The possibility question concerns the status of possibilities: do they form an irreducible category of the external reality, or are they merely features of our cognitive framework? If fundamental physics is ever to shed light on this issue, it must be done by some future theory that unifies insights of general relativity and quantum mechanics. The paper investigates one programme of this kind, namely the causal sets programme, as it apparently considers alternative developments of a given system. To evaluate this claim, we prove some algebraic facts about the sequential growth of causal sets. These facts tell against alternative developments, given that causal sets are understood as particular events. We thus interpret causal sets as multi-realisable objects, like states. This interpretation, however, is undermined by an argument for the probabilistic constraint of general covariance, as it says that multiple paths along which a causal set is produced are not physically different.
The possibility question concerns the status of possibilities: do they form an irreducible category of the external reality, or are they merely features of our cognitive framework? If fundamental physics is ever to shed light on this issue, it must be done by some future theory that unifies insights of general relativity and quantum mechanics. The paper investigates one programme of this kind, namely the causal sets programme, as it apparently considers alternative developments of a given system. To evaluate this claim, we prove some algebraic facts about the sequential growth of causal sets. These facts tell against alternative developments, given that causal sets are understood as particular events. We thus interpret causal sets as multi-realisable objects, like states. This interpretation, however, is undermined by an argument for the probabilistic constraint of general covariance, as it says that multiple paths along which a causal set is produced are not physically different.
Given the controversial status of the various interpretations of non-relativistic quantum mechanics (QM for short), it may seem crazy to use the philosophy of quantum physics to try to learn some lessons about the prevailing problems in the literature on dispositions and causal powers. However, such an attempt seems worthwhile for at least three reasons. The first is more internal to the philosophy of QM. Apart from a seminal paper by Robert Clifton and Constantine Pagonis (1995), who investigated the issue of dispositional properties in Bohmian mechanics, very little has been done to shed This neglect seems particularly surprising, especially if one considers that some of the founding fathers of quantum physics, notably Werner Heisenberg, have made direct reference to Aristotelian potentiae to refer to and interpret the elusive nature of the atomic and subatomic world ‘in se’, that is, before measurement: ‘Such a probability function [i.e. the statistical algorithm of quantum theory] combines objective and subjective elements. It contains statements on possibilities, or better tendencies (“potentiae” in Aristotelian philosophy), and such statements are completely objective, they don’t depend on any observer the passage from the “possible” to the Some years before, Henry Margenau3 had already characterized the properties of quantum systems as merely latent, in contrast to the properties intervening in the description of classical systems, which are always definite even when they are merely dispositional. Similarly, Karl Popper4 and Nicholas Maxwell5 have defended some sort of a propensity interpretation of probability, and a view of quantum reality essentially characterized by irreducibly probabilistic propensities. Influenced by this tradition, Michael Redhead’s influential textbook on the philosophy of QM distinguishes among three different interpretations of the theory, the second of which presupposes real propensities and potentialities and attributes to measurements the function of ‘converting latent values in possessed values’.6 Clearly, for this second interpretation to make less than an instrumentalistic sense, one needs to construe potentialities and dispositions as real properties of systems. Consequently, it seems important to try to get a firmer grasp of the sense in which QM might need irreducible dispositions to shed light on the nature of the properties of quantum systems before measurements, in particular when the state of such systems is not an eigenstate of the relevant physical observable.
