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Finite Blocklength Secrecy Coding

Jack Pfister

Published May 9, 2018• 3 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

Coding for physical layer security is typically evaluated as blocklengths approach infinity using information theoretic measures.This thesis presents techniques to quantify secrecy guarantees of finite blocklength wiretap codes across two common channel models.This is an important step for the field of physical layer security as secrecy guarantees are generally not quantified at finite blocklengths.From this analysis, we are able to determine the best performing linear secrecy codes for their respective blocklengths and information rates.Due to the error correcting shortcomings of wiretap codes, we also investigate the error correcting capabilities of a secrecy coding technique that uses polar codes.

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Coding for physical layer security is typically evaluated as blocklengths approach infinity using information theoretic measures.This thesis presents techniques to quantify secrecy guarantees of finite blocklength wiretap codes across two common channel models.This is an important step for the field of physical layer security as secrecy guarantees are generally not quantified at finite blocklengths.From this analysis, we are able to determine the best performing linear secrecy codes for their respective blocklengths and information rates.Due to the error correcting shortcomings of wiretap codes, we also investigate the error correcting capabilities of a secrecy coding technique that uses polar codes.
In this paper, we provide secrecy metrics applicable to physical-layer coding techniques with finite blocklengths over Gaussian and fading wiretap channel models and analyze their secrecy performance over several cases of concatenated code designs. Our metrics go beyond some of the known practical secrecy measures, such as bit error rate and security gap, so as to make lower bound probabilistic guarantees on error rates over short blocklengths both preceding and following a secrecy decoder. Our techniques are especially useful in cases where application of traditional information-theoretic security measures is either impractical or simply not yet understood. The metrics can aid both practical system analysis, including cryptanalysis, and practical system design when concatenated codes are used for physical-layer security. Furthermore, these new measures fill a void in the current landscape of practical security measures for physical-layer security coding and may assist in the wide-scale adoption of physical-layer techniques for security in real-world systems. We also show how the new metrics provide techniques for reducing realistic channel models to simpler discrete memoryless wiretap channel equivalents over which existing secrecy code designs may achieve information-theoretic security.
For physical-layer secrecy performance, existing studies only focus on coding schemes that can achieve the secrecy capacity. However, finite blocklength penalty could be fatal for security of private message. In this paper, we explore the impact of finite blocklength on secrecy for the wiretap channel model. We propose secrecy performance matrices for finite blocklength analysis and provide analytical expressions to evaluate the secrecy performance. We demonstrate trade-off between secrecy and reliability, and also provide an upper bound of secret information rate in finite blocklength case. The results are also applied to indicate asymptotic performance.
For physical-layer secrecy performance, existing studies only focus on coding schemes that can achieve the secrecy capacity. However, finite blocklength penalty could be fatal for security of private message. In this paper, we explore the impact of finite blocklength on secrecy for the wiretap channel model. We propose secrecy performance matrices for finite blocklength analysis and provide analytical expressions to evaluate the secrecy performance. We demonstrate trade-off between secrecy and reliability, and also provide an upper bound of secret information rate in finite blocklength case. The results are also applied to indicate asymptotic performance.
In this work, we consider the pros and cons of using various layers of keyless coding to achieve secure and reliable communication over the Gaussian wiretap channel. We define a new approach to information theoretic security, called practical secrecy and the secrecy benefit, to be used over real-world channels and finite blocklength instantiations of coding layers, and use this new approach to show the fundamental reliability and security implications of several coding mechanisms that have traditionally been used for physical-layer security. We perform a systematic/structured analysis of the effect of error-control coding, scrambling, interleaving, and coset coding, as coding layers of a secrecy system. Using this new approach, scrambling and interleaving are shown to be of no effect in increasing information theoretic security, even when measuring the effect at the output of the eavesdropper's decoder. Error control coding is shown to present a trade-off between secrecy and reliability that is dictated by the chosen code and the signal-to-noise ratios at the legitimate and eavesdropping receivers. Finally, the benefits of secrecy coding are highlighted, and it is shown how one can shape the secrecy benefit according to system specifications using combinations of different layers of coding to achieve both reliable and secure throughput.
In a classical wiretap channel setting, Alice communicates with Bob through a main communication channel, while her transmission also reaches an eavesdropper Eve through a wiretap channel. In this paper, we consider a general class of polar secrecy codes for wiretap channels and study their finite-length performance. In particular, bounds on the normalized mutual information security (MIS) leakage, a fundamental measure of secrecy in information-theoretic security frameworks, are presented for polar secrecy codes. The bounds are utilized to characterize the finite-length scaling behavior of polar secrecy codes, where scaling here refers to the non-asymptotic behavior of both the gap to the secrecy capacity as well as the MIS leakage. Furthermore, the bounds are shown to facilitate characterizing numerical bounds on the secrecy guarantees of polar secrecy codes in finite block lengths of practical relevance, where directly calculating the MIS leakage is in general infeasible.
Physical-layer security (PLS) is a promising technique to complement more traditional means of communication security in beyond-5G wireless networks. However, studies of PLS are often based on ideal assumptions such as infinite coding blocklengths or perfect knowledge of the wiretap link’s channel state information (CSI). In this work, we study the performance of finite blocklength (FBL) transmissions using a new secrecy metric — the average information leakage (AIL). We evaluate the exact and approximate AIL with Gaussian signaling and arbitrary fading channels, assuming that the eavesdropper’s instantaneous CSI is unknown. We then conduct case studies that use artificial noise (AN) beamforming to analyze the AIL in both Rayleigh and Rician fading channels. The accuracy of the analytical expressions is verified through extensive simulations, and various insights regarding the impact of key system parameters on the AIL are obtained. Particularly, our results reveal that allowing a small level of AIL can potentially lead to significant reliability enhancements. To improve the system performance, we formulate and solve an average secrecy throughput (AST) optimization problem via both non-adaptive and adaptive design strategies. Our findings highlight the significance of blocklength design and AN power allocation, as well as the impact of their trade-off on the AST.