Security of Visible Light Communication systems—A survey

Ozan Çirkinoglu, Onur Ferhanoğlu, Güneş Karabulut Kurt

Mohamed Amine Arfaoui, Mohammad Dehghani Soltani, Iman Tavakkolnia +4 more

Due to the dramatic increase in high data rate services and in order to meet the demands of the fifth-generation (5G) networks, researchers from both academia and industry are exploring advanced transmission techniques, new network architectures and new frequency spectrum such as the visible light and the millimeter wave (mmWave) spectra. Visible light communication (VLC) particularly is an emerging technology that has been introduced as a promising solution for 5G and beyond, owing to the large unexploited spectrum, which translates to significantly high data rates. Although VLC systems are more immune against interference and less susceptible to security vulnerabilities since light does not penetrate through walls, security issues arise naturally in VLC channels due to their open and broadcasting nature, compared to fiber-optic systems. In addition, since VLC is considered to be an enabling technology for 5G, and security is one of the 5G fundamental requirements, security issues should be carefully addressed and resolved in the VLC context. On the other hand, due to the success of physical layer security (PLS) in improving the security of radio-frequency (RF) wireless networks, extending such PLS techniques to VLC systems has been of great interest. Only two survey papers on security in VLC have been published in the literature. However, a comparative and unified survey on PLS for VLC from information theoretic and signal processing point of views is still missing. This paper covers almost all aspects of PLS for VLC, including different channel models, input distributions, network configurations, precoding/signaling strategies, and secrecy capacity and information rates. Furthermore, we propose a number of timely and open research directions for PLS-VLC systems, including the application of measurement-based indoor and outdoor channel models, incorporating user mobility and device orientation into the channel model, and combining VLC and RF systems to realize the potential of such technologies.

Rana Shaaban, Saleh Faruque

Summary Visible light communication (VLC) is considered to be a great replacement or complement to existing radio frequency networks to provide the future fifth‐generation (5G) wireless technology with higher data rates for indoor connectivity, which alleviates the traffic demand. Therefore, many issues emerged regarding the security in 5G networks as human safety is at risk. This work presents a comprehensive study on the physical‐layer security (PLS) and solutions in 5G networks, specifically, the security of VLC technology as one of the core PLS solutions for 5G future wireless networks. Furthermore, VLC threats and PLS solutions are extensively investigated. Based on our study, we propose a new indoor VLC secure model to enhance the secrecy performance in VLC networks using a combination of multiple PLS techniques to achieve this aim as beamforming, secure communication zones, and friendly jamming. The simulation results with respect to the received optical power and signal‐to‐noise ratio (SNR) prove that the proposed indoor VLC model can improve the secrecy performance. As the user's SNR exceeded 100 dB and optical received power reached 15 mW, the malicious user's SNR barely reached 30 dB with a 4‐μW received power outside the target zone increasing his interference level. Finally, future research directions in VLC security are outlined to encourage future research.

Zixian Wei, Rui Deng, Binbin Zhu +3 more

Hiroyuki Endo, Mikio Fujiwara, Mitsuo Kitamura +6 more

Sunghwan Cho, Gaojie Chen, Justin P. Coon +1 more

This article highlights challenges associated with securing visible light communication (VLC) systems by using physical layer security (PLS) techniques. Motivated by the achievements in PLS studies for radio frequency (RF) communication, many PLS techniques for VLC systems were also rigorously investigated by tailoring the RF techniques to the VLC environment. However, careful consideration of the inherent differences between RF and VLC systems is still needed. By disregarding these differences, an eavesdropper could be given an opportunity to wiretap the VLC systems, even when PLS techniques are employed to protect them. Crucially, the fact that it is often not possible to know the number and locations of eavesdroppers in real VLC systems may allow eavesdroppers to devise various cooperative eavesdropping methods. By examining a few examples of the possible eavesdropper threats that can occur in VLC systems, this article offers novel insights into the vulnerabilities of state-of-the-art PLS schemes for VLC systems. Although the focus of the paper is mostly on these weaknesses, some potential solutions are also briefly proposed with a view to stimulating discourse in the community.