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Breaking the provably secure SAKE-C authenticated key exchange protocol with Extended Key Compromise Impersonation (E-KCI) Attack.

Ali Mackvandi, Maryam Saeed, Mansour Naddafiun

Published Jan 1, 2012• 0 citations
OpenAlex

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A Key Compromise Impersonation attack against Wang's Provably Secure Identity-based Key Agreement Protocol.

Maurizio Adriano Strangio

•Jan 1, 2013•1 citation

Enhancing CK-Model for Key Compromise Impersonation Resilience and Identity-based Key Exchange.

Robert W. Zhu, Xiaojian Tian, Duncan S. Wong

Abstract. In 2001, Canetti and Krawczyk proposed a security model (CKmodel) for authentication protocols. They also gave an indistinguishabilitybased definition for key exchange protocols. Since then the model has almost exclusively been used for analyzing key exchange protocols, although it can be applied to authentication protocols in general. The model not only captures a large class of attacks but also provides a modular approach to the design of authentication protocols. However, the model does not capture the property of Key Compromise Impersonation (KCI) Resilience. Until now, analysis concerning this property has mostly been done heuristically and restricted to key exchange protocols only. Previous attempts on formalizing KCI have mostly been done in some ad hoc manner and additional proofs have to be given specifically for the security of KCI resilience. In this paper, we propose an extension to the CK-model, which allows, for the first time, the KCI attacks to be considered in authentication protocols in general, rather than restricted to key exchange protocols, and no more additional proofs are required specifically for KCI security. With the revival of interest in identity-based (ID-based) cryptography, there have been many new ID-based key exchange protocols proposed. Despite the fact that some of them have been proven in some restricted versions of a model proposed by Bellare and Rogaway in 1993 and some others have been proven in the original CK-model, there is no rigorous model specifically for ID-based key exchange security. In particular, forward secrecy against compromised Key Generation Server (KGS-FS) has never been captured even though this notion is more important and stronger than the perfect forward secrecy in ID-based key exchange. For this, we further extend our model to ID-based setting and capture the property of KGS-FS for ID-based key exchange security. 1

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Extended KCI attack against two-party key establishment protocols

Qiang Tang, Liqun Chen

Information Processing Letters•May 20, 2011•13 citations

Provably secure identity-based authenticated key agreement protocol and its application

Shuai Shao, Bin Tian, Xin Wang +1 more

We point out the RYY+ identity-based (ID-based) key agreement protocol is vulnerable to Key-compromise impersonation (KCI) attack and Intermediate results leakage (IRL) attack. Then we give the improved protocol which provides KCI and IRL resistance. The novel protocol is provably secure under the gap Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption in the seCK model, which enhances the adversary's queries comparing with previous ID based AKE models. The proposed scheme also has an advantage over most previous schemes on security and efficiency.

IEEE International Conference on Cloud Computing and Intelligence Systems (CCIS)•Oct 1, 2012•0 citations

Modeling Key Compromise Impersonation Attacks on Group Key Exchange Protocols

M. Choudary Gorantla, Colin Boyd, Juan Manuel González Nieto

Lecture notes in computer science•Jan 1, 2009•50 citations

Impersonation Attack on Two Identity-Based Authenticated Key Exchange Protocols

Shiwu Zhang, Qingfeng Cheng, Xuekui Wang

In 2009, Holbl et al. proposed two new identity-based authenticated key exchange protocols and claimed that their protocols can withstand various attacks. In this paper, we will show that Holbl et al.'s protocols cannot resist basic impersonation attack. It also means that their protocols are vulnerable to key compromise impersonation (KCI) attacks. Furthermore, we propose improvements of their protocols with impersonation attack resilience and KCI resilience.

WASE International Conference on Information Engineering•Aug 1, 2010•7 citations
Abstract. In 2001, Canetti and Krawczyk proposed a security model (CKmodel) for authentication protocols. They also gave an indistinguishabilitybased definition for key exchange protocols. Since then the model has almost exclusively been used for analyzing key exchange protocols, although it can be applied to authentication protocols in general. The model not only captures a large class of attacks but also provides a modular approach to the design of authentication protocols. However, the model does not capture the property of Key Compromise Impersonation (KCI) Resilience. Until now, analysis concerning this property has mostly been done heuristically and restricted to key exchange protocols only. Previous attempts on formalizing KCI have mostly been done in some ad hoc manner and additional proofs have to be given specifically for the security of KCI resilience. In this paper, we propose an extension to the CK-model, which allows, for the first time, the KCI attacks to be considered in authentication protocols in general, rather than restricted to key exchange protocols, and no more additional proofs are required specifically for KCI security. With the revival of interest in identity-based (ID-based) cryptography, there have been many new ID-based key exchange protocols proposed. Despite the fact that some of them have been proven in some restricted versions of a model proposed by Bellare and Rogaway in 1993 and some others have been proven in the original CK-model, there is no rigorous model specifically for ID-based key exchange security. In particular, forward secrecy against compromised Key Generation Server (KGS-FS) has never been captured even though this notion is more important and stronger than the perfect forward secrecy in ID-based key exchange. For this, we further extend our model to ID-based setting and capture the property of KGS-FS for ID-based key exchange security. 1
We point out the RYY+ identity-based (ID-based) key agreement protocol is vulnerable to Key-compromise impersonation (KCI) attack and Intermediate results leakage (IRL) attack. Then we give the improved protocol which provides KCI and IRL resistance. The novel protocol is provably secure under the gap Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption in the seCK model, which enhances the adversary's queries comparing with previous ID based AKE models. The proposed scheme also has an advantage over most previous schemes on security and efficiency.