Industrial Internet-of-Things (IIoT) is the basis of Industry 4.0, which extends Internet connectivity beyond traditional computing devices like computers and smartphones to the physical world for improving efficiency and accuracy while reducing the production cost. However, there are tremendous security threats to IIoT, such as IIoT device hijacking and data leaks. Therefore, a lightweight authenticated key agreement (AKA) protocol is commonly applied to establish a session key for securing the communication between IIoT devices. To protect the previous session keys from being compromised, perfect forward secrecy (PFS) has been one of the most important security properties of AKA. In this article, we present an efficient PFS-enabled AKA protocol for IIoT systems, which is developed based on a new dynamic authentication credential (DAC) framework, without using any public-key cryptographic primitives. It is worth noting that our protocol is also faster than the state-of-the-art DAC-based AKA protocols with PFS. Moreover, we give the formal security result of the proposed protocol in the random oracle model.
Industrial Internet-of-Things (IIoT) is the basis of Industry 4.0, which extends Internet connectivity beyond traditional computing devices like computers and smartphones to the physical world for improving efficiency and accuracy while reducing the production cost. However, there are tremendous security threats to IIoT, such as IIoT device hijacking and data leaks. Therefore, a lightweight authenticated key agreement (AKA) protocol is commonly applied to establish a session key for securing the communication between IIoT devices. To protect the previous session keys from being compromised, perfect forward secrecy (PFS) has been one of the most important security properties of AKA. In this article, we present an efficient PFS-enabled AKA protocol for IIoT systems, which is developed based on a new dynamic authentication credential (DAC) framework, without using any public-key cryptographic primitives. It is worth noting that our protocol is also faster than the state-of-the-art DAC-based AKA protocols with PFS. Moreover, we give the formal security result of the proposed protocol in the random oracle model.
Security in the Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) is vital as there are some cases where IIoT devices collect sensory information for crucial social production and life. Thus, designing secure and efficient communication channels is always a research hotspot. However, end devices have memory, computation, and power-supplying capacities limitations. Moreover, perfect forward secrecy (PFS), which means that long-term key exposure still discloses previous session keys, is a critical security property for authentication and key exchange (AKE). This article proposes an AKE protocol named SAKE* for the IIoT environment, where two types of keys (i.e., a master key and an evolution key) guarantee PFS. In addition, the SAKE* protocol merely uses concatenation, XOR, and hash-function operations to achieve lightweight authentication, key exchange, and message integrity. We also compare the SAKE* protocol with seven current and IoT-related authentication protocols regarding security properties and performance. Comparison results indicate that the SAKE* protocol consumes the least computation resource and third-least communication cost among eight AKE protocols while equipping 12 security properties.
The Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) is the application of the Internet of Things (IoT) in the industrial field. IIoT allows users to remotely access industrial equipment and the data in it, which also brings certain challenges to the security of industrial data. Authentication and key agreement protocols are very effective security technologies in the matter of protecting industrial data. There is a large amount of research work on authentication protocols in IIoT, but most of the protocols have security weaknesses. Recently, Rafique et al. proposed a multi-factor protocol in IIoT that can accomplish authentication and session key establishment through a gateway. Rafique et al. claimed that their protocol is secure, unfortunately, we carefully analyze the protocol of Rafique et al. and find some security flaws, i.e., it is vulnerable to insider attack and known session-specific temporary information (KSSTI) attack, and unable to provide forward security. We explore the factors of insecurity and propose an enhanced multi-factor secure authentication and key agreement protocol in IIoT. The new protocol improves the security of the protocol while using only symmetric cryptography, hash function, and XOR operation. Formal security analysis and informal security discussions demonstrate that the new protocol is resistant to a variety of known attacks. After performance analysis, our protocol has lower computational cost, and increases no significant communication cost, while providing more secure and robust properties.
Due to the openness of communication channels and the sensitivity of the data being collected and transmitted, securing data access and communication in IoT systems requires robust ECC-based authentication and key agreement (AKA) protocols. However, designing an AKA protocol for IoT presents significant challenges, as most IoT sensors are deployed in resource-constrained, unattended environments with limited computational power, connectivity, and storage. To achieve anonymous authentication, existing solutions typically rely on shared temporary public keys to mask device IDs or validate sender certificates, which increases the computational overhead. Furthermore, these protocols often fail to address crucial security concerns, such as nonresistance to ephemeral secret leakage (ESL) attacks and a lack of perfect forward security. To mitigate the computational burden, we propose a dynamic authenticated credentials (DACs) synchronization framework for anonymous authentication. Then, we introduce an ECC-based AKA scheme that employs DACs in place of temporary public keys or sender credentials, enabling efficient and secure anonymous authentication. The security of the proposed protocol was rigorously verified under the Real-or-Oracle model and validated using ProVerif. Performance comparisons demonstrate that our scheme offered significant improvements in security, with an over 37% reduction in communication cost and computational overhead.
Anonymity, robust synchronization, and perfect forward secrecy are the most important security properties of authenticated key agreement (AKA) protocols. Designing AKA protocols that simultaneously achieve these security properties and availability in the IoT environment is a challenging task. AKA protocols built using public key cryptographic primitives have advantages in achieving these critical security properties, but performing expensive public-key cryptographic operations is inefficient for resource-constrained IoT devices. The authentication protocols based on symmetric cryptographic primitives are often subject to various attacks. This paper proposes a secure lightweight AKA protocol with critical security properties (called CS-LAKA) for IoT environments without using public-key cryptographic primitives. LAKA cleverly achieves the security goals of anonymity, robust synchronization, and perfect forward secrecy by embedding dynamic identities in authenticators, and a few additional exchange messages are added. This enables LAKA to have both robust security and high efficiency. Subsequently, we perform a formal security analysis to prove that LAKA is secure, and compared with existing related schemes, LAKA has obvious advantages in terms of security, functionality and running performance.
With the significant development of the Internet, Internet of Things (IoT) has become an emerging technology in many industries. To support security and privacy in the Industrial IoT environment, a user may interact with another user on the Internet to share confidential information, which requires an authenticated communication channel. To meet this demand, in this article the authors developed an identity-based two-party authenticated key agreement (ID-2PAKA) protocol that allows two users to communicate securely and share sensitive data across IoT-enabled regions. Similar protocols found in the literature either proven to be insecure or carry the burden of high communication and computational costs. The proposed ID-2PAKA protocol is analyzed in the random oracle model to achieve provable security based on the hardness assumptions of computational Diffie-Hellman and bilinear Diffie-Hellman problems. The performance analysis of the proposed ID-2PAKA protocol is performed using the pairing-based cryptography library. The comparative results from the perspective of the computation and communication costs against the competing protocols showed that the proposed ID-2PAKA protocol is secure and efficient.
Internet of Things brings convenience to the social life, at the same time, putting forward higher requirements for the security of data transmission and storage. Security incidents based on industrial Internet of Things have occurred frequently recently, which should be given full consideration. The identity-based authenticated key agreement protocol can solve these security threats to a certain extent. Recently, a lightweight identity-based authenticated key agreement protocol for Industrial Internet of Things, called ID-2PAKA protocol, was claimed to achieve secure authentication and meet security properties. In this paper, we show that the ID-2PAKA protocol is insecure in identity authentication and cannot resisting ephemeral key compromise impersonation attack.