Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

Leggett-Garg inequality based device-independent quantum cryptography without entanglement

Akshata Shenoy H., S. Aravinda, R. Srikanth, Dipankar Home

Published Oct 1, 2013• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

In the cryptographic context, an earlier unexplored application of the temporal version of the Bell-type inequality is shown here in the device-independent (DI) scenario. This is done by using the Leggett-Garg inequality (LGI) to demonstrate the security against eavesdropping in a quantum key distribution (QKD) scheme. This typically involves a higher dimensional attack against which the standard BB84 protocol is insecure. For this purpose, we invoke an appropriate form of LGI. While the key generation is done by the usual Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) method, the security check against device attacks is provided by testing for the violation of the particular form of LGI used here.

Related papers

Exploring the role of Leggett-Garg inequality for quantum cryptography

Akshata Shenoy H., S. Aravinda, R. Srikanth +1 more

In the cryptographic context, an earlier unexplored application of the temporal version of the Bell-type inequality is shown here in the device-independent (DI) scenario. This is done by using the Leggett-Garg inequality (LGI) to demonstrate the security against eavesdropping in a quantum key distribution (QKD) scheme. This typically involves a higher dimensional attack against which the standard BB84 protocol is insecure. For this purpose, we invoke an appropriate form of LGI. While the key generation is done by the usual Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) method, the security check against device attacks is provided by testing for the violation of the particular form of LGI used here.

arXiv:1310.0438•Oct 1, 2013•0 citations

Device-independent Quantum Key Distribution and the Role of Bell Nonlocality

Timo Holz

Quantum entanglement is a unique property of quantum particles. It can correlate them in such a way, that further correlations to an additional unwanted party is prevented. This renders quantum theory as the prime candidate to implement a secure distribution of an encryption key. Quantum key distribution (QKD) is dedicated to this task. A striking feature of correlations in a statistical experiment is, that they can, in principle, always be approximated. Even more so, correlations can be obtained without a detailed knowledge about the underlying physical process that generated the experimental data. This no-characterization approach is at the heart of the device-independent (DI) paradigm. Here, Bell inequalities are an imperative tool to detect nonlocal correlations, which are necessary for a DI secret key. One central subject of this thesis is multipartite DIQKD and the implications of Bell nonlocality in this context. Any DIQKD protocol involves test rounds in which the violation of a Bell inequality is checked. For multipartite DIQKD, however, not all Bell inequalities are suitable. We identify the crucial properties a Bell test requires to be a viable option. In this light, a published protocol for multipartite DIQKD is examined. We establish an incompatibility which is inherent to the proposed Bell test in combination with the required quantum states. This leads us to the conclusion, that the proposed protocol necessarily aborts. In a subsequent work, we develop a family of multipartite Bell inequalities, specifically tailored to the task of DI conference key agreement (CKA). Several features of this Bell inequality are analytically characterized. In addition, we prove its usefulness for the purposes of DICKA. To this end, semidefinite programming techniques are employed and extended to the multipartite scenario which allows us to quantify asymptotic DI conference key rates. In a second part, we explore the challenges of implementing (bipartite) long-distance DIQKD with quantum repeaters. For two repeater protocols, we describe how experimental parameters manifest themselves in DI secret-key rates. In doing so, we shed light on the fundamental differences between the usual and the DI scenario and we benchmark the threshold requirements of quantum devices to make profitable DI secret-key rates feasible. Finally, we develop a general method to describe in a non-DI setting the propagation of an important class of errors through quantum circuits in arbitrary dimensions. With this, we discuss the potential of error-corrected quantum repeaters to overcome fundamental point-to-point limitations.

•Jan 1, 2020•0 citations

Quantum Key Distribution Protocols with Device-Independent Security

Jincheng Zhang

This paper explores the design and theoretical foundations of quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols engineered for device-independent security. The core argument presented is that achieving unconditional security in QKD is possible without relying on the assumption of perfect hardware, a limitation inherent in many existing protocols. We propose a framework leveraging Bell inequality violations to establish secure key exchange, offering a fundamentally different approach compared to traditional protocols. This approach aims to mitigate the risks associated with side-channel attacks and device imperfections. The protocol outlined here represents a significant step towards realizing truly robust and secure quantum communication systems, offering a pathway for building cryptographic infrastructure resilient to evolving threats. The key contributions lie in the theoretical rigor applied to device independence and the utilization of Bell tests as a core mechanism for establishing security. The presented model offers a starting point for future research and development in this critical area of quantum cryptography.

