Is There a Place for Consciousness in Quantum Mechanics?

Barry K. Ward

Alin Christoph Cucu

This chapter asks whether consciousness-collapse interpretations of quantum mechanics can help interactive dualism even if they do not solve the conservation problem. It begins by explaining why consciousness-collapse theories are often considered vague or mysterious, especially because consciousness seems difficult to integrate into precise physical dynamics. This chapter then examines the proposal that consciousness can be connected to quantum theory through a physical correlate of consciousness and through superposition-resistant properties. On this approach, consciousness or its physical correlate resists quantum superposition and thereby contributes to wave function collapse. This chapter considers the strengths of this strategy, especially its promise of a lawful mind-matter connection, but also stresses major difficulties. Absolute superposition resistance faces the quantum Zeno problem, while weaker collapse models remain speculative. This chapter further argues that making consciousness-collapse dynamics precise may endanger libertarian freedom by placing conscious action under impersonal mathematical rules. It concludes that consciousness-collapse quantum mechanics is an intriguing research program, not a settled solution.

Weirui Xiong, Lu Yu

Карпенко Иван Александрович

Abstract The article presents the possible role of consciousness in quantum-mechanical description of physical reality. The widely spread interpretations of quantum phenomena are considered as indicating the apparent connection between conscious processes (such as observation) and the properties of the microcosm. The reasons for discrepancies between the results of observations of the microcosm and macrocosm and the potential association of consciousness with these reasons are closely investigated. The mentioned connection is meant to be interpreted in the sense that the probable requirement for a complete understanding of quantum theory is the adequate description of consciousness within it and that the correct theory of consciousness should include quantum-mechanical theoretical apparatus. In this context, the question about the methods of scientific cognition is discussed, in particular, the problem of the place and the importance of intellectual intuition in science and philosophy of science. The author draws the conclusions about the current state of the “measuring” consciousness. problem in its relationship with

Michel Bitbol

There are two versions of the putative connection between consciousness and the measurement problem of quantum mechanics: consciousness as the cause of state vector reduction, and state vector reduction as the physical basis of consciousness. In this article, these controversial ideas are neither accepted uncritically, nor rejected from the outset in the name of some prejudice about objective knowledge. Instead, their origin is sought in our most cherished (but disputable) beliefs about the place of mind and consciousness in the world. It is first pointed out that these common beliefs about mind and consciousness arise from reification of situated first-person experience. Then, situatedness is shown to be a constitutive part of any exhaustive treatment of quantum measurements. It turns out that the alleged connection between consciousness and the measurement problem is a symptom of (i) the ineliminability of our being situated from the end-product of science, and (ii) our difficulty to express correctly this being situated.

Henry Margenau