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IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology

Three-Stage Stackelberg Game for Defending Against Full-Duplex Active Eavesdropping Attacks in Cooperative Communication

He Fang, Li Xu, Yulong Zou, Xianbin Wang, Kim‐Kwang Raymond Choo

Published Sep 5, 2018• 55 citations
Publisher

Abstract

In this paper, we study how to defend against full-duplex active eavesdropping attacks in the cooperative communication system. Unlike passive eavesdropping attackers, a full-duplex active eavesdropper acts as both a jammer and a classical eavesdropper in full-duplex mode, and seeks to maximize eavesdropping. Furthermore, in a real-world network, the relays may be selfish and have their own objectives due to competing/limited resources. This may lead to the failure of cooperative communication if there is no incentive to stimulate relays to participate in forwarding the transmitter's messages. Therefore, in this paper, we propose a three-stage Stackelberg game approach to model the behaviors of attacker, and the competitions among the transmitter, relays and attacker. Through finding the Stackelberg equilibrium of our scheme, the legitimate users can achieve cooperative communication to improve the secrecy capacity and to defend against full-duplex active eavesdropping attacks. Findings from the evaluations demonstrate that with an increasing number of channels, our scheme can significantly reduce the intercept probability; therefore, the security performance is improved. It is shown that our scheme can greatly improve the utilities of both the transmitter and multiple relays over the results of the Nash equilibrium scheme and rand power control scheme, which means that the relays are more willing to participate in the cooperative communication, and the transmitter can achieve better secure transmission in our scheme. We also demonstrate that our scheme outperforms other existing schemes, i.e., power control with smart jamming game in a single-channel model/multiple-channel model.