•Aug 31, 2026•0 citations

A practical trojan horse for Bell-inequality-based quantum cryptography

Jan-Åke Larsson

Quantum Cryptography, or more accurately, Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is based on using an unconditionally secure ``quantum channel'' to share a secret key among two users. A manufacturer of QKD devices could, intentionally or not, use a (semi-)classical channel instead of the quantum channel, which would remove the supposedly unconditional security. One example is the BB84 protocol, where the quantum channel can be implemented in polarization of single photons. Here, use of several photons instead of one to encode each bit of the key provides a similar but insecure system. For protocols based on violation of a Bell inequality (e.g., the Ekert protocol) the situation is somewhat different. While the possibility is mentioned by some authors, it is generally thought that an implementation of a (semi-)classical channel will differ significantly from that of a quantum channel. Here, a counterexample will be given using an identical physical setup as is used in photon-polarization Ekert QKD. Since the physical implementation is identical, a manufacturer may include this modification as a Trojan Horse in manufactured systems, to be activated at will by an eavesdropper. Thus, the old truth of cryptography still holds: you have to trust the manufacturer of your cryptographic device. Even when you do violate the Bell inequality.

arXiv:quant-ph/0111073•Quantum Information and Computation•Oct 1, 2002•21 citations

Device-Independent Security of Quantum Cryptography against Collective Attacks

Antonio Acín, Nicolas Brunner, Nicolas Gisin +3 more

We present the optimal collective attack on a quantum key distribution protocol in the "device-independent" security scenario, where no assumptions are made about the way the quantum key distribution devices work or on what quantum system they operate. Our main result is a tight bound on the Holevo information between one of the authorized parties and the eavesdropper, as a function of the amount of violation of a Bell-type inequality.

arXiv:quant-ph/0702152•Physical Review Letters•Jun 4, 2007•1,711 citations

Device-independent quantum key distribution secure against collective attacks

Stefano Pironio, Antonio Acín, Nicolas Brunner +3 more

Device-independent quantum key distribution (DIQKD) represents a relaxation of the security assumptions made in usual quantum key distribution (QKD). As in usual QKD, the security of DIQKD follows from the laws of quantum physics, but contrary to usual QKD, it does not rely on any assumptions about the internal working of the quantum devices used in the protocol. In this paper, we present in detail the security proof for a DIQKD protocol introduced in Acín et al (2008 Phys. Rev. Lett. 98 230501). This proof exploits the full structure of quantum theory (as opposed to other proofs that exploit only the no-signaling principle), but only holds against collective attacks, where the eavesdropper is assumed to act on the quantum systems of the honest parties independently and identically in each round of the protocol (although she can act coherently on her systems at any time). The security of any DIQKD protocol necessarily relies on the violation of a Bell inequality. We discuss the issue of loopholes in Bell experiments in this context.

