The problem of mind and consciousness cannot be treated as an object of science without much difficulty. Inevitably there is the self-contradiction that the work itself in science and thinking is an object of thought. In this meaning, we need to get back to the fundamental problem of how the world is perceived. The fundamental concept of quantum theory includes essentially unsolved problems such as the observation problem. In this paper, we begin to consider this fundamental problem in quantum theory and discuss the possibility of a description of mind in terms of quantum theory.
The existence of ontologically different but empirically indistinguishable versions of non-relativistic quantum mechanics is one of the most serious and widely discussed cases of metaphysical underdetermination. I argue that this problem is unlikely to disappear when we turn to the next more fundamental theory, namely relativistic quantum field theory. The problem is merely overshadowed by yet another interpretational controversy, but it persists regardless of the outcome of this latter debate. I further argue that one should not be too optimistic about transferring ontological lessons learned in the context of one physical theory to the context of a more fundamental theory.