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Conference on Lasers and Electro-Optics

BB84 and DQPS-QKD experiments using one polarization-insensitive measurement setup with a countermeasure against detector blinding and control attacks

Muataz Alhussein, Kyo Inoue, Toshimori Honjo

Published May 5, 2019• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

This paper demonstrates phase-encoding BB84-based QKD experiments with active basis selection using one interferometer with no phase and polarization controls, unlike conventional BB84-QKD experiments. A countermeasure against detector blinding attack is also implemented. © 2019 The Author(s)
DOI
10.23919/cleo.2019.8750248

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We report a proof-of-principle quantum key distribution experiment using a one-way optical scheme with polarization encoding implementing the BB84 protocol. LiNbO 3 phase modulators are used for generating polarization states for Alice and active basis selection for Bob. This allows the former to use a single laser source, while the latter needs only two single-photon detectors. The presented optical scheme is simple and consists of standard fiber components. Calibration algorithm for three polarization controllers used in the scheme has been developed. The experiment was carried with 10 MHz repetition frequency laser pulses over a distance of 50 km of standard telecom optical fiber.
Abstract The BB84 quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol sets the foundation for achieving secure communication against quantum threats. Since its inception, significant advancements have aimed towards frugal experimental implementations with enhanced security. In this paper, we report a passive polarization encoded BB84 protocol. By passively and randomly encoding the polarization states, the setup avoids active modulation and simplifies design with security standards analogous to entanglement-based QKD. The heralding of a probabilistic single-photon source ensures an extremely low probability of multi-photon emissions evading photon number-splitting attacks. The quality of the single-photon source and thus, the QKD setup is certified by the second-order correlation function, g (2) (0) = 0.006 ± 0.0002. Our protocol provides an optimisation trade-off between the conventional BB84 and the BBM92 protocol. The advantage relies on using fewer detectors (compared to the BBM92 protocol) and no reliance on active quantum random number generators (compared to the standard BB84) to drive Alice’s encoding scheme. Our implementation achieves a quantum bit error rate of 7% and a secure key rate of 5 kbps.
The influence of bright light on a single-photon detector has been described in a number of recent publications. The impact on quantum key distribution (QKD) is important, and several hacking experiments have been tailored to fully control single-photon detectors. Special attention has been given to avoid introducing further errors into a QKD system. We describe the design and technical details of an apparatus which allows to attack a quantum-cryptographic connection. This device is capable of controlling free-space and fiber-based systems and of minimizing unwanted clicks in the system. With different control diagrams, we are able to achieve a different level of control. The control was initially targeted to the systems using BB84 protocol, with polarization encoding and basis switching using beamsplitters, but could be extended to other types of systems. We further outline how to characterize the quality of active control of single-photon detectors.
The Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol is one of the simplest protocols for implementing quantum key distribution (QKD). In the protocol, the sender and the receiver iteratively choose one of two complementary measurement bases. Regarding the basis choice by the receiver, a passive setup has been adopted in a number of its implementations, including satellite QKD and time-bin encoding. However, conventional theoretical techniques to prove the security of the BB84 protocol are not applicable if the receiver chooses their measurement basis passively, rather than actively, with a biased probability, followed by measurement with threshold detectors. Here we present a fully analytical security proof against coherent attacks for such a decoy-state BB84 protocol with the receiver’s passive basis choice and measurement with threshold detectors. Numerical simulations under practical situations show that the difference in secure key rate between the active and passive implementations of the protocol is negligible except for long communication distances.
Abstract The Quantum Key Distribution protocol can encode a single quantum state and implements an information-theoretically secure key distribution protocol in communication. In the actual QKD experimental system, there are usually two encoding methods which are phase encoding and polarization encoding. Ma et al (Phase-Matching Quantum Key Distribution, Phys. Rev. X., 2018, 83) proposed the phase-matching QKD protocol, which has high transmission and it is an extension of the measurement device independent QKD. This paper successfully gives the polarization scheme of this PM-QKD protocol, the bases in the polarization scheme are arbitrary, and eliminates detector side channel attacks. Furthermore, we give the security analysis and simulation results of the polarization scheme, and compare it with the BB84 protocol. The simulation results show that our protocol is superior to the BB84 protocol in terms of transmission distance under the fixed key rate.