We investigate sampling procedures that certify that an arbitrary quantum state on
n subsystems is close to an ideal mixed state
φ⊗n for a given reference state
φ, up to errors on a few positions. This task makes no sense classically: it would correspond to certifying that a given bitstring was generated according to some desired probability distribution. However, in the quantum case, this is possible if one has access to a prover who can supply a purification of the mixed state. In this work, we introduce the concept of mixed-state certification, and we show that a natural sampling protocol offers secure certification in the presence of a possibly dishonest prover: if the verifier accepts then he can be almost certain that the state in question has been correctly prepared, up to a small number of errors. We then apply this result to two-party quantum coin-tossing. Given that strong coin tossing is impossible, it is natural to ask "how close can we get". This question has been well studied and is nowadays well understood from the perspective of the bias of individual coin tosses. We approach and answer this question from a different---and somewhat orthogonal---perspective, where we do not look at individual coin tosses but at the global entropy instead. We show how two distrusting parties can produce a common high-entropy source, where the entropy is an arbitrarily small fraction below the maximum (except with negligible probability).
We propose a coin-flip protocol which yields a string of strong, random coins and is fully simulatable against poly-sized quantum adversaries on both sides. It can be implemented with quantum-computational security without any set-up assumptions, since our construction only assumes mixed commitment schemes which we show how to construct in the given setting. We then show that the interactive generation of random coins at the beginning or during outer protocols allows for quantum-secure realizations of classical schemes, again without any set-up assumptions. As example applications we discuss quantum zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge and quantum-secure two-party function evaluation. Both applications assume only fully simulatable coin-flipping and mixed commitments. Since our framework allows to construct fully simulatable coin-flipping from mixed commitments, this in particular shows that mixed commitments are complete for quantum-secure two-party function evaluation. This seems to be the first completeness result for quantum-secure two-party function evaluation from a generic assumption.
Entanglement in bipartite systems has been applied to generate secure random numbers, which are playing an important role in cryptography or scientific numerical simulations. Here, we propose to use multipartite entanglement distributed between trusted and untrusted parties for generating randomness of arbitrary dimensional systems. We show that the distributed structure of several parties leads to additional protection against possible attacks by an eavesdropper, resulting in more secure randomness generated than in the corresponding bipartite scenario. Especially, randomness can be certified in the group of untrusted parties, even when there is no randomness in either of them individually. We prove that the necessary and sufficient resource for quantum randomness in this scenario is multipartite quantum steering when each untrusted party has a choice between only two measurements. However, the sufficiency no longer holds with more measurement settings. Finally, we apply our analysis to some experimentally realized states and show that more randomness can be extracted compared with the existing analysis.