arXiv:0903.4460•New Journal of Physics•Apr 30, 2009•590 citations
In the cryptographic context, an earlier unexplored application of the temporal version of the Bell-type inequality is shown here in the device-independent (DI) scenario. This is done by using the Leggett-Garg inequality (LGI) to demonstrate the security against eavesdropping in a quantum key distribution (QKD) scheme. This typically involves a higher dimensional attack against which the standard BB84 protocol is insecure. For this purpose, we invoke an appropriate form of LGI. While the key generation is done by the usual Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) method, the security check against device attacks is provided by testing for the violation of the particular form of LGI used here.
In the cryptographic context, an earlier unexplored application of the temporal version of the Bell-type inequality is shown here in the device-independent (DI) scenario. This is done by using the Leggett-Garg inequality (LGI) to demonstrate the security against eavesdropping in a quantum key distribution (QKD) scheme. This typically involves a higher dimensional attack against which the standard BB84 protocol is insecure. For this purpose, we invoke an appropriate form of LGI. While the key generation is done by the usual Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) method, the security check against device attacks is provided by testing for the violation of the particular form of LGI used here.
Quantum entanglement is a unique property of quantum particles. It can correlate them in such a way, that further correlations to an additional unwanted party is prevented. This renders quantum theory as the prime candidate to implement a secure distribution of an encryption key. Quantum key distribution (QKD) is dedicated to this task. A striking feature of correlations in a statistical experiment is, that they can, in principle, always be approximated. Even more so, correlations can be obtained without a detailed knowledge about the underlying physical process that generated the experimental data. This no-characterization approach is at the heart of the device-independent (DI) paradigm. Here, Bell inequalities are an imperative tool to detect nonlocal correlations, which are necessary for a DI secret key. One central subject of this thesis is multipartite DIQKD and the implications of Bell nonlocality in this context. Any DIQKD protocol involves test rounds in which the violation of a Bell inequality is checked. For multipartite DIQKD, however, not all Bell inequalities are suitable. We identify the crucial properties a Bell test requires to be a viable option. In this light, a published protocol for multipartite DIQKD is examined. We establish an incompatibility which is inherent to the proposed Bell test in combination with the required quantum states. This leads us to the conclusion, that the proposed protocol necessarily aborts. In a subsequent work, we develop a family of multipartite Bell inequalities, specifically tailored to the task of DI conference key agreement (CKA). Several features of this Bell inequality are analytically characterized. In addition, we prove its usefulness for the purposes of DICKA. To this end, semidefinite programming techniques are employed and extended to the multipartite scenario which allows us to quantify asymptotic DI conference key rates. In a second part, we explore the challenges of implementing (bipartite) long-distance DIQKD with quantum repeaters. For two repeater protocols, we describe how experimental parameters manifest themselves in DI secret-key rates. In doing so, we shed light on the fundamental differences between the usual and the DI scenario and we benchmark the threshold requirements of quantum devices to make profitable DI secret-key rates feasible. Finally, we develop a general method to describe in a non-DI setting the propagation of an important class of errors through quantum circuits in arbitrary dimensions. With this, we discuss the potential of error-corrected quantum repeaters to overcome fundamental point-to-point limitations.
This paper explores the design and theoretical foundations of quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols engineered for device-independent security. The core argument presented is that achieving unconditional security in QKD is possible without relying on the assumption of perfect hardware, a limitation inherent in many existing protocols. We propose a framework leveraging Bell inequality violations to establish secure key exchange, offering a fundamentally different approach compared to traditional protocols. This approach aims to mitigate the risks associated with side-channel attacks and device imperfections. The protocol outlined here represents a significant step towards realizing truly robust and secure quantum communication systems, offering a pathway for building cryptographic infrastructure resilient to evolving threats. The key contributions lie in the theoretical rigor applied to device independence and the utilization of Bell tests as a core mechanism for establishing security. The presented model offers a starting point for future research and development in this critical area of quantum cryptography.
Quantum Cryptography, or more accurately, Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is based on using an unconditionally secure ``quantum channel'' to share a secret key among two users. A manufacturer of QKD devices could, intentionally or not, use a (semi-)classical channel instead of the quantum channel, which would remove the supposedly unconditional security. One example is the BB84 protocol, where the quantum channel can be implemented in polarization of single photons. Here, use of several photons instead of one to encode each bit of the key provides a similar but insecure system. For protocols based on violation of a Bell inequality (e.g., the Ekert protocol) the situation is somewhat different. While the possibility is mentioned by some authors, it is generally thought that an implementation of a (semi-)classical channel will differ significantly from that of a quantum channel. Here, a counterexample will be given using an identical physical setup as is used in photon-polarization Ekert QKD. Since the physical implementation is identical, a manufacturer may include this modification as a Trojan Horse in manufactured systems, to be activated at will by an eavesdropper. Thus, the old truth of cryptography still holds: you have to trust the manufacturer of your cryptographic device. Even when you do violate the Bell inequality.
Device-independent quantum key distribution (DIQKD) represents a relaxation of the security assumptions made in usual quantum key distribution (QKD). As in usual QKD, the security of DIQKD follows from the laws of quantum physics, but contrary to usual QKD, it does not rely on any assumptions about the internal working of the quantum devices used in the protocol. In this paper, we present in detail the security proof for a DIQKD protocol introduced in Acín et al (2008 Phys. Rev. Lett. 98 230501). This proof exploits the full structure of quantum theory (as opposed to other proofs that exploit only the no-signaling principle), but only holds against collective attacks, where the eavesdropper is assumed to act on the quantum systems of the honest parties independently and identically in each round of the protocol (although she can act coherently on her systems at any time). The security of any DIQKD protocol necessarily relies on the violation of a Bell inequality. We discuss the issue of loopholes in Bell experiments in this context.