We consider a source model for information theoretic secret key agreement based on the distance among the nodes, in a basic system consisting of two legitimate users and an eavesdropper. The legitimate nodes try to agree on a reliable and secure key based on their noisy observation of distance between them. We propose two methods to enhance system utility: 1) Artificial Noise Forwarding (ANF), 2) transmission in different beam directions (multi-antenna transmission). In the first method artificial noise is used to worsen e a vesdropper's distance estimation and in the second method beacon signals are sent in different directions and the virtual distances in different beam directions are used as the randomness sources. We show that if eavesdropper is not equipped with multi-directional antenna, then ANF is a useful method while in the case of users equipped with multi-directional antenna, transmitting in different directions is a suitable way to increase the secret key rate.
We consider a source model for information theoretic secret key agreement based on the distance among the nodes, in a basic system consisting of two legitimate users and an eavesdropper. The legitimate nodes try to agree on a reliable and secure key based on their noisy observation of distance between them. We propose two methods to enhance system utility: 1) Artificial Noise Forwarding (ANF), 2) transmission in different beam directions (multi-antenna transmission). In the first method artificial noise is used to worsen e a vesdropper's distance estimation and in the second method beacon signals are sent in different directions and the virtual distances in different beam directions are used as the randomness sources. We show that if eavesdropper is not equipped with multi-directional antenna, then ANF is a useful method while in the case of users equipped with multi-directional antenna, transmitting in different directions is a suitable way to increase the secret key rate.
We consider secret key generation from relative localization information of a pair of nodes in a mobile wireless network in the presence of a mobile eavesdropper. Our scheme consists of two phases: in the first phase, legitimate node pair exchanges beacon signals to establish localization information based on noisy observations of these beacons; in the second phase, nodes generate secret key bits via a public discussion. Our problem can be categorized under the source models of information theoretic secrecy, where the distance between the legitimate nodes acts as the observed common randomness. We characterize the achievable secret key bit rate in terms of the observation noise variance at the legitimate nodes and the eavesdropper. This work provides a framework that combines information theoretic secrecy and wireless localization, and proves that the localization information provides a significant additional resource for secret key generation in mobile wireless networks.
Due to the shared nature of wireless medium, generating secret key between legitimate nodes under the presence of eavesdroppers remains challenging in wireless network environment.In this research, a framework of secret key agreement utilizing observations of nodes' relative location is considered.While many current works concern secret key generation only for 3-nodes (2 legitimate nodes and 1 eavesdropper), this research proposes an approach and analysis for a wireless network environment with m (m≥3) legitimate nodes and 1 eavesdropper.The proposed algorithm uses the distance between a randomly selected node 1 and node 2 as the Reference Distance (RD) to establish the secret key.In order to secure the delivery of RD to other m-2 nodes, an Additive Distance Value (ADV) is used for public discussion.Further, different types of topologies are developed to accomplish secret key agreement for m node wireless network including star, chain and hybrid topologies.After the ADV distribution and RD estimation, the secret key is generated through secret bit extraction.The Maximum achievable Secret key generation Rate (MSR) based on the above network topologies is studied through theoretical analysis and mathematical estimation.Based on these analyze, the feasibility of proposed secret key xi
We consider secret key generation by a pair of mobile nodes utilizing observations of their relative locations in the presence of a mobile eavesdropper. In our proposed algorithm, the legitimate node pair makes noisy observations of the relative locations of each other. Based on these observations, the nodes generate secret key bits via information reconciliation, data compression, and privacy amplification. We characterize a theoretically achievable secret key bit rate in terms of the observation noise variance at the legitimate nodes and the eavesdropper and show that the performance of our algorithm is comparable to the theoretical bounds. We also test our algorithm in a vehicular setting based on observations made using wireless beacon exchange between the legitimate nodes. To achieve this, we used TelosB wireless radios mounted on the sides of the vehicles on local roads and freeways. Note that our approach relies solely on distance reciprocity, and thus, it is not restricted to the use of wireless radios and can be used with other localization systems (e.g., infrared and ultrasound systems) as well. Overall, this study proves, via both information theoretic and practical analysis, that localization information provides a significant additional resource for secret key generation in mobile networks.
