We present a framework for evaluating the concrete security assurances of cryptographic constructions given by the worst-case SIVP_γ to average-case SIS_{n,m,q,β} reductions. As part of this analysis, we present the tightness gaps for three worst-case SIVP_γ to average-case SIS_{n,m,q,β} reductions. We also analyze the hardness of worst-case SIVP_γ instances. \nWe apply our methodology to two SIS-based signature schemes, and compute the security guarantees that these systems get from reductions to worst-case SIVP_γ. We find that most of the presented reductions do not apply to the chosen parameter sets for the signature schemes. We propose modifications to the schemes to make the reductions applicable, and find that the worst-case security assurances of the (modified) signature schemes are, for both signature schemes, significantly lower than the amount of security previously claimed.
We present a framework for evaluating the concrete security assurances of cryptographic constructions given by the worst-case SIVP_γ to average-case SIS_{n,m,q,β} reductions. As part of this analysis, we present the tightness gaps for three worst-case SIVP_γ to average-case SIS_{n,m,q,β} reductions. We also analyze the hardness of worst-case SIVP_γ instances. \nWe apply our methodology to two SIS-based signature schemes, and compute the security guarantees that these systems get from reductions to worst-case SIVP_γ. We find that most of the presented reductions do not apply to the chosen parameter sets for the signature schemes. We propose modifications to the schemes to make the reductions applicable, and find that the worst-case security assurances of the (modified) signature schemes are, for both signature schemes, significantly lower than the amount of security previously claimed.
We present a structured security and performance analysis of modern post-quantum latticebased constructions, emphasizing module lattices and their core hardness assumptions: ModuleLearning With Errors (Module-LWE) and Module Short Integer Solution (Module-SIS). Weoutline the reductionist security story from worst-case lattice problems to average-case ModuleLWE, describe the role of Gaussian measures and smoothing, and provide a reproducible experimental workflow for estimating attack costs using standard lattice estimators. We also discuss the gap between asymptotic hardness and concrete parameter selection, and we provide plots that summarize scaling trends for reviewer-facing evaluation
Building cryptographic schemes upon as many fundamentally different hard problems as possible, seems to be the best way to hedge against future threats such as quantum computers. Being mainly based on the hardness of factoring and computing discrete logarithms, the present security landscape is at risk. In contrast, problems in lattices, such as finding short non-zero vectors, seem to withstand quantum computer attacks and the best known algorithms run in exponential time. In sharp contrast to other fields of cryptography, lattices admit a worst-case to average-case reduction (Ajtai 1996). Instead of assuming that a problem is hard for randomly chosen instances, lattice-based cryptosystems merely require the existence of a single hard instance, i.e., hardness in the worst case. With such an additional "trust anchor", the resulting security guarantees are much more plausible. Quite recently, we have seen an increased interest in lattice-based cryptography with many striking results. In this thesis, we are particularly interested in signature schemes, which provide a supporting pillar for today's economy. While we have seen basic signature schemes from lattices, e.g., (Gentry, Peikert, Vaikuntanathan 2008), (Lyubashevsky, Micciancio 2008), (Lyubashevsky 2009), or (Cash, Hofheinz, Kiltz, Peikert 2009), there are hardly any results dealing with the specific needs of applications, where ordinary signatures often fall too short. In this thesis, we build upon the above results and equip them with additional features, motivated by an exemplary selection of application scenarios. Hence, we demonstrate the great versatility of lattices in cryptography. In particular, we facilitate privacy-friendly electronic elections, fair online contract signing, signature compression, secure signatures in the strongest sense, as well as identity-based primitives. As far as possible, we avoid simplifying assumptions, such as the random oracle model. We believe that our techniques can be transferred to other application scenarios as well. Independently of the these results, we discuss the practical hardness of lattice problems and provide a framework for estimating the security of essentially all modern lattice-based cryptography.
The study of digital signatures with tight reductions has attracted considerable attention over the past two decades, as such schemes inherit essentially the same quantitative hardness as the underlying computational problem. In the context of lattice-based cryptography, the GPV approach (Gentry, Peikert, and Vaikuntanathan, STOC ’08) admits a simple tight reduction from the SIS problem, but relies on preimage sampling via trapdoors, which often leads to complex and brittle implementations. By contrast, tight proofs for trapdoor-free constructions, following the Fiat–Shamir paradigm, necessarily rely on decisional assumptions, most notably the decisional LWE assumption. From the perspective of concrete security, however, reliance on a search assumption is preferable, as known search-to-decision reductions for LWE provide only weak quantitative guarantees. \ind This paper presents the first efficient lattice-based signature scheme with a tight reduction to a search assumption (namely, the hardness of the search LWE problem) that does not require any trapdoor in the scheme itself (but merely uses, instead, a trapdoor in the proof). Our construction follows the Fiat-Shamir paradigm and can be viewed as a lattice analogue of Chevallier–Mames signatures (CRYPTO ’05). Establishing security in the lattice setting, however, requires overcoming significant technical obstacles: in particular, our proof develops several new techniques to cope with the inherently weak soundness guarantees of lattice-based interactive proofs.
