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International Conference on Transparent Optical Networks

On minimal assumptions to obtain a universally composable quantum bit commitment

Mariano Lemus, Preeti Yadav, Paulo Mateus, Nikola Paunković, André Souto

Published Jul 1, 2019• 3 citations
Publisher

Abstract

It is well known, due to the no-go theorems, that perfectly secure bit commitment is impossible. For that reason, there exist many proposals for bit commitment protocols that are secure under certain assumptions (such as the existence of a trusted party, computational hardness, or noisy memories). In this paper, we investigate the minimal assumptions required to obtain a secure bit commitment protocol. We show that it is possible to construct a bit commitment scheme with two parties Alice and Bob as long as there is a third party that is willing to broadcast either entangled qubits for the parties or to produce classical strings that are xor-correlated. We also show that the bit commitment scheme proposed is universally composable.

DOI
10.1109/icton.2019.8840386

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It is well known, due to the no-go theorems, that perfectly secure bit commitment is impossible. For that reason, there exist many proposals for bit commitment protocols that are secure under certain assumptions (such as the existence of a trusted party, computational hardness, or noisy memories). In this paper, we investigate the minimal assumptions required to obtain a secure bit commitment protocol. We show that it is possible to construct a bit commitment scheme with two parties Alice and Bob as long as there is a third party that is willing to broadcast either entangled qubits for the parties or to produce classical strings that are xor-correlated. We also show that the bit commitment scheme proposed is universally composable.
Quantum bit commitment has been known to be impossible by the independent proofs of Mayers, and Lo and Chau, under the assumption that the whole quantum states right before the unveiling phase are static to users. We here provide an unconditionally secure non-static quantum bit commitment protocol with a trusted third party, which is not directly involved in any communications between users and can be limited not to get any information of commitment without being detected by users. We also prove that our quantum bit commitment protocol is not secure without the help of the trusted third party. The proof is basically different from the Mayers-Lo-Chau's no-go theorem, because we do not assume the staticity of the finally shared quantum states between users.
Unconditionally secure nonrelativistic bit commitment is known to be impossible in both the classical and the quantum world. However, when committing to a string of n bits at once, how far can we stretch the quantum limits? In this Letter, we introduce a framework of quantum schemes where Alice commits a string of n bits to Bob, in such a way that she can only cheat on a bits and Bob can learn at most b bits of information before the reveal phase. Our results are twofold: we show by an explicit construction that in the traditional approach, where the reveal and guess probabilities form the security criteria, no good schemes can exist: a + b is at least n. If, however, we use a more liberal criterion of security, the accessible information, we construct schemes where a = 4log2(n) + O(1) and b = 4, which is impossible classically. Our findings significantly extend known no-go results for quantum bit commitment.
Unconditionally secure non-relativistic bit commitment is known to be impossible in both the classical and quantum worlds. However, when committing to a string of n bits at once, how far can we stretch the quantum limits? We consider quantum schemes where Alice commits a string of n bits to Bob, in such a way that she can only cheat on a bits and Bob can learn at most b bits of ''information'' before the reveal phase. We show a negative and a positive result, depending on how we measure Bob's information. If we use the Holevo quantity, no good schemes exist: a+b is at least n. If, however, we use accessible information, there exists a scheme where a=4 log n+O(1) and b=4. This is classically impossible. Our protocol is not efficient, however, we also exhibit an efficient scheme when Bob's measurement circuit is restricted to polynomial size. Our scheme also implies a protocol for n simultaneous coin flips which achieves higher entropy of the resulting string than any previously known protocol.
Unconditionally secure nonrelativistic bit commitment is known to be impossible in both the classical and the quantum worlds. But when committing to a string of nnn bits at once, how far can we stretch the quantum limits? In this paper, we introduce a framework for quantum schemes where Alice commits a string of nnn bits to Bob in such a way that she can only cheat on aaa bits and Bob can learn at most bbb bits of information before the reveal phase. Our results are twofold: we show by an explicit construction that in the traditional approach, where the reveal and guess probabilities form the security criteria, no good schemes can exist: a+ba+ba+b is at least nnn. If, however, we use a more liberal criterion of security, the accessible information, we construct schemes where a=4 log2 n+O(1)a=4\text{ }{\text{log}}_{2}\text{ }n+O(1)a=4 log2​ n+O(1) and b=4b=4b=4, which is impossible classically. We furthermore present a cheat-sensitive quantum bit string commitment protocol for which we give an explicit tradeoff between Bob's ability to gain information about the committed string, and the probability of him being detected cheating.
Due to the high cost of the qubit generating device (QGD) (the single photon source), QGD may not be available at the same time in both communicating parties (Alice and Bob) who have to execute the quantum bit string commitment (QBSC) protocol for some application environments. All the existing QBSC protocols allow one-way commitment i.e., only the party (Bob) who possesses the QGD is allowed to commit a bit string to Alice who does not have the QGD, but not the other way around. However, what happens if Alice, who does not have the QGD, is required to commit a bit string to Bob? The current QBSC protocols fail to provide a solution in this case. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to allow Alice, who is not equipped with the QGD, to commit a bit string to Bob who has the QGD. With our proposed protocol, together with previously proposed QBSC protocols, Alice and Bob can perform two-way commitment, even though Bob is the only party who is equipped with the QGD.