Bohmian Philosophy of Mind?

Henry Pierce Stapp

Michaël Esfeld

Mohammad Vahid Jamali, Mehdi Golshani, Yousef Jamali

In quantum approaches to consciousness, the authors try to propose a model and mechanism for the mind-brain interaction using modern physics and some quantum concepts which do not exist in the classical physics. The independent effect of mind on the brain has been one of the challenging issues in the history of science and philosophy. In some recent mind-brain interaction models, the direct influence of mind on matter is either not accepted (as in Stapp's model) or not clear, and there have not been any clear mechanism for it (as in Penrose-Hameroff's model or in Eccles's model). In this manuscript we propose a model and mechanism for mind's effect on the matter using an extended Bohmian quantum mechanics and Avicenna's ideas. We show that mind and mental states can affect brain's activity without any violation of physical laws. This is a mathematical and descriptive model which shows the possibility of providing a causal model for mind's effect on matter. It is shown that this model guarantees the realistic philosophical constraints and respects the laws of nature. In addition, it is shown that it is in agreement with the Libet style experimental results and parapsychological data. To propose this model, we obtained a modified (non-unitary) Schrödinger equation via second quantization method which affects the particle through a modified quantum potential and a new term in the continuity equation. At the second quantized level, which is equivalent to quantum field theory level (QFT), we can use the path integral formalism of Feynman. We show that there are three methods to extend Bohmian QM via path integral formalism, which has different interpretations. By numerical simulation of trajectories in the two-slits experiment, we show their differences and choose one of these methods for our mind-brain model which can be the basis for explaining some phenomena which are not possible to explain in the standard Bohmian QM.

Gordon G. Globus

David Bohm (1917-1992) was a major figure in 20th century physics and one of its most original thinkers. From the time of his classic textbook Quantum theory (1951), through Causality and chance in modern physics (1957), The special theory of relativity (1965), to Wholeness and the implicate order (1980), Bohm was concerned with deep philosophical issues, even more than Niels Bohr. Bohm’s ontological emphasis was “holonomic,” that is, ontology under the law of the whole. The Bohmian program continues to be carried forward today in physics by Basil Hiley and in philosophy by Paavo Pylkkanen.

Don Nelson Page

Andrew J. Marlow

The contribution of quantum mechanics to the debate on whether free will exists is usually limited to considerations of how the indeterminism implied by certain interpretations of quantum mechanics might allow room for free will where the classical determinism of Newtonian mechanics seemingly would not. However, this Paper advances the idea that such arguments are flawed, as they cannot account for how an agent would exercise control over an indeterministic choice, which could just as easily be resolved by chance or randomness. This Paper will put forward an alternative account of how quantum mechanics could account for free will, based on the deterministic and non-materialistic interpretation of David Bohm. In this interpretation, the human mind, seen objectively as “active information” and perceived subjectively as “meaning”, can have an “informational” causal influence on the behaviour of the human body. This is shown to complement a compatibilist account of free will, where free will is taken to mean simply that an agent can act according to his/her will without impediment and is thus compatible with determinism, and to augment it, by giving mind a fundamental place in reality and thus explaining the mental causation necessary for any account of free will. This analysis is then taken to legal philosophy, to show that a Bohmian account of compatibilist free will can similarly augment the ‘Act Requirement’ of criminal jurisprudence and the ‘formal agency’ element of Brudner’s liberal theory of penal justice, such that it can better ground our philosophical justification of holding individuals responsible for criminal acts.