It is obviously necessary that the security of post-quantum cryptographic schemes is based on computational problems that are hard to solve even with a quantum computer (unlike, e.g., factoring). Examples of such computational problems appear in the theory of lattices or in coding theory. However, this is not sufficient: also the security proof, which comes in the form of an algorithmic reduction that turns any hypothetical attacker into an algorithm that solves the considered hard computational problem, needs to be valid when considering quantum computing as the model of computation. In this work, we provide an overview of the hurdles one typically encounters when proving the security of post-quantum cryptographic schemes, and we elaborate on some of the mathematical techniques that have been developed in order to overcome these hurdles (to some extent). We also analyze the caveat that even when a security proof can be established (by reducing the security to a quantum-hard computational problem), the reduction often suffers from a larger reduction loss, compared to when proving classical security, which negatively affects the concrete security. In the second part of this work, we offer a survey of the respective reduction losses in (1) generic transformations that are often used in the design of cryptographic schemes (like the Fiat-Shamir and Fujisaki-Okamoto transformations), and (2) some concrete cryptographic schemes (with a focus on those standardized by NIST), when considering classical and when considering post-quantum security. Finally, we investigate how these reduction losses translate into bit security, the standard measure of the concrete security of a cryptographic scheme (or of the hardness of an underlying computational problem). A natural question is how the bit security is affected by the different reduction losses we encountered. Surprisingly, we observe that a better or worse reduction (in terms of the reduction loss) is not always reflected as such in the bit security. We explain this phenomenon by the fact that the bit security is oblivious to the actual advantage–time function, and instead considers a worst-case behavior of that function. Thus, by exploiting the actual advantage–time function there is potential to get more accurate (i.e., less conservative) estimates for the concrete security.
Regev (2005) introduced the learning with errors (LWE) problem and showed a quantum reduction from a worst case lattice problem to LWE. Building on the work of Peikert (2009), a classical reduction from the gap shortest vector problem to LWE was obtained by Brakerski et al. (2013). A concrete security analysis of Regev's reduction by Chatterjee et al. (2016) identified a huge tightness gap. The present work performs a concrete analysis of the tightness gap in the classical reduction of Brakerski et al. It turns out that the tightness gap in the Brakerski et al. classical reduction is even larger than the tightness gap in the quantum reduction of Regev. This casts doubts on the implication of the reduction to security assurance of practical cryptosystems.
One essential quest in cryptography is the search for hard instances of a given computational problem that is known to be hard in the worst-case. In lattice cryptography we are in the unique situation that we have found a way of picking random instances which are at least as hard as well-studied lattice problems in the worst-case. At the same time, no attack running in subexponential time is known to break these problems, even for an adversary using quantum computers. Virtually all public-key schemes in use today are subject to such attacks, and the development of quantum computers is actively pursued, so it is prudent to investigate lattice-based alternatives. There are two fundamental open problems in lattice cryptography today and this thesis contributes to solving them. First, there exists a widely used efficiency improvement that allows for trapdoors whose asymptotic keysize and evaluation time are both quasilinear in the dimension of an associated lattice. This is accomplished by restricting oneself to lattices with special structure, so-called ideal lattices. This entails the use of newer security assumptions, but these have not been analyzed thoroughly so far. We start this work by comparing the class of ideal lattice problems with its general counterpart in terms of size. Affirming folklore, we find the number of restricted instances among all instances to be asymptotically negligible for those classes of lattices suggested for practical use. The second open problem is that while the connection to worst-case problems is well understood, the practical hardness of the related average-case problems is not. Specifically, there have been parameters suggested for practical usage, where current lattice basis reduction algorithms can solve these worst-case problems, but the related average-case problems, which these are reduced to and which represent the basis of practical security of the cryptosystems, are completely infeasible. In most cases, this lack of understanding has lead either to a very conservative choice of parameters, or none at all. This in turn makes it impossible for the resulting lattice schemes to compete with their counterparts based on other paradigms. We further the understanding of this practical security and at the same time improve the efficiency of several common related cryptographic schemes. Among other things, we find that for the SWIFFT compression function, solving certain problems closely related to finding collisions is easier than previously thought and we suggest efficient replacement parameters. We propose a novel zero-knowledge identification scheme that, to our knowledge, beats all competing post-quantum schemes, even those based on other paradigms. Possibly most important, we help to tighten the efficiency gap between lattice encryption schemes that are provably secure and the acclaimed ad-hoc encryption scheme NTRU. This is done by unifying many recent developments into a new provably secure design and providing a comprehensive analysis of practical security, which together results in a great leap of efficiency.