DOI
10.1109/tvt.2018.2868900

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In this paper, we study how to defend against full-duplex active eavesdropping attacks in the cooperative communication system. Unlike passive eavesdropping attackers, a full-duplex active eavesdropper acts as both a jammer and a classical eavesdropper in full-duplex mode, and seeks to maximize eavesdropping. Furthermore, in a real-world network, the relays may be selfish and have their own objectives due to competing/limited resources. This may lead to the failure of cooperative communication if there is no incentive to stimulate relays to participate in forwarding the transmitter's messages. Therefore, in this paper, we propose a three-stage Stackelberg game approach to model the behaviors of attacker, and the competitions among the transmitter, relays and attacker. Through finding the Stackelberg equilibrium of our scheme, the legitimate users can achieve cooperative communication to improve the secrecy capacity and to defend against full-duplex active eavesdropping attacks. Findings from the evaluations demonstrate that with an increasing number of channels, our scheme can significantly reduce the intercept probability; therefore, the security performance is improved. It is shown that our scheme can greatly improve the utilities of both the transmitter and multiple relays over the results of the Nash equilibrium scheme and rand power control scheme, which means that the relays are more willing to participate in the cooperative communication, and the transmitter can achieve better secure transmission in our scheme. We also demonstrate that our scheme outperforms other existing schemes, i.e., power control with smart jamming game in a single-channel model/multiple-channel model.
In this paper, a coordinated multiple-relays-based cooperative communication scheme is proposed to improve the physical-layer security. In order to benefit the relays in forwarding the signals for defending against the eavesdropping attacks, the interactions between the source and the multiple relays are modeled as a single-leader multiple-followers Stackelberg game. The source plays as the leader to coordinate the relays, including the phase of signals forwarded by the relays and the transmit power of the relays, for maximizing the secrecy capacity of the system. An algorithm is developed for the relays to find an optimal price allocation to achieve the fairness among the multiple relays based on the egalitarian welfare solution, and an approximate optimal strategy of source (i.e., phase coordinated vector and power allocation) is studied. The closed-form intercept probability of the proposed scheme is derived. Numerical studies demonstrate that the proposed scheme can greatly improve the utilities of both the source and multiple relays over that resulted from the Nash equilibrium scheme and rand scheme, which means that the relays are more willing to participate in the cooperative communication, and the source can achieve better secure transmission based on the proposed scheme. It is also shown that the proposed scheme performs much better in defending against the eavesdropping attacks than those existing schemes, for example, the single relay selection scheme, the opportunistic relay selection scheme, the optimal relay scheme, and cooperative jamming scheme.
Security is an issue of paramount importance, yet is it a significant challenge for wireless communications, which becomes more intricate when facing a full duplex (FD) active eavesdropper capable of performing eavesdropping and jamming simultaneously. In this paper, we investigate the physical layer security issue in the presence of an FD active eavesdropper, who launches jamming attacks to further improve the eavesdropping. The jamming, however, also results in self-interference at the eavesdropper itself. This security problem is formulated within a hierarchical game framework where the eavesdropper acts as the leader and the legitimate user is the follower. In particular, we first investigate the follower's secrecy rate maximization problem and derive the optimal legitimate transmission strategy. Then, the leader's wiretap rate maximization is expressed as a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC). Leveraging the concavity of the follower's problem, we transform the MPEC problem into a single-level optimization and obtain the jamming power allocation strategy by applying the primal-dual interior-point method. Moreover, we analyze the situations where only partial channel state information is available at the legitimate user and the corresponding impacts on the game. Finally, we present extensive simulation results to validate our theoretical analysis.
As many security solutions integrated with various technologies have been proposed against eavesdropping attacks, technical advances for adversaries can also pose a serious security threat. This paper considers a problem of smart eavesdropping attacks on multiple-input-multiple-output wiretap channels for a legitimate transceiver. We present a smart eavesdropper model and a cooperative jamming solution between transceivers that can control the jamming signal power to achieve the optimal secrecy performance. In particular, for practical applications, our proposed solution considers the residual self-interference from the full-duplex receiver and the limited cancellation capability of the smart eavesdropper. We derive the secrecy outage probability in general and smart eavesdropper cases, and show numerical results and secrecy regions for evaluation. As a result, our proposed solutions can improve the secrecy performance significantly by exploiting the full-duplex receiver and the cooperative jamming strategies with the sophisticated power control according to power expenditure.
This paper investigates UAV secure communication against multiple UAV active eavesdroppers (Eves). The active eavesdropper (Eve)can act adaptively as passive Eve or active jammer based on transmitting source power. In order to safeguard system security, we formulate the secure communication problem as a non-cooperative Stackelberg game and derive the equilibrium. Then Q-Learning algorithm is used to devise a Stackelberg equilibrium strategy in order to maximize the utility of the transmitter and optimize the secrecy rate. Simulation results indicate that the proposed scheme can enhance the security of the UAV communication in the presence of multiple UAV active Eves. Moreover, the impact of the distance between UAV Eves and legitimate transmitter-receiver on the secrecy rate and attack mode probabilities of Eves are also revealed.
In this paper, we focus on a practical communication system, an untrusted full-duplex relay (UFDR) network with a transmitter Alice and a full-duplex receiver Bob. The relay is untrusted who is supposed to forward the signal to Bob and at the same time, acts as a potential eavesdropper to intercept the message from Alice. Since there is no direct link between Alice and Bob, positive secrecy rate can not be obtained. To handle with this issue, based on the precondition that in-band full-duplex technology has been basically matured and can be applied in relay communication, we propose a destination-aided cooperative intended jamming scheme (UFDR-IJ scheme for short). We study the secure performance of the communication system model described in this paper, and obtain a closed-form expression for the secrecy outage probability which verifies the fact that the UFDR-IJ scheme can significantly enhance the secure performance while double the secrecy capacity of the communication system comparing to the traditional cooperative communication scheme.
This paper investigates physical layer secure communication of a three node multicarrier network with a legitimate transmitter, a legitimate receiver, and a wireless powered full-duplex eavesdropper, where the eavesdropper splits the received signal power into two parts, one for energy harvesting and the remaining for information decoding. The eavesdropper sends jamming signals to interfere with the legitimate communication using the harvested energy to degrade the secure communication of the legitimate user. We use the non-cooperative game to model the interaction between the legitimate user and the eavesdropper, where the aim of the legitimate user is to maximize its sum secrecy rate on all subcarriers under the total transmit power constraint and the aim of the eavesdropper is to minimize the sum secrecy rate of the legitimate communication on all subcarriers under the energy causality constraint. We propose an iterative algorithm to achieve the Nash equilibrium of the non-cooperative game. Simulation results verify the proposed algorithm and show that the proposed algorithm significantly outperforms the benchmark algorithms and is resistant to the jamming from the eavesdropper.