Both deterministic and indeterministic physical laws are incompatible with control by genuine (non-illusory) free will. We propose that an indeterministic dynamics can be
weakly compatible with free will (FW), whereby the latter acts by altering the probability distribution over allowed outcomes. In the quantum physical world, such a FW can collapse the wave function, introducing deviations from the Born rule. In principle, this deviation would stand in conflict with both special relativity and (a variant of) the Strong Church-Turing thesis, implying that the brain may be an arena of exotic, non-standard physics. However, in practice, these deviations would not be directly or easily observable, because they occur in sub-neuronal superpositions in the brain, where they would be shrouded in random measurement errors, noise and statistical fluctuations. Our result elucidates the difference between the FW of human observers and that of observed particles in the Free Will Theorem. This difference is a basic reason for why FW (and, in general, consciousness) cannot be recreated by standard artificial intelligence (AI) technology. We propose various neurobiological experiments to test our proposed theory. We speculate that for observers to be aware of a physical theory such as quantum mechanics, FW is necessary and that the theory must therefore not be universal. We suggest that FW may be regarded as a primitive principle in Nature for explaining quantum indeterminism.
It has been argued that quantum mechanics is not locally causal and cannot be embedded in a locally causal theory. That conclusion depends on treating certain experimental parameters, typically the orientations of polarization filters, as free variables. Roughly speaking it is supposed that an experimenter is quite free to choose among the various possibilities offered by his equipment. But it might be that this apparent freedom is illusory. Perhaps experimental parameters and experimental results are both consequences, or partially so, of some common hidden mechanism. Then the apparent non-locality could be simulated. This possibility is the starting point of a paper by Clauser, Home and Shimony (CHS hereafter), which is valuable in particular for a careful mathematical formulation of the assumption which excludes such a conspiracy. In this connection they severely criticize my own ‘theory of local beables’ (B hereafter). Much of their criticism is perfectly just. In B there were jumps in the argument, and the assumption in question was not stated at the appropriate place, but only later and inadequately. However, I do not agree with CHS that this assumption, when carefully formulated, is an unreasonable one. I will organize these remarks around the three phrases in which I belatedly formulated the hypothesis in B, Section 8.
The two stages of visual perception according to the models of visual search, the preattentional and the attentional, are presented. The first stage is related to the left cerebral hemisphere, while the second to the left one. The phenomenon of illusory conjunction of features during the object‐integration in the macroscopic world is described. It is suggested that the illusory conjunction is similar to the quantum entanglement of microscopic particles. The imagining of microscopic particles, like electron, is explained by the theory of re‐entrant, namely, as activation of primary visual cortical areas by the higher neural system. It is suggested that both macroscopic object‐integration and the microscopic collapse of the wave function are an exchange of the cerebral hemisphere, which create the ontological model of the perceived phenomenon.