This paper considers the secure communication via combining the artificial noise with the masked beamforming scheme. In this scenario, the transmitter is equipped with multi-antenna while each of the eavesdroppers is equipped with only one antenna, and the legitimate receiver has a receiving antenna and a transmitting antenna, respectively. The transmitter simultaneously transmits a beamformed secret information-bearing signal to a legitimate receiver and artificial noise (AN) to the eavesdroppers. The legitimate receiver sends the AN to confuse the eavesdropper while receiving the desired signal from the transmitter. We compare the proposed scheme that combining the AN with masked beamforming with no beamforming vector scheme, and derive that the combined strategy obviously improved the secrecy rate.
As a way to ensure security on wireless communication, a secret key agreement scheme exploiting the unique properties of the wireless medium, the reciprocity of radio propagation and the irregularity of multipath fading, is being proposed [1-3]. The method enables two legitimate users to share a secret key without distributing the actual key, by using the radio propagation channel between the two as a common and exclusive source of randomness upon which a secret key could be derived. As an application of this scheme to environments where the radio propagation characteristics are static, a method employing a variable directivity antenna called the ESPAR antenna [4] has been known to be effective. In this method, secret keys are generated from received signal strength indicator (RSSI) sequences of legitimate users. One known problem of this method is that in environments with simple radio propagation characteristics such as a rectangular room of concrete with no fixtures, the strength of the direct wave becomes the dominant factor affecting the fluctuation of the RSSI, thus increasing the chance for eavesdroppers located near the path of such waves to estimate the secret key. Since all previous considerations of the aforementioned scheme has been done with environments where the legitimate users are in line-of-sight, this paper aims to illustrate how the location of eavesdroppers affect the secrecy of keys generated with the scheme, in a radio propagation environment with no clearly dominant wave. The key capacity in respect to the position of the eavesdropper in such environment is shown using computer simulations.
Confidentiality of information is a key consideration in many networking applications, including e-commerce, online banking, and intelligence operations. How can information be communicated reliably to the legitimate users, while keeping it secret from eavesdroppers? How does such a secrecy constraint on communication affect the limits on information flow in the network? In this chapter, we study these questions under the information theoretic notion of secrecy, which requires each eavesdropper to obtain essentially no information about the messages sent from knowledge of its received sequence, the channel statistics, and the codebooks used. We investigate two approaches to achieve secure communication. The first is to exploit the statistics of the channel from the sender to the legitimate receivers and the eavesdroppers. We introduce the wiretap channel as a 2-receiver broadcast channel with a legitimate receiver and an eavesdropper, and establish its secrecy capacity, which is the highest achievable secret communication rate. The idea is to design the encoder so that the channel from the sender to the receiver becomes effectively stronger than the channel to the eavesdropper; hence the receiver can recover the message but the eavesdropper cannot. This wiretap coding scheme involves multicoding and randomized encoding. If the channel from the sender to the receiver is weaker than that to the eavesdropper, however, secret communication at a positive rate is not possible. This brings us to the second approach to achieve secret communication, which is to use a secret key shared between the sender and the receiver but unknown to the eavesdropper. We show that the rate of such secret key must be at least as high as the rate of the confidential message. This raises the question of how the sender and the receiver can agree on such a long secret key in the first place. After all, if they had a confidential channel with sufficiently high capacity to communicate the key, then why not use it to communicate the message itself! We show that if the sender and the receiver have access to correlated sources (e.g., through a satellite beaming common randomness to them), then they can still agree on a secret key even when the channel has zero secrecy capacity. We first consider the source model for key agreement, where the sender communicates with the receiver over a noiseless public broadcast channel to generate a secret key from their correlated sources.