Dual receiver encryption (DRE) is an important cryptographic primitive introduced by Diament et al. at CCS’04, which allows two independent receivers to decrypt a same ciphertext to obtain the same plaintext. This primitive is quite useful in designing combined public key cryptosystems and denial of service attack-resilient protocols. In this paper, we obtain some results as follows. Using weak lattice-based programmable hash functions (wLPHF) with high min-entropy (Crypto’16), we give a generic IND-CCA secure DRE construction in the standard model. Furthermore, we get a concrete DRE scheme by instantiating a concrete wLPHF with high min-entropy. For DRE notion in the identity-based setting, identity-based DRE (IB-DRE), basing on lattice-based programmable hash functions (LPHF) with high min-entropy, we give a framework of IND-ID-CPA secure IB-DRE construction in the standard model. When instantiating with concrete LPHFs with high min-entropy, we obtain five concrete IB-DRE schemes.
Dual receiver encryption (DRE) is an important cryptographic primitive introduced by Diament et al. at CCS’04, which allows two independent receivers to decrypt a same ciphertext to obtain the same plaintext. This primitive is quite useful in designing combined public key cryptosystems and denial of service attack-resilient protocols. In this paper, we obtain some results as follows. Using weak lattice-based programmable hash functions (wLPHF) with high min-entropy (Crypto’16), we give a generic IND-CCA secure DRE construction in the standard model. Furthermore, we get a concrete DRE scheme by instantiating a concrete wLPHF with high min-entropy. For DRE notion in the identity-based setting, identity-based DRE (IB-DRE), basing on lattice-based programmable hash functions (LPHF) with high min-entropy, we give a framework of IND-ID-CPA secure IB-DRE construction in the standard model. When instantiating with concrete LPHFs with high min-entropy, we obtain five concrete IB-DRE schemes.
Dual receiver encryption (DRE), being originally conceived at CCS 2004 as a proof technique, enables a ciphertext to be decrypted to the same plaintext by two different but dual receivers and becomes popular recently due to itself useful application potentials such secure outsourcing, trusted third party supervising, client puzzling, etc. Identity-based DRE (IB-DRE) further combines the bilateral advantages/facilities of DRE and identity-based encryption (IBE). Most previous constructions of IB-DRE are based on bilinear pairings, and thus suffers from known quantum algorithmic attacks. It is interesting to build IB-DRE schemes based on the well-known post quantum platforms, such as lattices. At ACISP 2018, Zhang et al. gave the first lattice-based construction of IB-DRE, and the main part of the public parameter in this scheme consists of 2 n + 2 matrices where n is the bit-length of arbitrary identity. In this paper, by introducing an injective map and a homomorphic computation technique due to Yamada at EUROCRYPT 2016, we propose another lattice-based construction of IB-DRE in an even efficient manner: The main part of the public parameters consists only of 2 p n 1 p + 2 matrices of the same dimensions, where p ( ≥ 2 ) is a flexible constant. The larger the p and n, the more observable of our proposal. Typically, when p = 2 and n = 284 according to the suggestion given by Peikert et al., the size of public parameters in our proposal is reduced to merely 12% of Zhang et al.’s method. In addition, to lighten the pressure of key generation center, we extend our lattice-based IB-DRE scheme to hierarchical scenario. Finally, both the IB-DRE scheme and the HIB-DRE scheme are proved to be indistinguishable against adaptively chosen identity and plaintext attacks (IND-ID-CPA).
