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Analytic quantum weak coin flipping protocols with arbitrarily small bias

Atul Singh Arora, Jérémie Roland, Chrysoula Vlachou

Published Jan 1, 2021• 6 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Weak coin flipping (WCF) is a fundamental cryptographic primitive for two-party secure computation, where two distrustful parties need to remotely establish a shared random bit whilst having opposite preferred outcomes. It is the strongest known primitive with arbitrarily close to perfect security quantumly while classically, its security is completely compromised (unless one makes further assumptions, such as computational hardness). A WCF protocol is said to have bias ∊ if neither party can force their preferred outcome with probability greater than 1/2 + ∊. Classical WCF protocols are shown to have bias 1/2, i.e., a cheating party can always force their preferred outcome. On the other hand, there exist quantum WCF protocols with arbitrarily small bias, as Mochon showed in his seminal work in 2007 [arXiv:0711.4114]. In particular, he proved the existence of a family of WCF protocols approaching bias ∊(k) = 1/(4k +2) for arbitrarily large k and proposed a protocol with bias 1/6. Last year, Arora, Roland and Weis presented a protocol with bias 1/10 and to go below this bias, they designed an algorithm that numerically constructs unitary matrices corresponding to WCF protocols with arbitrarily small bias [STOC'19, p. 205–216]. In this work, we present new techniques which yield a fully analytical construction of WCF protocols with bias arbitrarily close to zero, thus achieving a solution that has been missing for more than a decade. Furthermore, our new techniques lead to a simplified proof of existence of WCF protocols by circumventing the non-constructive part of Mochon's proof. As an example, we illustrate the construction of a WCF protocol with bias 1/14.

DOI
10.1137/1.9781611976465.58

Related papers

Analytic quantum weak coin flipping protocols with arbitrarily small bias

Atul Singh Arora, Jérémie Roland, Chrysoula Vlachou

Weak coin flipping (WCF) is a fundamental cryptographic primitive for two-party secure computation, where two distrustful parties need to remotely establish a shared random bit whilst having opposite preferred outcomes. It is the strongest known primitive with arbitrarily close to perfect security quantumly while classically, its security is completely compromised (unless one makes further assumptions, such as computational hardness). A WCF protocol is said to have bias $\epsilon$ if neither party can force their preferred outcome with probability greater than $1/2+\epsilon$. Classical WCF protocols are shown to have bias $1/2$, i.e., a cheating party can always force their preferred outcome. On the other hand, there exist quantum WCF protocols with arbitrarily small bias, as Mochon showed in his seminal work in 2007 [arXiv:0711.4114]. In particular, he proved the existence of a family of WCF protocols approaching bias $\epsilon (k)=1/(4k+2)$ for arbitrarily large $k$ and proposed a protocol with bias $1/6$. Last year, Arora, Roland and Weis presented a protocol with bias $1/10$ and to go below this bias, they designed an algorithm that numerically constructs unitary matrices corresponding to WCF protocols with arbitrarily small bias [STOC'19, p.205-216]. In this work, we present new techniques which yield a fully analytical construction of WCF protocols with bias arbitrarily close to zero, thus achieving a solution that has been missing for more than a decade. Furthermore, our new techniques lead to a simplified proof of existence of WCF protocols by circumventing the non-constructive part of Mochon's proof. As an example, we illustrate the construction of a WCF protocol with bias $1/14$.

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Quantum Weak Coin Flipping

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We investigate weak coin flipping, a fundamental cryptographic primitive where two distrustful parties need to remotely establish a shared random bit. A cheating player can try to bias the output bit towards a preferred value. For weak coin flipping the players have known opposite preferred values. A weak coin-flipping protocol has a bias $\epsilon$ if neither player can force the outcome towards their preferred value with probability more than $\frac{1}{2}+\epsilon$. While it is known that all classical protocols have $\epsilon=\frac{1}{2}$, Mochon showed in 2007 [arXiv:0711.4114] that quantumly weak coin flipping can be achieved with arbitrarily small bias (near perfect) but the best known explicit protocol has bias $1/6$ (also due to Mochon, 2005 [Phys. Rev. A 72, 022341]). We propose a framework to construct new explicit protocols achieving biases below $1/6$. In particular, we construct explicit unitaries for protocols with bias approaching $1/10$. To go below, we introduce what we call the Elliptic Monotone Align (EMA) algorithm which, together with the framework, allows us to numerically construct protocols with arbitrarily small biases.

