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Istituto Lombardo - Accademia di Scienze e Lettere - Incontri di Studio

COSTRUTTIVISMO E REALISMO NELLE SCIENZE FISICHE

Paolo Perinotti

Published Mar 4, 2019• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

While classical physics is consistent with an objectivist point of view, the advent of modern physics undermines its fundamental assumptions. Quantum mechanics, in particular, put a question to the philosophy of science as to whether its intrinsically probabilistic interpretation should be revised in order to save the traditional epistemology, or should be adopted unconditionally, along with its revolutionary consequences. We propose some crucial arguments in favour of the second option. Finally, we discuss how the above choice may suggest a constructivist view about the nature of physical sciences.

DOI
10.4081/incontri.2019.461

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While classical physics is consistent with an objectivist point of view, the advent of modern physics undermines its fundamental assumptions. Quantum mechanics, in particular, put a question to the philosophy of science as to whether its intrinsically probabilistic interpretation should be revised in order to save the traditional epistemology, or should be adopted unconditionally, along with its revolutionary consequences. We propose some crucial arguments in favour of the second option. Finally, we discuss how the above choice may suggest a constructivist view about the nature of physical sciences.
ABSTRACT The paper aims to bridge the history of quantum theory with its philosophical implications. The focus is not only on the scientific underpinnings of quantum mechanics (these theories emerged as ‘ad hoc’ responses to experimental anomalies) but also on the philosophical ramifications of its probabilistic nature and indeterminacy, which differ from classical realism. The paper examines Dirac's, Bell's, and modern views, focusing on how quantum mechanics (QM) challenges traditional notions of causality, objectivity, and truth while embracing epistemological and metaphysical perspectives. Debates over collapse theories and hidden variables are discussed, as well as Putnam's philosophical outlook, which includes his trenchant involvement with realism, logic, and the measurement problem. Finally, the paper proposes that QM represents a philosophical revolution that renews our understanding of reality, knowledge, and scientific explanation, rather than simply serving as a physical theory for assessing the prospects of quantum philosophy by connecting it to broader aspects such as relativity, causality, and scientific realism.
The growth of modern science resulted in a radically new cognitive approach to many problems of classical philosophy. In the context of contemporary theoretical physics, if only one avoids easy apologetic, it is no longer possible to defend this version of epistemological empiricism that was defended half a century ago. Whereas in the 1930’s the traditional distinction between theoretical and observational terms was called into question, due to its arbitrary nature, in the 1980’s the basic philosophical opposition between material and immaterial (resp. between physical and mathematical) objects seems arbitrary since the very notion of matter appears nothing but a terminological relic of the bygone epoch.
In this paper we discuss the principles of two fundamental theories of physics: mechanics and quantum mechanics. First, we consider two philosophical positions of the German physicist Heinrich Hertz. He established one of the both in the introduction of his well known Principles of Mechanics. This view - Hertz's "picture" concept - which has a long tradition in philosophy, particularly with regard to physics and later to other empirical sciences, serves as the starting point of an interpretation of the relationship between real systems and theoretical structures of modern science using the concept of fuzziness. This "fuzzy view" on philosophy of science gives particularly an interpretation of Hertz's earlier lecture on The Constitution of matter. Second we consider some principles of quantum mechanics, particularly Werner Heisenberg's uncertainty relation of subatomic object's position and momentum, and Max Born's probabilistic interpretation of the quantum mechanical wave function. These principles are parts of the so-called Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. Third, we argue that the "fuzzy approach" is fruitful for a "fuzzy" interpretation of quantum mechanics because fuzziness fills the gap between systems and phenomena in reality and the scientific theory of quantum mechanics - as every other scientific theory.
As with any scientific revolution, quantum mechanics entailed a profound revision of our fundamental epistemological concepts and also of our worldview as a whole. This was the case for the concepts of causality and reality. Around these concepts, there arose in the third decade of the last century a heated debate in which almost all the scientists and philosophers of the time took part and which in a certain sense is still going on today. The Author provides a reconstruction of the various different positions, from the conservative attempt to defend determinism to the most radical stochastic positions, and singles out in Ernst Cassirer’s solution the most convincing approach.
Ockham's razor is a heuristic concept applied in philosophy of science to decide between two or more feasible physical theories. Ockham's razor operates by deciding in favour of the theory with least assumptions and concepts; roughly speaking, the less complex theory. Could Ockham's razor not easily treat the different interpretations as theories and decide in favour of the one with fewest assumptions? We provide an answer to this question by means of examples of applications in literature and the discussion of its historical origin. We review the historical context of Ockham's razor and its connection to medieval philosophical struggles, discuss the essence of its parsimonious core and put it in relation with modern struggles in the context of interpretational issues in Quantum Mechanics. Due to the lack of experimental evidences in string theory, a new field of modern heuristics arose in the last years. We will discuss these heuristics in the context of Ockham-related heuristic methods and analyse the connection of these heuristics with the interpretations of Quantum Mechanics.
Scientific realism has traditionally maintained that our best scientific theories can be regarded as more or less true and as representing the world as it is (more or less). However, one of our very best current theories—quantum mechanics—has famously resisted such a realist construal, threatening to undermine the realist stance altogether. The chapters in this volume carefully examine this tension and the reasons behind it, including the underdetermination generated by the multiplicity of formulations and interpretations of quantum physics, each presenting a different way the world could be. Authors in this volume offer a range of alternative ways forward: some suggest new articulations of realism, limiting our commitments in one way or another; others attempt to articulate a ‘third way’ between traditional forms of realism and antirealism, or are critical of such attempts. Still others argue that quantum theory itself should be reconceptualised, or at least alternative formulations should be considered in the hope of evading the problems faced by realism. And some examine the nature of these issues when moving beyond quantum mechanics to quantum field theory. Taken together they offer an exciting new set of perspectives on one of the most fundamental questions in the philosophy of modern physics: how can one be a realist about quantum theory, and what does this realism amount to?