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On the Colluding Attack to Compromise Physical Layer Key Generation Through a Large-Scale Fading Estimation

Yang Lu, Yansong Gao, Seyit Ahmet Camtepe, Dhammika Jayalath

Published Oct 19, 2019• 0 citations
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A Channel Perceiving Attack on Long-Range Key Generation and Its Countermeasure

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The physical-layer key generation is a lightweight technique to generate secret keys from wireless channels for resource-constrained Internet of things (IoT) applications. The security of key generation relies on spatial decorrelation, which assumes that eavesdroppers observe uncorrelated channel measurements when they are located over a half-wavelength away from legitimate users. Unfortunately, there is no experimental validation for communications environments when there are large-scale and small-scale fading effects. Furthermore, while the current key generation work mainly focuses on short-range communications techniques such as WiFi and ZigBee, the exploration with long-range communications, e.g., LoRa, is rather limited. This paper presents a LoRa-based key generation testbed and reveals a new colluding-eavesdropping attack that perceives and utilizes large-scale fading effects in key generation channels, by using multiple eavesdroppers circularly around a legitimate user. We formalized the attack and validated it through extensive experiments conducted under both indoor and outdoor environments. It is corroborated that the attack reduces secret key capacity when large-scale fading is predominant. We further investigated potential defenses by proposing a conditional entropy and high-pass filter-based countermeasure to estimate and eliminate large-scale fading associated components. The experimental results demonstrated that the countermeasure can significantly improve the key generation's security when there are both varying large-scale and small-scale fading effects. The key bits generated by legitimate users have a low key disagreement rate (KDR) and validated by the NIST randomness tests. On the other hand, eavesdroppers' average KDR is increased to 0.49, which is no better than a random guess.

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Lightweight session key agreement schemes are expected to play a central role in building Internet of things (IoT) security in sixth-generation (6G) networks. A well-established approach deriving from the physical layer is a secret key generation (SKG) from shared randomness (in the form of wireless fading coefficients). However, although practical, SKG schemes have been shown to be vulnerable to active attacks over the initial "advantage distillation" phase, throughout which estimates of the fading coefficients are obtained at the legitimate users. In fact, by injecting carefully designed signals during this phase, a man-in-the-middle (MiM) attack could manipulate and control part of the reconciled bits and thus render SKG vulnerable to brute force attacks. Alternatively, a denial of service attack can be mounted by a reactive jammer. In this paper, we investigate the impact of injection and jamming attacks during the advantage distillation in a multiple-input-multiple-output (MIMO) system. First, we show that a MiM attack can be mounted as long as the attacker has one extra antenna with respect to the legitimate users, and we propose a pilot randomization scheme that allows the legitimate users to successfully reduce the injection attack to a less harmful jamming attack. Secondly, by taking a game-theoretic approach we evaluate the optimal strategies available to the legitimate users in the presence of reactive jammers.

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Investigating the eavesdropper attack in physical layer security wireless key generation: a simulation case study

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In this work we explore the problem of physical layer security key exchange between two communicating devices in wideband wireless networks. We propose to obtain a pair of symmetric keys through a general filtering procedure, which exploits the frequency-selective characteristics of the radio channel. We focus our analysis on the keys bits mismatch with respect to the signal-to-noise-ratio and the link distance, through simulations of realistic radio channels in both indoor and outdoor scenarios. We investigated the impact of a proximity-attack by a malicious third device, founding that it is capable to eavesdrop large parts of the generated key compromising the overall security.

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Enhancing Physical-Layer Secrecy in Modern Wireless Communication Systems

Y.-W. Peter Hong, Pang-Chang Lan, C.‐C. Jay Kuo

Springer briefs in electrical and computer engineering•Sep 26, 2013•1 citation
The physical-layer key generation is a lightweight technique to generate secret keys from wireless channels for resource-constrained Internet of things (IoT) applications. The security of key generation relies on spatial decorrelation, which assumes that eavesdroppers observe uncorrelated channel measurements when they are located over a half-wavelength away from legitimate users. Unfortunately, there is no experimental validation for communications environments when there are large-scale and small-scale fading effects. Furthermore, while the current key generation work mainly focuses on short-range communications techniques such as WiFi and ZigBee, the exploration with long-range communications, e.g., LoRa, is rather limited. This paper presents a LoRa-based key generation testbed and reveals a new colluding-eavesdropping attack that perceives and utilizes large-scale fading effects in key generation channels, by using multiple eavesdroppers circularly around a legitimate user. We formalized the attack and validated it through extensive experiments conducted under both indoor and outdoor environments. It is corroborated that the attack reduces secret key capacity when large-scale fading is predominant. We further investigated potential defenses by proposing a conditional entropy and high-pass filter-based countermeasure to estimate and eliminate large-scale fading associated components. The experimental results demonstrated that the countermeasure can significantly improve the key generation's security when there are both varying large-scale and small-scale fading effects. The key bits generated by legitimate users have a low key disagreement rate (KDR) and validated by the NIST randomness tests. On the other hand, eavesdroppers' average KDR is increased to 0.49, which is no better than a random guess.
Lightweight session key agreement schemes are expected to play a central role in building Internet of things (IoT) security in sixth-generation (6G) networks. A well-established approach deriving from the physical layer is a secret key generation (SKG) from shared randomness (in the form of wireless fading coefficients). However, although practical, SKG schemes have been shown to be vulnerable to active attacks over the initial "advantage distillation" phase, throughout which estimates of the fading coefficients are obtained at the legitimate users. In fact, by injecting carefully designed signals during this phase, a man-in-the-middle (MiM) attack could manipulate and control part of the reconciled bits and thus render SKG vulnerable to brute force attacks. Alternatively, a denial of service attack can be mounted by a reactive jammer. In this paper, we investigate the impact of injection and jamming attacks during the advantage distillation in a multiple-input-multiple-output (MIMO) system. First, we show that a MiM attack can be mounted as long as the attacker has one extra antenna with respect to the legitimate users, and we propose a pilot randomization scheme that allows the legitimate users to successfully reduce the injection attack to a less harmful jamming attack. Secondly, by taking a game-theoretic approach we evaluate the optimal strategies available to the legitimate users in the presence of reactive jammers.
In this work we explore the problem of physical layer security key exchange between two communicating devices in wideband wireless networks. We propose to obtain a pair of symmetric keys through a general filtering procedure, which exploits the frequency-selective characteristics of the radio channel. We focus our analysis on the keys bits mismatch with respect to the signal-to-noise-ratio and the link distance, through simulations of realistic radio channels in both indoor and outdoor scenarios. We investigated the impact of a proximity-attack by a malicious third device, founding that it is capable to eavesdrop large parts of the generated key compromising the overall security.