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Atul Singh Arora, Jérémie Roland, Stephan Weis

We investigate weak coin flipping, a fundamental cryptographic primitive where two distrustful parties need to remotely establish a shared random bit. A cheating player can try to bias the output bit towards a preferred value. For weak coin flipping the players have known opposite preferred values. A weak coin-flipping protocol has a bias є if neither player can force the outcome towards their preferred value with probability more than 1/2+є. While it is known that all classical protocols have є=1/2, Mochon showed in 2007 that quantumly weak coin flipping can be achieved with arbitrarily small bias (near perfect) but the former best known explicit protocol has bias 1/6 (also due to Mochon, 2005). We propose a framework to construct new explicit protocols achieving biases below 1/6. In particular, we construct explicit unitaries for protocols with bias down to 1/10. To go lower, we introduce what we call the Elliptic Monotone Align (EMA) algorithm which, together with the framework, allows us to construct protocols with arbitrarily small biases.

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Weak coin flipping is an important cryptographic primitive$\unicode{x2013}$it is the strongest known secure two-party computation primitive that classically becomes secure only under certain assumptions (e.g. computational hardness), while quantumly there exist protocols that achieve arbitrarily close to perfect security. This breakthrough result was established by Mochon in 2007 [arXiv:0711.4114]. However, his proof relied on the existence of certain unitary operators which was established by a non-constructive argument. Consequently, explicit protocols have remained elusive. In this work, we give exact constructions of related unitary operators. These, together with a new formalism, yield a family of protocols approaching perfect security thereby also simplifying Mochon's proof of existence. We illustrate the construction of explicit weak coin flipping protocols by considering concrete examples (from the aforementioned family of protocols) that are more secure than all previously known protocols. 76 pages. This is the TheoretiCS journal version

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As in modern communication networks, the security of quantum networks will rely on complex cryptographic tasks that are based on a handful of fundamental primitives. Weak coin flipping (WCF) is a significant such primitive which allows two mistrustful parties to agree on a random bit while they favor opposite outcomes. Remarkably, perfect information-theoretic security can be achieved in principle for quantum WCF. Here, we overcome conceptual and practical issues that have prevented the experimental demonstration of this primitive to date, and demonstrate how quantum resources can provide cheat sensitivity, whereby each party can detect a cheating opponent, and an honest party is never sanctioned. Such a property is not known to be classically achievable with information-theoretic security. Our experiment implements a refined, loss-tolerant version of a recently proposed theoretical protocol and exploits heralded single photons generated by spontaneous parametric down conversion, a carefully optimized linear optical interferometer including beam splitters with variable reflectivities and a fast optical switch for the verification step. High values of our protocol benchmarks are maintained for attenuation corresponding to several kilometers of telecom optical fiber.

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Experimental cheat-sensitive quantum weak coin flipping

Simon Neves, Verena Yacoub, Ulysse Chabaud +3 more

As in modern communication networks, the security of quantum networks will rely on complex cryptographic tasks that are based on a handful of fundamental primitives. Weak coin flipping (WCF) is a significant such primitive which allows two mistrustful parties to agree on a random bit while they favor opposite outcomes. Remarkably, perfect information-theoretic security can be achieved in principle for quantum WCF. Here, we overcome conceptual and practical issues that have prevented the experimental demonstration of this primitive to date, and demonstrate how quantum resources can provide cheat sensitivity, whereby each party can detect a cheating opponent, and an honest party is never sanctioned. Such a property is not known to be classically achievable with information-theoretic security. Our experiment implements a refined, loss-tolerant version of a recently proposed theoretical protocol and exploits heralded single photons generated by spontaneous parametric down conversion, a carefully optimized linear optical interferometer including beam splitters with variable reflectivities and a fast optical switch for the verification step. High values of our protocol benchmarks are maintained for attenuation corresponding to several kilometers of telecom optical fiber.

