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International Conference on Communications

One-Way and Two-Way Physical Layer Security Protocols for the Gaussian Satellite Channel

M. A. Vázquez‐Castro, Masahito Hayashi

Published May 1, 2019• 5 citations
Publisher

Abstract

We present the comparative modelling and analysis of one-way and two-way physical layer security protocols using privacy amplification for the Gaussian satellite channel. It is known that one-way protocols based on the classic Wyner?s wiretap channel require Eve's channel to be degraded w.r.t. Bob?s channel. Here, to overcome this limiting performance condition, we introduce a two-way protocol inspired in Maurer?s protocol in IEEE TIT (1993), which differently to other proposals of two-way protocols, fully eliminates the channel degradation condition (i.e. secrecy capacity is always guaranteed to be positive). We present the description of the two protocols and the comparison of secrecy capacity when Eve uses any type of orbit. We show their realistic performance taking into consideration orbital dynamics, i.e. the only assumption made on Eve is that she has to comply with orbit mechanics. Our numerical security analysis results confirm that the two-way protocol outperforms the one-way protocol in different degrees depending on the orbit and legitimate antenna radiation patterns.

DOI
10.1109/icc.2019.8761490

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In this paper we propose a two-way protocol of physical layer security using the method of privacy amplification against eavesdroppers. First we justify our proposed protocol by analyzing the physical layer security provided by the classic wiretap channel model (i.e. one-way protocol). In the Gaussian channels, the classic one-way protocol requires Eve's channel to be degraded w.r.t. Bob's channel. However, this channel degradation condition depends on Eve's location and whether Eve's receiving antenna is more powerful than Bob's. To overcome this limitation, we introduce a two-way protocol inspired in IEEE TIT (1993) that eliminates the channel degradation condition. In the proposed two-way protocol, on a first phase, via Gaussian channel, Bob sends randomness to Alice, which is partially leaked to Eve. Then, on a second phase, Alice transmits information to Bob over a public noiseless channel. We derive the secrecy capacity of the two-way protocol when the channel to Eve is also Gaussian. We show that the capacity of the two-way protocol is always positive. We present numerical values of the capacities illustrating the gains obtained by our proposed protocol. We apply our result to simple yet realistic models of satellite communication channels.

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The increasing demand in data rates and new emerging applications require that the future generation of satellite networks will be designed at sub-THz frequencies with ultra-broad bandwidth. Such next generation communication network owing to its own complexity will be prone to cyberattacks. In this study, we design a physical layer security for the next generation LEO satellite link. We consider a scenario where Eve is placed at a certain distance from the legitimate ground station (Bob) while communicating with low-earth orbit (LEO) satellite (Alice). By taking advantage of the uniqueness of THz atmospheric channel, we derive a closed form expression of the optimum power spectral density (PSD) of the transmitted signal so as to maximize the channel capacity. By leveraging the higher losses due to atmospheric channel and optimum PSD, we improve the physical layer security of the satellite link in the considered scenario. The simulation results show that we can enhance the normalized secrecy capacity beyond a small coverage area near the legitimate receiver Bob.

