IEEE Transactions on Information Theory

Optimal Accuracy-Privacy Trade-Off for Secure Computations

Patrick Ah-Fat, Michael Huth

Published Dec 12, 2018• 18 citations

Abstract

The purpose of secure multi-party computation is to enable protocol participants to compute a public function of their private inputs while keeping their inputs secret, without resorting to any trusted third party. However, opening the public output of such computations inevitably reveals some information about the private inputs. We propose a measure generalizing both Rényi entropy and g -entropy so as to quantify this information leakage. In order to control and restrain such information flows, we introduce the notion of function substitution, which replaces the computation of a function that reveals sensitive information with that of an approximate function. We exhibit theoretical bounds for the privacy gains that this approach provides and experimentally show that this enhances the confidentiality of the inputs while controlling the distortion of computed output values. Finally, we investigate the inherent compromise between accuracy of computation and privacy of inputs and we demonstrate how to realize such optimal trade-offs.

DOI: 10.1109/tit.2018.2886458

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