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Weak coin flipping (WCF) is a fundamental cryptographic primitive for two-party secure computation, where two distrustful parties need to remotely establish a shared random bit whilst having opposite preferred outcomes. It is the strongest known primitive with arbitrarily close to perfect security quantumly while classically, its security is completely compromised (unless one makes further assumptions, such as computational hardness). A WCF protocol is said to have bias ∊ if neither party can force their preferred outcome with probability greater than 1/2 + ∊. Classical WCF protocols are shown to have bias 1/2, i.e., a cheating party can always force their preferred outcome. On the other hand, there exist quantum WCF protocols with arbitrarily small bias, as Mochon showed in his seminal work in 2007 [arXiv:0711.4114]. In particular, he proved the existence of a family of WCF protocols approaching bias ∊(k) = 1/(4k +2) for arbitrarily large k and proposed a protocol with bias 1/6. Last year, Arora, Roland and Weis presented a protocol with bias 1/10 and to go below this bias, they designed an algorithm that numerically constructs unitary matrices corresponding to WCF protocols with arbitrarily small bias [STOC'19, p. 205–216]. In this work, we present new techniques which yield a fully analytical construction of WCF protocols with bias arbitrarily close to zero, thus achieving a solution that has been missing for more than a decade. Furthermore, our new techniques lead to a simplified proof of existence of WCF protocols by circumventing the non-constructive part of Mochon's proof. As an example, we illustrate the construction of a WCF protocol with bias 1/14.
Weak coin flipping (WCF) is a fundamental cryptographic primitive for two-party secure computation, where two distrustful parties need to remotely establish a shared random bit whilst having opposite preferred outcomes. It is the strongest known primitive with arbitrarily close to perfect security quantumly while classically, its security is completely compromised (unless one makes further assumptions, such as computational hardness). A WCF protocol is said to have bias ϵ\epsilonϵ if neither party can force their preferred outcome with probability greater than 1/2+ϵ1/2+\epsilon1/2+ϵ. Classical WCF protocols are shown to have bias 1/21/21/2, i.e., a cheating party can always force their preferred outcome. On the other hand, there exist quantum WCF protocols with arbitrarily small bias, as Mochon showed in his seminal work in 2007 [arXiv:0711.4114]. In particular, he proved the existence of a family of WCF protocols approaching bias ϵ(k)=1/(4k+2)\epsilon (k)=1/(4k+2)ϵ(k)=1/(4k+2) for arbitrarily large kkk and proposed a protocol with bias 1/61/61/6. Last year, Arora, Roland and Weis presented a protocol with bias 1/101/101/10 and to go below this bias, they designed an algorithm that numerically constructs unitary matrices corresponding to WCF protocols with arbitrarily small bias [STOC'19, p.205-216]. In this work, we present new techniques which yield a fully analytical construction of WCF protocols with bias arbitrarily close to zero, thus achieving a solution that has been missing for more than a decade. Furthermore, our new techniques lead to a simplified proof of existence of WCF protocols by circumventing the non-constructive part of Mochon's proof. As an example, we illustrate the construction of a WCF protocol with bias 1/141/141/14.
We investigate weak coin flipping, a fundamental cryptographic primitive where two distrustful parties need to remotely establish a shared random bit. A cheating player can try to bias the output bit towards a preferred value. For weak coin flipping the players have known opposite preferred values. A weak coin-flipping protocol has a bias ϵ\epsilonϵ if neither player can force the outcome towards their preferred value with probability more than 12+ϵ\frac{1}{2}+\epsilon21​+ϵ. While it is known that all classical protocols have ϵ=12\epsilon=\frac{1}{2}ϵ=21​, Mochon showed in 2007 [arXiv:0711.4114] that quantumly weak coin flipping can be achieved with arbitrarily small bias (near perfect) but the best known explicit protocol has bias 1/61/61/6 (also due to Mochon, 2005 [Phys. Rev. A 72, 022341]). We propose a framework to construct new explicit protocols achieving biases below 1/61/61/6. In particular, we construct explicit unitaries for protocols with bias approaching 1/101/101/10. To go below, we introduce what we call the Elliptic Monotone Align (EMA) algorithm which, together with the framework, allows us to numerically construct protocols with arbitrarily small biases.
