum key. Some QKD protocols have been developed to be resistant to the PNS attack, like the decoy method, but those define a single photonic gain in the quantum channel. To overcome this limitation, we have developed a new QKD protocol, called ack-QKD, which is resistant to the PNS attack. Even more, it uses attenuated quantum states, but defines two interleaved photonic quantum flows to detect the eavesdropper activity by means of the quantum photonic error gain (QPEG) or the quantum bit error rate (QBER). The physical implementation of the ack-QKD is similar to the well-known BB84 protocol.