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Lecture notes in computer science

The Double Ratchet: Security Notions, Proofs, and Modularization for the Signal Protocol

Joël Alwen, Sandro Coretti, Yevgeniy Dodis

Published Jan 1, 2019• 146 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-3-030-17653-2_5

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Signal is a famous secure messaging protocol used by billions of people, by virtue of many secure text messaging applications including Signal itself, WhatsApp, Facebook Messenger, Skype, and Google Allo. At its core it uses the concept of “double ratcheting,” where every message is encrypted and authenticated using a fresh symmetric key; it has many attractive properties, such as forward security, post-compromise security, and “immediate (no-delay) decryption,” which had never been achieved in combination by prior messaging protocols.
In 2025, Signal deployed the Sparse Post-Quantum Ratchet (SPQR), an MLKEM-based post-quantum secure messaging protocol that was combined with the widely used Double Ratchet protocol to attain hybrid Forward Secrecy (FS) and Post-Compromise Security (PCS): FS and PCS hold unless both the classic Elliptic-Curve Diffie-Hellman and the post-quantum Key Encapsulation Mechanism constructions are broken. This paper presents the verification-driven process used to design SPQR and the first formal specification and security analysis of SPQR, along with formal guarantees for its implementation. We detail the modular design of the SPQR protocol in terms of a core Sparse Continuous Key Agreement (SCKA) component (as defined in [4] ). We evaluate a series of candidate protocols, including the deployed protocol, in various fine-grained compromise scenarios, using the ProVerif symbolic analyzer. Beyond design-time verification, we integrate the hax toolchain into Signal's continuous integration pipeline to prove runtime safety of the production implementation and to prove that the implementation meets the security goals of the protocol. The results of this work are now deployed in Signal Messenger and relied upon by millions of users.