The surprising thing is that the most successful scientific field of the century is quantum physics, and quantum physics in its most orthodox interpretation is decidedly anti-realist. At least that is what Niels Bohr, the foremost thinker in the field, said explicitly: "an independent reality in the ordinary physical sense can neither be ascribed to the phenomena nor to the agencies of observation." Many philosophers, however, would cringe at the thought that any form of relativism may be considered sensible. Their support for realism stems in part from the belief that the alternative to realism is relativism and that relativism is incoherent. Likewise at the level of science, a view may allow the bat such striking success in dealing with certain difficult questions that the bat adopts it as his means of viewing that entire area of experience.
The surprising thing is that the most successful scientific field of the century is quantum physics, and quantum physics in its most orthodox interpretation is decidedly anti-realist. At least that is what Niels Bohr, the foremost thinker in the field, said explicitly: "an independent reality in the ordinary physical sense can neither be ascribed to the phenomena nor to the agencies of observation." Many philosophers, however, would cringe at the thought that any form of relativism may be considered sensible. Their support for realism stems in part from the belief that the alternative to realism is relativism and that relativism is incoherent. Likewise at the level of science, a view may allow the bat such striking success in dealing with certain difficult questions that the bat adopts it as his means of viewing that entire area of experience.
We discuss the influential role of Niels Bohr's work in the anti-realist realist re-foundation of physics that took place during the 20th century. We will focus in how, developing the modern co-relational matrix of scientific understanding, his essentially anti-realist scheme was able to capture, subvert and defeat the realist program of science through the establishment of a weakened impotent form of "religious realism" grounded on faith instead of scientific conditions. Finally, we will focus in how, still today, anti-realist realism continues to rule the contemporary post-modern research in both (quantum) physics and philosophy.
Niels Bohr, considered one of the fathers of quantum mechanics, formulated a complex interpretation \nof quantum mechanics that guided his understanding of quantum experiments. The contemporary dispute \nbetween realism and anti-realism, the two main approaches to the interpretation of quantum mechanics, \nis often based on different attitudes towards or even readings of Bohr. We propose that a better \nunderstanding of Bohr’s philosophical thought can contribute to the contemporary reconciliation of \nthese opposing philosophical views and thus to a better understanding of the quantum world. Unfortunately, \nin many contemporary interpretations, Bohr’s philosophical approach to quantum mechanics \nhas been misunderstood, re-interpreted or labelled as ambiguous. This is mostly due to the dispersion \nof Bohr’s complex and unique interpretation through different texts, never united in a single systematically \nconceptualized work. To comprehensively explain Bohr’s philosophical approach and his main \nphilosophical concepts, we consider the many similarities between Bohr’s and Husserl’s philosophical \napproach to science. Husserl developed his philosophical standpoint in a cultural context similar to \nBohr’s and shared Bohr’s objects of philosophical consideration as well as his approach to these objects. \nParallel reading of Bohr’s and Husserl’s texts reveals the closeness between Bohr’s ontological realism— \nepistemological anti-realism standpoint and Husserl’s phenomenological standpoint. This explains \ntheir similar views on the relationship between mathematical language, scientific method and Nature. \nWhile Bohr’s use of the term phenomenon is not equal to Husserl’s, Husserl’s rigorous philosophical \nexplanation of the term helps us to better understand Bohr’s use. Furthermore, the parallel reading \nfacilitates better understanding of one of Bohr’s main philosophical theses, often labelled as ambiguous \nand interpreted in different ways, that it is necessary to use classical concepts to describe quantum phenomena. \nWe claim that the thesis is connected with the advance of epistemological reconsideration of \nscience at the time of Bohr’s writing. Thus, Bohr considers some parts of argumentation as self-evident, \nwhile they are not evident to the contemporary reader. Husserl’s analysis of the relationship between science and the life-world offers a much-needed background for a comprehensive understanding of \nBohr’s thesis. The insight into the similarities between Bohr’s and Husserl’s philosophical approach \nto science and scientific phenomena enables a philosophically rigorous reading of Bohr’s texts; it can \neliminate some of the disagreements between realists and anti-realists and provide a firmer philosophical \nground for a dialog between them.
The Copenhagen interpretation is first and foremost associated with Niels Bohr's philosophy of quantum mechanics. In this paper, I attempt to lay out what I see as Bohr's pragmatic approach to science in general and to quantum physics in particular. A part of this approach is his claim that the classical concepts are indispensable for our understanding of all physical phenomena, and it seems as if the claim is grounded in his reflection upon how the evolution of language is adapted to experience. Another, recent interpretation, QBism, has also found support in Darwin's theory. It may therefore not be surprising that sometimes QBism is said to be of the same breed as the Copenhagen interpretation. By comparing the two interpretations, I conclude, nevertheless, that there are important differences.
Philosophical relativism, which denies objectivity and undermines causality, has been a constant feature of ideological struggle in this century, especially in mystifying science and undercutting belief in social progress through scientific understanding. Surprisingly, while the relativist attack has been led by culture critics, they have been able to claim support from the writings of some of the leading scientists themselves, especially in quantum theory. While current quantum theory yields a highly accurate representation of reality, it has been interpreted to deny objectivity and causality. Einstein fought throughout his life against these relativist interpretations, associated especially with the views of Bohr and Heisenberg. It is only in the last few years that Einstein has been largely vindicated by new experimental and theoretical developments, and by a fuller understanding of how the Copenhagen interpretation of Bohr came to dominate the conventional wisdom.
The aim of the present paper is to sbo» that anti-realism in science, 1vhich has a1;guab/y become more fashionable in recentyears, contrary to tuha: its proponents assert, cannot make use of quantum mechanics and its impressiue achievements as a frump card in justifying its claims. I will argue that scientific anti-realism far from providing scientific communiry with a progressive methodologicalframeuorle is a restrictive approach wbicb would hamper scientific progress. Focusing on the historical evidence of the 1vqys in subicb quantum mechanics was deueloped, I 1vill further argue that the orthodox interpretation of quantum mechanics due to Bohr and Heisenberg, among others, iuith its in-built anti-realistic elements provides a damning verdict against the claims of anti-realists. Following a critical assessment of a number of alternative interpretations or the calculus of quantum mechanics, I shall present realistic approaches which provide more effective and frudful conceptualframeu;orks for the advancement of research in the quantum
Scientific realists often say that there should be belief in the approximate truth of ‘our best scientific theories.’ It is hard to hear the phrase ‘our best scientific theories’ without thinking of quantum mechanics and quantum field theories. But as numerous chapters in this collection make clear, it is unclear that some experts even know how to make sense of being a realist about quantum theories. They provide recipes for calculating incredibly precise predictions for observations, but beyond the recipes, they do not seem to offer a clear-cut or unambiguous picture of what physical reality is like at the fundamental level. After giving an overview of the problems that beset any attempt to believe in the truth or approximate truth of quantum theories, Chapter 2 turns to the question of how to protect scientific realism from the ills of the quantum. The aim is to show that it is possible to quarantine the worst of those ills, freeing us to adopt a robustly realistic attitude toward many other extremely successful areas of contemporary science, such as (parts of) geology, microbiology, and chemistry. The quarantine barrier may be imperfect and permeable in places, but is strong enough (the chapter argues) to help the cause of scientific realism.