We investigate weak coin flipping, a fundamental cryptographic primitive where two distrustful parties need to remotely establish a shared random bit. A cheating player can try to bias the output bit towards a preferred value. For weak coin flipping the players have known opposite preferred values. A weak coin-flipping protocol has a bias є if neither player can force the outcome towards their preferred value with probability more than 1/2+є. While it is known that all classical protocols have є=1/2, Mochon showed in 2007 that quantumly weak coin flipping can be achieved with arbitrarily small bias (near perfect) but the former best known explicit protocol has bias 1/6 (also due to Mochon, 2005). We propose a framework to construct new explicit protocols achieving biases below 1/6. In particular, we construct explicit unitaries for protocols with bias down to 1/10. To go lower, we introduce what we call the Elliptic Monotone Align (EMA) algorithm which, together with the framework, allows us to construct protocols with arbitrarily small biases.
Weak coin flipping is an important cryptographic primitive$\unicode{x2013}$it is the strongest known secure two-party computation primitive that classically becomes secure only under certain assumptions (e.g. computational hardness), while quantumly there exist protocols that achieve arbitrarily close to perfect security. This breakthrough result was established by Mochon in 2007 [arXiv:0711.4114]. However, his proof relied on the existence of certain unitary operators which was established by a non-constructive argument. Consequently, explicit protocols have remained elusive. In this work, we give exact constructions of related unitary operators. These, together with a new formalism, yield a family of protocols approaching perfect security thereby also simplifying Mochon's proof of existence. We illustrate the construction of explicit weak coin flipping protocols by considering concrete examples (from the aforementioned family of protocols) that are more secure than all previously known protocols. 76 pages. This is the TheoretiCS journal version
As in modern communication networks, the security of quantum networks will rely on complex cryptographic tasks that are based on a handful of fundamental primitives. Weak coin flipping (WCF) is a significant such primitive which allows two mistrustful parties to agree on a random bit while they favor opposite outcomes. Remarkably, perfect information-theoretic security can be achieved in principle for quantum WCF. Here, we overcome conceptual and practical issues that have prevented the experimental demonstration of this primitive to date, and demonstrate how quantum resources can provide cheat sensitivity, whereby each party can detect a cheating opponent, and an honest party is never sanctioned. Such a property is not known to be classically achievable with information-theoretic security. Our experiment implements a refined, loss-tolerant version of a recently proposed theoretical protocol and exploits heralded single photons generated by spontaneous parametric down conversion, a carefully optimized linear optical interferometer including beam splitters with variable reflectivities and a fast optical switch for the verification step. High values of our protocol benchmarks are maintained for attenuation corresponding to several kilometers of telecom optical fiber.
As in modern communication networks, the security of quantum networks will rely on complex cryptographic tasks that are based on a handful of fundamental primitives. Weak coin flipping (WCF) is a significant such primitive which allows two mistrustful parties to agree on a random bit while they favor opposite outcomes. Remarkably, perfect information-theoretic security can be achieved in principle for quantum WCF. Here, we overcome conceptual and practical issues that have prevented the experimental demonstration of this primitive to date, and demonstrate how quantum resources can provide cheat sensitivity, whereby each party can detect a cheating opponent, and an honest party is never sanctioned. Such a property is not known to be classically achievable with information-theoretic security. Our experiment implements a refined, loss-tolerant version of a recently proposed theoretical protocol and exploits heralded single photons generated by spontaneous parametric down conversion, a carefully optimized linear optical interferometer including beam splitters with variable reflectivities and a fast optical switch for the verification step. High values of our protocol benchmarks are maintained for attenuation corresponding to several kilometers of telecom optical fiber.