From correspondence to complementarity: The emergence of Bohr's Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics

Arkady Plotnitsky

Reza Maleeh, Parisa Amani

In this article, we argue that although Bohr's version of the Copenhagen interpretation is in line with several key elements of logical positivism, pragmatism is the closest approximation to a classification of the Copenhagen interpretation, whether or not pragmatists directly influenced the key figures of the interpretation. Pragmatism already encompasses important elements of operationalism and logical positivism, especially the liberalized Carnapian reading of logical positivism. We suggest that some elements of the Copenhagen interpretation, which are in line with logical positivism, are also supported by pragmatism. Some of these elements are empirical realism, fallibilism, holism, and instrumentalism. However, pragmatism goes beyond logical positivism in espousing some other key elements of the Copenhagen interpretation, though imperfectly, such as the correspondence principle, complementarity, and indeterminism.

de Wm Willem Muynck, Michel Willem

In the past both instrumentalism and empiricism have inspired certain pragmatic elements into the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. The relation of such pragmatisms with the correspondence principle is discussed. It is argued that neither Bohr nor Heisenberg did take ‘correspondence’ in one of these forms, and that it, in particular, was Bohr’s classical attitude which caused him to apply in an inconsistent way his correspondence principle to the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen experiment, thus causing much confusion. It is demonstrated that an empiricist pragmatism is conducive to an explanation of violation of the Bell inequalities as a consequence of ‘complementarity’ in the sense of ‘mutual disturbance in a joint nonideal measurement of incompatible observables’ rather than as being caused by ‘nonlocal influences’.

Mara Beller

Willem M. de Muynck

In the past both instrumentalism and empiricism have inspired certain pragmatic elements into the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. The relation of such pragmatisms with the correspondence principle is discussed. It is argued that neither Bohr nor Heisenberg did take `correspondence' in one of these forms, and that it, in particular, was Bohr's classical attitude which caused him to apply in an inconsistent way his correspondence principle to the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen experiment, thus causing much confusion. It is demonstrated that an empiricist pragmatism is conducive to an explanation of violation of the Bell inequalities as a consequence of `complementarity' in the sense of `mutual disturbance in a joint nonideal measurement of incompatible observables' rather than as being caused by `nonlocal influences'.

Jeffrey Bub