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An efficient threshold public key cryptosystem secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack

Ran Canetti, Shafi Goldwasser

Theory and Application of Cryptographic TechniquesMay 2, 1999142 citations

An Efficient Two-Party Public Key Cryptosystem Secure against Adaptive Chosen Ciphertext Attack

Philip Mac Kenzie

Lecture notes in computer scienceDec 18, 200212 citations

An Efficient threshold Public Key Cryptosystem Secure Against Adaptive Chosen Ciphertext Attack (Extended Abstract)

Ran Canetti, Shafi Goldwasser

Lecture notes in computer scienceJan 1, 1999113 citations

Identity-based encryption with leakage-amplified chosen-ciphertext attacks security

Yanwei Zhou, Bo Yang, Zhe Xia +2 more

Theoretical Computer ScienceDec 31, 20196 citations

Secure Signatures and Chosen Ciphertext Security in a Post-Quantum World.

Dan Boneh, Mark Zhandry

We initiate the study of quantum-secure digital signatures and quantum chosen ciphertext security. In the case of signatures, we enhance the standard chosen message query model by allowing the adversary to issue quantum chosen message queries: given a superposition of messages, the adversary receives a superposition of signatures on those messages. Similarly, for encryption, we allow the adversary to issue quantum chosen ciphertext queries: given a superposition of ciphertexts, the adversary receives a superposition of their decryptions. These adversaries model a natural post-quantum environment where end-users sign messages and decrypt ciphertexts on a personal quantum computer. We construct classical systems that remain secure when exposed to such quantum queries. For signatures we construct two compilers that convert classically secure signatures into signatures secure in the quantum setting and apply these compilers to existing post-quantum signatures. We also show that standard constructions such as Lamport one-time signatures and Merkle signatures remain secure under quantum chosen message attacks, thus giving signatures whose quantum security is based on generic assumptions. For encryption, we define security under quantum chosen ciphertext attacks and present both public-key and symmetric-key constructions.We initiate the study of quantum-secure digital signatures and quantum chosen ciphertext security. In the case of signatures, we enhance the standard chosen message query model by allowing the adversary to issue quantum chosen message queries: given a superposition of messages, the adversary receives a superposition of signatures on those messages. Similarly, for encryption, we allow the adversary to issue quantum chosen ciphertext queries: given a superposition of ciphertexts, the adversary receives a superposition of their decryptions. These adversaries model a natural post-quantum environment where end-users sign messages and decrypt ciphertexts on a personal quantum computer. We construct classical systems that remain secure when exposed to such quantum queries. For signatures we construct two compilers that convert classically secure signatures into signatures secure in the quantum setting and apply these compilers to existing post-quantum signatures. We also show that standard constructions such as Lamport one-time signatures and Merkle signatures remain secure under quantum chosen message attacks, thus giving signatures whose quantum security is based on generic assumptions. For encryption, we define security under quantum chosen ciphertext attacks and present both public-key and symmetric-key constructions.

Jan 1, 20133 citations

Bounded Key-Dependent Message Security

Boaz Barak, Iftach Haitner, Dennis Hofheinz +1 more

Lecture notes in computer scienceJan 1, 2010144 citations

Efficient Key Dependent Message Security Amplification Against Chosen Ciphertext Attacks

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