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Optik

A scheme on converting quantum deniable authentication into universal quantum designated verifier signature

Wei‐Min Shi, Shuo-Wang, Yanmei Wang, Yi‐Hua Zhou, Yu‐Guang Yang

Published May 23, 2019• 4 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1016/j.ijleo.2019.05.054

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A designated verifier signature is a special type of digital signature, which convinces a designated verifier that she has signed a message in such a way that the designated verifier cannot transfer the signature to a third party. A strong designated verifier signature scheme enhances the privacy of the signer such that no one but the designated verifier can verify the signer's signatures. In this paper we present two generic frame works for constructing strong designated verifier signature schemes from any secure ring signature scheme and any deniable one-pass authenticated key exchange protocol, respectively. Compared with similar protocols, the instantiations of our construction achieve improved efficiency.
AmphiKey, a dual-mode post-quantum/traditional (PQ/T) hybrid authenticated key exchange mechanism (AKEM) has been designed to secure smart grid communications against both classical and quantum threats. AmphiKey offers two distinct operational modes within a single framework: an Authenticated Mode and a Deniable Mode. The Authenticated Mode employs a blackbox approach, combining ephemeral ML-KEM-768 and X25519 with long-term Raccoon DSA keys to provide forward secrecy and strong, non-repudiable authenticity. This design achieves "OR" confidentiality, where security holds if either of the KEMs is unbroken, and robust "AND" authenticity. For the signature operation, it leverages the 'masking-friendly' Raccoon digital signature (DSA), which is specifically designed for side-channel attack resistance, though this protection is localized to the signing key and does not provide deniability. In contrast, Deniable Mode provides deniable authentication, preserving privacy. The protocol used ML-KEM-768 (AKEM-1), Ephemeral X25519 (AKEM-2), Raccoon-based DSA (Rac) (compared performance to ML-DSA-65), and the Ascon cipher to deliver its security guarantees. Key contributions include providing a flexible protocol with enhanced security, optional deniability, and efficiency adapted to the diverse needs of the smart grid infrastructure. We present a comprehensive performance evaluation on a heterogeneous testbed featuring a powerful server and client (AMD Ryzen 5) and a resource-constrained client (Raspberry Pi). In efficient Deniable mode, the full handshake completes in 0.15 ms on the server and 0.41 ms on the Raspberry Pi client. In contrast, the Authenticated Mode is bottlenecked by the client-side signature generation; the handshake takes 4.8 ms for the Raspberry Pi client to initiate and 0.84 ms for the server to verify.
The Signal protocol and its X3DH key exchange core are regularly used by billions of people in applications like WhatsApp but are unfortunately not quantum-secure. Thus, designing an efficient and post-quantum secure X3DH alternative is paramount. Notably, X3DH supports asynchronicity, as parties can immediately derive keys after uploading them to a central server, and deniability, allowing parties to plausibly deny having completed key exchange. To satisfy these constraints, existing post-quantum X3DH proposals use ring signatures (or equivalently a form of designated-verifier signatures) to provide authentication without compromising deniability as regular signatures would. Existing ring signature schemes, however, have some drawbacks. Notably, they are not generally proven secure in the quantum random oracle model (QROM) and so the quantum security of parameters that are proposed is unclear and likely weaker than claimed. In addition, they are generally slower than standard primitives like KEMs. In this work, we propose an efficient, deniable and post-quantum X3DH-like protocol that we call K-Waay, that does not rely on ring signatures. At its core, K-Waay uses a split-KEM, a primitive introduced by Brendel et al. [SAC 2020], to provide Diffie-Hellman-like implicit authentication and secrecy guarantees. Along the way, we revisit the formalism of Brendel et al. and identify that additional security properties are required to prove a split-KEM-based protocol secure. We instantiate split-KEM by building a protocol based on the Frodo key exchange protocol relying on the plain LWE assumption: our proofs might be of independent interest as we show it satisfies our novel unforgeability and deniability security notions. Finally, we complement our theoretical results by thoroughly benchmarking both K-Waay and existing X3DH protocols. Our results show even when using plain LWE and a conservative choice of parameters that K-Waay is significantly faster than previous work.