The Epistemic View upon Science

Inge Svein Helland

Menas C. Kafatos, Robert L. Nadeau

Rasmus Jaksland

Abstract Quantum mechanics supersedes classical mechanics, and social science, some argue, should be responsive to this change. This paper finds that two rather different arguments are currently being used to argue that quantum mechanics is epistemically relevant in social science. One, attributed to Alexander Wendt, appeals to the presence of quantum physical effects in the social world. The other, attributed to Karen Barad, insists on the importance of quantum metaphysics even when quantum effects are negligible. Neither argument, however, is sound. Consequently, the paper concludes that neither of them offers compelling arguments for the view that quantum mechanics has epistemic relevance for social science.

Ali Barzegar

Generally, there are two interpretative approaches to quantum theory: psi-ontic and psi-epistemic. According to the psi-ontic interpretations, quantum theory does/should describe or represent what the world is like. In contrast, according to the psi-epistemic interpretations, rather than representing the way the world is, quantum theory advises us on what to expect from the world and so helps us better navigate our surrounding world. In this paper, we will argue that Edmund Husserl’s philosophy of science especially his notion of lifeworld provides an appropriate framework for better understanding this shift from the psi-ontic to psi-epistemic interpretations of quantum theory. In particular, we analyse Richard Healey’s pragmatic approach to quantum mechanics from a phenomenological point of view.

Bernard d’Espagnat

Philipp Berghofer

QBism is currently one of the most widely discussed 'subjective' interpretations of quantum mechanics. Its key move is to say that quantum probabilities are personalist Bayesian probabilities and that the quantum state represents subjective degrees of belief. Even probability-one predictions are considered subjective assignments expressing the agent's highest possible degree of certainty about what they will experience next. For most philosophers and physicists this means that QBism is simply too subjective. Even those who agree with QBism that the wave function should not be reified and that we should look for alternatives to standard Psi-ontic interpretations often argue that QBism must be abandoned because it detaches science from objectivity. The problem is that from the QBist perspective it is hard to see how objectivity could enter science. In this paper, I introduce and motivate an interpretation of quantum mechanics that takes QBism as a starting point, is consistent with all its virtues, but allows objectivity to enter from the get-go. This is the view that quantum probabilities should be understood as objective degrees of epistemic justification.