In CCS'04, Diament etc al. presented special kind of public key encryption called Dual Receiver Encryption (DRE).In DRE, sender encrypts the plaintext using public keys of two independent receivers.Both independent receivers can decrypt the ciphertext into the same plaintext using their own private keys.This new cryptography primitive has applications in construction of complete nonmalleability and plaintext-awareness public key encryption, for a secure management of data that is to be disseminated to distributed processors, for ubiquitous and mobile computing applications.Daode Zhang et.al. constructed lattice-based IB-DRE scheme which is secure against stronger security notion i.e. adaptive-ID.We present hierarchical identity based dual encryption (HIB-DRE) scheme under LWE assumption.To the best of our knowledge, this gives the first provably secure HIB-DRE scheme in the lattice based setting.Independent work by Naccache[1] and Chatterjee -Sarkar[2] presented a variant of Waters's identity based encryption scheme to reduce Public Parameters.They have considered an identity of l-bits as l chunks where size of each chunk is l/l .This reduces the Public Parameter (PP) size from l to l n × m matrices.This idea was named as blocking technique [3].We have used blocking technique to reduce the size of PP.Daode Zhang et.al.[4] presented adaptive secure IB-DRE scheme.This scheme[4] contains l + 1, n × m matrices as PPs, where l denotes the number of the bits in identity.Using blocking technique we have reduced the size of PP by around factor β .Because of this the size of prime number q in field Z q is increased by 2 β which results in increase in computation cost.We have shown that compared to Daode Zhang et.al.scheme the size of the PP can be decreased approximately by 80% and the time complexity is increased by only 1.40% for a suitably chosen β .
There only exists one deterministic identity-based encryption (DIBE) scheme which is adaptively secure in the auxiliary-input setting, under the learning with errors (LWE) assumption. However, the master public key consists of basic matrices. In this paper, we consider to construct adaptively secure DIBE schemes with more compact public parameters from the LWE problem. (i) On the one hand, we gave a generic DIBE construction from lattice-based programmable hash functions with high min-entropy. (ii) On the other hand, when instantiating our generic DIBE construction with four LPHFs with high min-entropy, we can get four adaptively secure DIBE schemes with more compact public parameters. In one of our DIBE schemes, the master public key only consists of basic matrices.
There only exists one deterministic identity-based encryption (DIBE) scheme which is adaptively secure in the auxiliary-input setting, under the learning with errors (LWE) assumption. However, the master public key consists of O(λ) basic matrices. In this paper, we consider to construct adaptively secure DIBE schemes with more compact public parameters from the LWE problem. (i) On the one hand, we gave a generic DIBE construction from lattice-based programmable hash functions with high min-entropy. (ii) On the other hand, when instantiating our generic DIBE construction with four LPHFs with high min-entropy, we can get four adaptively secure DIBE schemes with more compact public parameters. In one of our DIBE schemes, the master public key only consists of ω(logλ) basic matrices.
Receiver selective opening (RSO) security considers the security of encryption schemes under the scenario of a single sender and multiple receivers, where an adversary is allowed to adaptively corrupt some receivers’ secret keys. RSO security has been proven to be more secure than indistinguishability-based security notions. A lot of research has focused on RSO security in terms of public-key encryption and identity-based encryption (IBE); however, hierarchical IBE (HIBE), which is a generalization of IBE, is still lacking in the study, and how to obtain such a construction remains an open problem. To address this gap, we initiate a study of RSO security on HIBE in this work. Precisely, we first formalize the definition of simulation-based RSO against identity-chosen-plaintext/ciphertext attacks in the k-challenge setting (SIM-ID-RSO k -CPA/CCA) for HIBE. We then present generic SIM-ID-RSO k -CCA secure HIBE constructions by introducing the double secret key paradigm. Specifically, we show that a SIM-ID-RSO k -CCA secure HIBE scheme can be obtained from an IND-ID-CPA secure HIBE scheme as well as a one-time signature scheme that satisfies strong unforgeability. Through our general construction, we can derive various concrete schemes based on different hard assumptions (e.g., lattice-based and pairing-based SIM-ID-RSO k -CCA secure HIBE schemes) according to usage requirements.
In the situation where there are one sender and multiple receivers, a receiver selective opening (RSO) attack for an identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme considers adversaries that can corrupt some of the receivers and get their user secret keys and plaintexts. Security against RSO attacks for an IBE scheme ensures confidentiality of ciphertexts of uncorrupted receivers. In this paper, we formalize a definition of RSO security against chosen ciphertext attacks (RSO-CCA security) for IBE and propose the first RSO-CCA secure IBE schemes. More specifically, we construct an RSO-CCA secure IBE scheme based on an IND-ID-CPA secure IBE scheme and a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof system with unbounded simulation soundness and multi-theorem zero-knowledge. Through our generic construction, we obtain the first pairing-based and lattice-based RSO-CCA secure IBE schemes.