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Lecture notes in computer science

Single Private-Key Generator Security Implies Multiple Private-Key Generators Security

Atsushi Fujioka, Kazuki Yoneyama

Published Jan 1, 2018• 1 citation
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-3-030-01446-9_4

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A B S T R A C T Key agreement protocols are essential for secure communications in open and distributed environments. Recently, identity-based key agreement protocols have been increasingly researched because of the simplicity of public key management. The basic idea behind an identity-based cryptosystem is that a public key is the identity (an arbitrary string) of a user, and the corresponding private key is generated by a trusted Private Key Generator (PKG). However, it is unrealistic to assume that a single PKG will be responsible for issuing private keys to members of dierent organizations or a large-scale nation. Hence, it is needed to consider multiple PKG environments with dierent system parameters. In this paper, we propose an identity-based key agreement protocol among users of dierent networks with independent PKGs, which makes use of elliptic curves. We prove the security of the proposed protocol in the random oracle model and show that all security attributes are satised. We also demonstrate a comparison between our protocol and some related protocols in terms of the communication costs and the execution time. The results show that the execution time of our protocol is less than 10%, and its communication costs are about 50% of the competitor protocols.
This paper introduces two new security models for identity-based authenticated-key exchange (IBAKE): the id-neCK security model and the id-reCK security model. While most existing IBAKE models assume that the private-key generator (PKG) behaves honestly, the id-neCK model captures a malicious scenario in which an adversary can obtain the random string used by the PKG to generate the master public- and secret-keys. In contrast, the id-reCK model captures an attack in which an adversary can replace the master public- and secret-keys generated by an honest PKG. We prove that the id-reCK security notion is strictly stronger than both the id-neCK security notion and the existing id-eCK (identity-based extended Canetti-Krawczyk) security notion, which guarantees resistance against ephemeral private information leakage. Next, assuming the existence of a secure public-key cryptosystem, we show that there exists an IBAKE protocol that is id-eCK secure but not id-neCK secure. This implies that, under this assumption, the id-neCK security notion is strictly stronger than the id-eCK security notion. Finally, we discuss IBAKE protocols that satisfy these security notions.