Quantum mechanics has achieved unparalleled success as an operational theory, describing a wide range of experiments to remarkable accuracy. However, the physical foundations on which it rests remain as puzzling as they were a century ago, and a concise statement of the physical principles that underlie quantum mechanics is still outstanding. One promising approach holds that these principles should be formulated in terms of information, since many of the counter-intuitive effects in quantum theory concern questions such as what one can know about a quantum system and how the information encoded therein can be processed and distributed between parties. Another challenging feature of quantum theory is its incompatibility with the other cornerstone of modern physics, general relativity. In order to reconcile the two, one must identify and retain only the essential concepts and principles of each theory, and in the case of general relativity, causality has been identified as such a concept. This raises the question of how our classical understanding of causality must change when quantum theory is taken into account. In order to address these questions about information, knowledge and causality, I turn to the framework of causal models. In classical statistics, causal models explain the relations among a set of variables in terms of causal influences, which makes them a powerful tool for structuring our knowledge about complex systems and developing strategies for interacting with them. More importantly, the framework provides the conceptual underpinnings and mathematical methods for addressing questions about causation, information and knowledge in a rigorous manner. In this thesis, I develop a version of the classical causal models framework that is compatible with quantum theory and explore its physical implications. \n \n \nA first step is to define quantum versions of fundamental elements such as variables, conditionals and belief propagation rules. This allows one to consider the question of what one can come to know about a quantum variable from the point of view of causal modelling. The conditionals relating quantum variables are found to have a richer structure than their classical counterparts, which can be exploited for the task of discerning causal relations given limited data -- a central problem in classical causal modelling. The mathematical properties of quantum conditionals also establish a correspondence between various classes of two-party correlations, such as bound and distillable entanglement, and the types of causal structures that can give rise to them, which may become a useful tool for entanglement theory and quantum information processing. In the context of open quantum systems dynamics, quantum causal models provide a clear physical explanation of not completely positive maps and, more broadly, of non-Markovian quantum dynamics. Finally, I consider the possibility of non-classical effects in the way that different causal mechanisms are combined -- that is, non-classical causal structures. For the simple case of two causally ordered variables, I propose indicators that witness different classes of combinations of causal mechanisms, including a non-classical mixture, and describe an experiment realizing examples of the different classes. \n \n \nAs these results illustrate, the framework of quantum causal models provides both greater conceptual clarity and a comprehensive mathematical formalism for studying a diverse set of problems, ranging from foundational questions to applications in open systems dynamics and the exploration of non-classical causal structures, which are likely to feature in a future theory of quantum gravity. The material presented in this thesis is intended as a foundation and inspiration for further applications of quantum causal models.
I suppose one could imagine laws of physics which would dictate that a world be exactly so, and not otherwise, allowing no detail to be varied. But what could dictate that those laws of physics be ‘the’ laws of physics? By considering a spectrum of possible laws, one could again consider a spectrum of possible worlds. In fact the laws of physics of our actual world, as presently understood, have no such dictatorial character. So that even with the laws given, a spectrum of different worlds is possible. There are two kinds of freedom. Although the laws say something about how a given state of the world may develop, they say nothing (or anyway very little) about in what state the world should start. So, to begin with, we have freedom as regards ‘initial conditions’. To go on with, the future that can evolve from a given present is not uniquely determined, according to contemporary orthodoxy. The laws list various possibilities, and attach to them various probabilities. The relation between the set of possibilities and the unique actuality which emerges is quite peculiar in modern ‘quantum theory’ – the contemporary all-embracing basic physical theory. The absence of determinism, the probabilistic nature of the assertions of the theory, is already a little peculiar… at least in the light of pre-twentieth-century ‘classical’ physics. But after all everyday life, if not classical physics, prepares us very well for the idea that not everything is predictable, that chance is important.
