Attacking post-quantum cryptography

xie lu, Tao Zheng, Ran Ge +3 more

With the rapid development of quantum technology, quantum attacks have provided global countries with a new perspective to view this new technological storm. Cryptography, as the cornerstone of Internet security and trust, will open a new chapter of cryptography in the context of the new era in the challenges brought by quantum attacks. Post-quantum cryptography has thus developed rapidly. This paper focuses on the research of post-quantum cryptography technology, analyzing the current development status and challenges of post-quantum cryptography, exploring from the perspective of basic telecommunications operators the scenarios and key technical points that post-quantum cryptography should have in 5G and evolved networks, and deeply explores the significance and value of post-quantum cryptography applications based on technology and compliance metrics, so as to provide technical reference for post-quantum cryptography applications.

Tsuyoshi Takagi, Tanja Lange

Michele Mosca

Adarsh Kumar, Carlo Ottaviani, Sukhpal Singh Gill +1 more

Abstract Traditional and lightweight cryptography primitives and protocols are insecure against quantum attacks. Thus, a real‐time application using traditional or lightweight cryptography primitives and protocols does not ensure full‐proof security. Post‐quantum cryptography is important for the internet of things (IoT) due to its security against quantum attacks. This paper offers a broad literature analysis of post‐quantum cryptography for IoT networks, including the challenges and research directions to adopt in real‐time applications. The work draws focus towards post‐quantum cryptosystems that are useful for resource‐constraint devices. Further, those quantum attacks are surveyed, which may occur over traditional and lightweight cryptographic primitives.

S. Yu. Mikhnevich, P. I. Hladun

The process of selecting post-quantum cryptography algorithms for standardization based on parameters proposed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is described. The resistance of post-quantum cryptography algorithms to attacks by classical and quantum computers is assessed, taking into account their specific features. The different numbers of operations for attacks by quantum and classical computers are substantiated. The parallelization potential of post-quantum cryptography algorithms is analyzed. It is noted that, despite the proposed use of quantum computers, the primary goal of cryptography is the application of algorithms based on problems that are not reducible to problems of P-class complexity.

Bo‐Yin Yang