A Formal Analysis of Signal's Sparse Post-Quantum Ratchet Protocol and its Implementation
Karthikeyan Bhargavan, Maxime Buyse, Graeme Connell +2 more
In 2025, Signal deployed the Sparse Post-Quantum Ratchet (SPQR), an MLKEM-based post-quantum secure messaging protocol that was combined with the widely used Double Ratchet protocol to attain hybrid Forward Secrecy (FS) and Post-Compromise Security (PCS): FS and PCS hold unless both the classic Elliptic-Curve Diffie-Hellman and the post-quantum Key Encapsulation Mechanism constructions are broken. This paper presents the verification-driven process used to design SPQR and the first formal specification and security analysis of SPQR, along with formal guarantees for its implementation. We detail the modular design of the SPQR protocol in terms of a core Sparse Continuous Key Agreement (SCKA) component (as defined in [4] ). We evaluate a series of candidate protocols, including the deployed protocol, in various fine-grained compromise scenarios, using the ProVerif symbolic analyzer. Beyond design-time verification, we integrate the hax toolchain into Signal's continuous integration pipeline to prove runtime safety of the production implementation and to prove that the implementation meets the security goals of the protocol. The results of this work are now deployed in Signal Messenger and relied upon by millions of users.
ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS)•Nov 12, 2026•0 citations