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Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Physics

Decoy States and Low-Density Parity-Check Error-Correcting Codes in Quantum Cryptography with Phase–Time Coding

I. V. Sinil’shchikov, S. N. Molotkov

Published Aug 1, 2019• 9 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Abstract The cryptographic robustness of quantum key distribution (QKD) with phase–time coding against a photon number splitting (PNS) attack is analyzed. The line length up to which a secret key distribution is guaranteed is determined both by the protocol itself and by the efficiency of error correction in raw keys. The effect of different parameters of avalanche single-photon detectors on the length of the secret key distribution line is investigated. To correct errors, various versions of low-density parity-check (LDPC) codes are considered whose efficiency today is the closest to the Shannon theoretical limit.

DOI
10.1134/s1063776119070124

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Abstract The cryptographic robustness of quantum key distribution (QKD) with phase–time coding against a photon number splitting (PNS) attack is analyzed. The line length up to which a secret key distribution is guaranteed is determined both by the protocol itself and by the efficiency of error correction in raw keys. The effect of different parameters of avalanche single-photon detectors on the length of the secret key distribution line is investigated. To correct errors, various versions of low-density parity-check (LDPC) codes are considered whose efficiency today is the closest to the Shannon theoretical limit.
Abstract We discuss the photon number splitting attack (PNS) in systems of quantum cryptography with phase coding. It is shown that this attack, as well as the structural equations for the PNS attack for phase encoding, differs physically from the analogous attack applied to the polarization coding. As far as we know, in practice, in all works to date processing of experimental data has been done for phase coding, but using formulas for polarization coding. This can lead to inadequate results for the length of the secret key. These calculations are important for the correct interpretation of the results, especially if it concerns the criterion of secrecy in quantum cryptography.
Quantum encryption guarantees the absolute security of key distribution from the physical mechanism. However, in the process of quantum key distribution (QKD), quantum channel noise will reduce the transmission efficiency. Quantum low-density parity check (quantum LDPC) code has become a hot research topic of quantum error correcting code due to its great flexibility in the choice of code length and code rate and its dependence on sparse graphs. In order to improve the transmission reliability, a QKD protocol based on BB84 and quantum LDPC code is designed. First, we construct a quantum LDCP error correcting code. Then we utilize the error correcting code and BB84 to construct our QKD protocol. Finally, we analyze the influence of the quantum LDPC code on the proposed protocol. The results show that the key transmission efficiency of the our protocol is improved, and the validity of the QKD protocol based on BB84 and quantum LDPC codes in noisy quantum channels is verified.
Abstract Quantum cryptography or, more precisely, quantum key distribution (QKD), is one of the advanced areas in the field of quantum technologies. The confidentiality of keys distributed with the use of QKD protocols is guaranteed by the fundamental laws of quantum mechanics. This paper is devoted to the decoy state method, a countermeasure against vulnerabilities caused by the use of coherent states of light for QKD protocols whose security is proved under the assumption of single-photon states. We give a formal security proof of the decoy state method against all possible attacks. We compare two widely known attacks on multiphoton pulses: photon-number splitting and beam splitting. Finally, we discuss the equivalence of polarization and phase coding.
Quantum key distribution protocols (QKD) identify eavesdroppers on quantum channel based on laws of quantum mechanics. In the original BB84 protocol, unauthorized measurements on qubits are discovered after Alice and Bob sacrifice some random resulting key bits as a test and find out a mismatch rate. Decoy state protocol alerts photon number splitting attack when the decoy multiphoton pulses deliberately positioned by Alice are registered abnormally higher at Bob’s detectors than the single photon pulses are. E91 protocol is the first QKD protocol that ever brought about entangled atoms. Based on Bell’s theorem, a probability coefficient is constrained within a fixed range under the circumstances of interception. While in practice, bit error rate (BER) is not necessarily associated with vicious eavesdropping. Detection inefficiency, transmission loss, imperfect entanglement sources and many other factors contribute as false alarms. Error correction is an essential post-processing procedure to tolerate implementation limits, yet secure the accuracy of the transmitted key. Quantifying third party contaminations also helps setting an optimal BER threshold to decide if one should abandon all previous communications. In this work, we summarize major causes of bit error in various practical QKD protocols mentioned above and study whether error correction models, such as low-density parity-check code (LDPC), perform accordingly to different kinds of errors.
Abstract The decoy state method has been proposed to detect a photon number splitting (PNS) attack. Today, the decoy state method is considered to be an almost universal method for proving the secrecy of quantum cryptography protocols and calculating the length of a secret key. In this paper, it is shown that there exist attacks, for example, a beam splitting (BS) attack, to which the decoy state method turns out to be insensitive. The decoy state method is oriented to the detection of changes in the photocount statistics of information states and decoy states under a PNS attack. Under a BS attack, the photocount statistics is not changed. As a result, the decoy state method significantly overestimates the length of the key. Thus, the decoy state method is not a universal method that allows the detection of various attacks. Apparently, due to a large number of publications on the decoy state method, a widespread opinion has been formed that this method is universal. This fact has led to attempts to adopt this method as an international standard in quantum cryptography, which is clearly premature.
Quantum cryptography provides methods for secret key distribution between the two distant users. An important step in quantum key distribution protocols is the correction of errors that occur during the transmission and implementation of the protocol. Here we consider error estimation and error correction with linear codes such as repetition code, Hamming code, low density parity check (LDPC) code. The paper investigates the increase in the efficiency of error correction using a combination of a repetition code and a LDPC code for a high error probability.