The idea that events are equipped with a partial causal order is central to our understanding of physics in the tested regimes: given two pointlike events A and B , either A is in the causal past of B , B is in the causal past of A , or A and B are space-like separated. Operationally, the meaning of these order relations corresponds to constraints on the possible correlations between experiments performed in the vicinities of the respective events: if A is in the causal past of B , an experimenter at A could signal to an experimenter at B but not the other way around, while if A and B are space-like separated, no signaling is possible in either direction. In the context of a concrete physical theory, the correlations compatible with a given causal configuration may obey further constraints. For instance, space-like correlations in quantum mechanics arise from local measurements on joint quantum states, while time-like correlations are established via quantum channels. Similarly to other variables, however, the causal order of a set of events could be random, and little is understood about the constraints that causality implies in this case. A main difficulty concerns the fact that the order of events can now generally depend on the operations performed at the locations of these events, since, for instance, an operation at A could influence the order in which B and C occur in A ’s future. So far, no formal theory of causality compatible with such dynamical causal order has been developed. Apart from being of fundamental interest in the context of inferring causal relations, such a theory is imperative for understanding recent suggestions that the causal order of events in quantum mechanics can be indefinite. Here, we develop such a theory in the general multipartite case. Starting from a background-independent definition of causality, we derive an iteratively formulated canonical decomposition of multipartite causal correlations. For a fixed number of settings and outcomes for each party, these correlations form a polytope whose facets define causal inequalities. The case of quantum correlations in this paradigm is captured by the process matrix formalism. We investigate the link between causality and the closely related notion of causal separability of quantum processes, which we here define rigorously in analogy with the link between Bell locality and separability of quantum states. We show that causality and causal separability are not equivalent in general by giving an example of a physically admissible tripartite quantum process that is causal but not causally separable. We also show that there are causally separable quantum processes that become non-causal if extended by supplying the parties with entangled ancillas. This motivates the concepts of extensibly causal and extensibly causally separable (ECS) processes, for which the respective property remains invariant under extension. We characterize the class of ECS quantum processes in the tripartite case via simple conditions on the form of the process matrix. We show that the processes realizable by classically controlled quantum circuits are ECS and conjecture that the reverse also holds.
Introduction In this chapter we apply the concepts presented in Chapter 22 to a topic that has been of much theoretical interest in recent decades: causal set theory (CST). It is interesting and useful to review the status of CST relative to other foundational topics in mathematical physics that have been and remain of prime significance to empirical physics, namely, special relativity (SR), general relativity (GR), and quantum mechanics (QM). Those great frameworks are built on foundations that presuppose the continuity of space and time. Despite this, it is an empirical fact that we are surrounded by discreteness in the form of atoms, so it is natural to see how that discreteness fits in with the continuity of space and time. We have attempted in this book to show that the application of discrete principles to QM can go far beyond the basic Planck quantum of action. We have gone as far as discretizing empirical time, in the form of the stage concept. However, as far as relativity in either of its manifestations is concerned, the case for any form of discreteness has not yet been established empirically, although great efforts are being made in that direction in the program known as quantum gravity . We have particularly in mind the discretization approaches to GR of Regge (Regge, 1961) and Penrose (Penrose, 1971). Regge's approach is a classically based discretization of the Riemannian manifold concept, so has at best a generalized propositional classification (GPC) of two. Penrose's spin network paradigm started as a quantum description of spacetime and has led to much work in the area of spin networks in the hope of unifying GR and QM. However, workers in spin networks and related branches of quantum gravity have focued their attention on the mathematical complexities and hardly any on the role of observers and their apparatus, leading to a GPC classification of quantum gravity as one, that is, as mathematical physics and not physics. Claims made that such programs represent empirical physics have not been empirically substantiated to date; quantum gravity at this time remains empirically vacuous, despite the best efforts of many theorists over many decades.
This article examines some experimental conditions that invite and possibly require recourse to quantum-mechanical-like mathematical models (QMLMs), models based on the key mathematical features of quantum mechanics, in scientific fields outside physics, such as biology, cognitive psychology, or economics. In particular, I consider whether the following two correlative features of quantum phenomena that were decisive for establishing the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics play similarly important roles in QMLMs elsewhere. The first is the individuality and discreteness of quantum phenomena, and the second is the irreducibly probabilistic nature of our predictions concerning them, coupled to the particular character of the probabilities involved, as different from the character of probabilities found in classical physics. I also argue that these features could be interpreted in terms of a particular form of epistemology that suspends and even precludes a causal and, in the first place, realist description of quantum objects and processes. This epistemology limits the descriptive capacity of quantum theory to the description, classical in nature, of the observed quantum phenomena manifested in measuring instruments. Quantum mechanics itself only provides descriptions, probabilistic in nature, concerning numerical data pertaining to such phenomena, without offering a physical description of quantum objects and processes. While QMLMs share their use of the quantum-mechanical or analogous mathematical formalism, they may differ by the roles, if any, the two features in question play in them and by different ways of interpreting the phenomena they considered and this formalism itself. This article will address those differences as well.