Tight quantum security of the Fiat-Shamir transform for commit-and-open identification schemes with applications to post-quantum signature schemes
André Chailloux
Applying the Fiat-Shamir transform on identification schemes is one of the main ways of constructing signature schemes. While the classical security of this transformation is well understood, it is only very recently that generic results for the quantum case have been proposed [DFMS19,LZ19]. These results are asymptotic and therefore can't be used to derive the concrete security of these signature schemes without a significant loss in parameters. In this paper, we show that if we start from a commit-and-open identification scheme, where the prover first commits to several strings and then as a second message opens a subset of them depending on the verifier's message, then there is a tight quantum reduction for the the Fiat-Shamir transform to special soundness notions. Our work applies to most 3 round schemes of this form and can be used immediately to derive quantum concrete security of signature schemes. We apply our techniques to several identification schemes that lead to signature schemes such as Stern's identification scheme based on coding problems, the [KTX08] identification scheme based on lattice problems, the [SSH11] identification schemes based on multivariate problems, closely related to the NIST candidate MQDSS, and the PICNIC scheme based on multiparty computing problems, which is also a NIST candidate.
arXiv:1906.05415•Jun 12, 2019•4 citations