IEEE International Conference on Cybernetics, Cognition and Machine Learning Applications (ICCCMLA)•Oct 7, 2023•3 citations
We present the comparative modelling and analysis of one-way and two-way physical layer security protocols using privacy amplification for the Gaussian satellite channel. It is known that one-way protocols based on the classic Wyner?s wiretap channel require Eve's channel to be degraded w.r.t. Bob?s channel. Here, to overcome this limiting performance condition, we introduce a two-way protocol inspired in Maurer?s protocol in IEEE TIT (1993), which differently to other proposals of two-way protocols, fully eliminates the channel degradation condition (i.e. secrecy capacity is always guaranteed to be positive). We present the description of the two protocols and the comparison of secrecy capacity when Eve uses any type of orbit. We show their realistic performance taking into consideration orbital dynamics, i.e. the only assumption made on Eve is that she has to comply with orbit mechanics. Our numerical security analysis results confirm that the two-way protocol outperforms the one-way protocol in different degrees depending on the orbit and legitimate antenna radiation patterns.
In this paper we propose a two-way protocol of physical layer security using the method of privacy amplification against eavesdroppers. First we justify our proposed protocol by analyzing the physical layer security provided by the classic wiretap channel model (i.e. one-way protocol). In the Gaussian channels, the classic one-way protocol requires Eve's channel to be degraded w.r.t. Bob's channel. However, this channel degradation condition depends on Eve's location and whether Eve's receiving antenna is more powerful than Bob's. To overcome this limitation, we introduce a two-way protocol inspired in IEEE TIT (1993) that eliminates the channel degradation condition. In the proposed two-way protocol, on a first phase, via Gaussian channel, Bob sends randomness to Alice, which is partially leaked to Eve. Then, on a second phase, Alice transmits information to Bob over a public noiseless channel. We derive the secrecy capacity of the two-way protocol when the channel to Eve is also Gaussian. We show that the capacity of the two-way protocol is always positive. We present numerical values of the capacities illustrating the gains obtained by our proposed protocol. We apply our result to simple yet realistic models of satellite communication channels.
Shannon introduced the classic model of a cryptosystem in 1949, where Eve has access to an identical copy of the cyphertext that Alice sends to Bob. Shannon defined perfect secrecy to be the case when the mutual information between the plaintext and the cyphertext is zero. Perfect secrecy is motivated by error-free transmission and requires that Bob and Alice share a secret key. Wyner in 1975 and later I. Csiszar and J. Korner in 1978 modified the Shannon model assuming that the channels are noisy and proved that secrecy can be achieved without sharing a secret key. This model is called wiretap channel model and secrecy capacity is known when Eve's channel is noisier than Bob's channel. In this paper we review the concept of wiretap coding from the satellite channel viewpoint. We also review subsequently introduced stronger secrecy levels which can be numerically quantified and are keyless unconditionally secure under certain assumptions. We introduce the general construction of wiretap coding and analyse its applicability for a typical satellite channel. From our analysis we discuss the potential of keyless information theoretic physical layer security for satellite channels based on wiretap coding. We also identify system design implications for enabling simultaneous operation with additional information theoretic security protocols.
Secure communications are becoming increasingly relevant in the development of space technology. Well-established cryptographic technology is already in place and is expected to continue to be so. On the other hand, information theoretical security emerges as a post-quantum versatile candidate to complement overall security strength. In order to prove such potential, performance analysis methods are needed that consider realistic legitimate and eavesdropper system assumptions and non-asymptotic coding lengths. In this paper, we propose the design of secure radio frequency (RF) satellite links with realistic system assumptions. Our contribution is three-fold. First, we propose a wiretap channel model for the finite-length regime. The model includes a stochastic wiretap encoding method using existing practical linear error correcting codes and hash codes. Secrecy is provided with privacy amplification, for which the finite-length secrecy metric is given that upper bounds semantic secrecy. Second, we derive a novel RF (broadcast) satellite wiretap channel model that parameterizes the stochastic degraded channel around the legitimate channel, a necessary condition to enable secure communication. Finally, we show the design of a secure satellite physical layer and finite-length performance evaluation. In doing so, we define as sacrifice rate the fixed fraction of the overall coding rate budget for reliability that needs to be allocated to secrecy. Our methodology does not make use of channel side information of the eavesdropper, it only makes assumptions on Eve's noise power. We illustrate our proposed design method with numerical results using practical error correcting codes in current standards of satellite communication.
This work considers the two way wiretap channel in which two legitimate users, Alice and Bob, wish to exchange messages securely in the presence of a passive eavesdropper Eve. In the full duplex scenario, where each node can transmit and receive simultaneously, we obtain new achievable secrecy rate regions based on the idea of allowing the two users to jointly optimize their channel prefixing distributions and binning codebooks; in addition to key sharing. The new regions are shown to be strictly larger than the known ones for a wide class of discrete memoryless and Gaussian channels. In the half duplex case, where a user can only transmit or receive on any given degree of freedom, we introduce the idea of randomized scheduling and establish the significant gain it offers in terms of the achievable secrecy sum-rate. We further develop an experimental setup based on a IEEE 802.15.4-enabled sensor boards to validate our theoretical analysis. Using this testbed, it is shown that one can exploit the two way nature of the communication, via appropriately randomizing the transmit power levels and transmission schedule, to introduce significant ambiguity at a noiseless Eve. To the best of our knowledge, this is one of the first attempts aiming towards building practical secrecy protocols inspired by information theoretic principles.
An alternative or supplementary approach named as physical layer security has been proposed to afford an extra security layer on top of the conventional cryptography technique. In this paper, an overview of secrecy performance investigations over the classic Alice-Bob-Eve wiretap fading channels is conducted. On the basis of the classic wiretap channel model, we have comprehensively listed and thereafter compared the existing works on physical layer secrecy analysis considering the small-scale, large-scale, composite, and cascaded fading channel models. Exact secrecy metrics expressions, including secrecy outage probability (SOP), the probability of non-zero secrecy capacity (PNZ), average secrecy capacity (ASC), and secrecy bounds, including the lower bound of SOP and ergodic secrecy capacity, are presented. In order to encompass the aforementioned four kinds of fading channel models with a more generic and flexible distribution, the mixture gamma (MG), mixture of Gaussian (MoG), and Fox's HHH-function distributions are three useful candidates to largely include the above-mentioned four kinds of fading channel models. It is shown that they are flexible and general when assisting the secrecy analysis to obtain closed-form expressions. Their advantages and limitations are also highlighted. Conclusively, these three approaches are proven to provide a unified secrecy analysis framework and can cover all types of independent wiretap fading channel models. Apart from those, revisiting the existing secrecy enhancement techniques based on our system configuration, the on-off transmission scheme, jamming approach (including artificial noise (AN) & artificial fast fading (AFF)), antenna selection, and security region are presented.
The increasing demand in data rates and new emerging applications require that the future generation of satellite networks will be designed at sub-THz frequencies with ultra-broad bandwidth. Such next generation communication network owing to its own complexity will be prone to cyberattacks. In this study, we design a physical layer security for the next generation LEO satellite link. We consider a scenario where Eve is placed at a certain distance from the legitimate ground station (Bob) while communicating with low-earth orbit (LEO) satellite (Alice). By taking advantage of the uniqueness of THz atmospheric channel, we derive a closed form expression of the optimum power spectral density (PSD) of the transmitted signal so as to maximize the channel capacity. By leveraging the higher losses due to atmospheric channel and optimum PSD, we improve the physical layer security of the satellite link in the considered scenario. The simulation results show that we can enhance the normalized secrecy capacity beyond a small coverage area near the legitimate receiver Bob.