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International Conference on Machinery, Materials and Computing Technology (ICMMCT)

Universally Composable Attribute-based Group Key Exchange

Zenghui Zhao, Yunfang Hao

Published Jan 1, 2018• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Several protocols implementing attribute-based group key exchange, which allows users with certain set of attributes to establish a session key, have been proposed in recent years.However, attacks on attribute-based group key exchange in current research have been considered only in stand-alone fashion.Thus these protocols may be vulnerable when run with other protocol sessions concurrently.We treat the security of attribute-based group key exchange in the universal composability framework to ensure that a protocol remains secure when run with arbitrary protocol sessions concurrently.More specifically, we define an ideal functionality for attribute-based group key exchange first, then propose a two-round protocol based on a primitive called encapsulation policy attribute-based key encapsulation mechanism.In addition, a complete security proof of our protocol in the universal composability framework under random oracle model is given. Encapsulation Policy Attribute-based Key Encapsulation Mechanism (EP-AB-KEM)The EP-AB-KEM introduced by Gorantla et al. and used by our protocol follows the framework of ciphertext policy attribute based encryption (CP-ABE).An EP-AB-KEM consists of five probabilistic polynomial time algorithm listed below.(1) Setup: inputs system security parameter and attribute universe description, then outputs system public parameters PK and system master key MK.

DOI
10.2991/icmmct-18.2018.67

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Several protocols implementing attribute-based group key exchange, which allows users with certain set of attributes to establish a session key, have been proposed in recent years.However, attacks on attribute-based group key exchange in current research have been considered only in stand-alone fashion.Thus these protocols may be vulnerable when run with other protocol sessions concurrently.We treat the security of attribute-based group key exchange in the universal composability framework to ensure that a protocol remains secure when run with arbitrary protocol sessions concurrently.More specifically, we define an ideal functionality for attribute-based group key exchange first, then propose a two-round protocol based on a primitive called encapsulation policy attribute-based key encapsulation mechanism.In addition, a complete security proof of our protocol in the universal composability framework under random oracle model is given. Encapsulation Policy Attribute-based Key Encapsulation Mechanism (EP-AB-KEM)The EP-AB-KEM introduced by Gorantla et al. and used by our protocol follows the framework of ciphertext policy attribute based encryption (CP-ABE).An EP-AB-KEM consists of five probabilistic polynomial time algorithm listed below.(1) Setup: inputs system security parameter and attribute universe description, then outputs system public parameters PK and system master key MK.
Several protocols implementing attribute-based group key exchange, which allows users with certain set of attributes to establish a session key, have been proposed in recent years.However, attacks on attribute-based group key exchange in current research have been considered only in stand-alone fashion.Thus these protocols may be vulnerable when run with other protocol sessions concurrently.We treat the security of attribute-based group key exchange in the universal composability framework to ensure that a protocol remains secure when run with arbitrary protocol sessions concurrently.More specifically, we define an ideal functionality for attribute-based group key exchange first, then propose a two-round protocol based on a primitive called encapsulation policy attribute-based key encapsulation mechanism.In addition, a complete security proof of our protocol in the universal composability framework under random oracle model is given.
Abstract. We introduce the concept of attribute-based authenticated key exchange (AB-AKE) within the framework of ciphertext policy attribute-based systems. A notion of AKE-security for AB-AKE is presented based on the security models for group key exchange protocols and also taking into account the security requirements generally considered in the ciphertext policy attribute-based setting. We also extend the paradigm of hybrid encryption to the ciphertext policy attribute-based encryption schemes. A new primitive called encapsulation policy attribute-based key encapsulation mechanism (EP-AB-KEM) is introduced and a notion of chosen ciphertext security is defined for EP-AB-KEMs. We propose an EP-AB-KEM from an existing attribute-based encryption scheme and show that it achieves chosen ciphertext security in the generic group and random oracle models. We present a generic one-round AB-AKE protocol that satisfies our AKE-security notion. The protocol is generically constructed from any EP-AB-KEM that satisfies chosen ciphertext security. Instantiating the generic AB-AKE protocol with our EP-AB-KEM will result in a concrete one-round AB-AKE protocol also secure in the generic group and random oracle models.
A group key exchange (GKE) protocol allows a set of parties to agree upon a common secret session key over a public network. In this thesis, we focus on designing efficient GKE protocols using public key techniques and appropriately revising security models for GKE protocols. For the purpose of modelling and analysing the security of GKE protocols we apply the widely accepted computational complexity approach. The contributions of the thesis to the area of GKE protocols are manifold. We propose the first GKE protocol that requires only one round of communication and is proven secure in the standard model. Our protocol is generically constructed from a key encapsulation mechanism (KEM). We also suggest an efficient KEM from the literature, which satisfies the underlying security notion, to instantiate the generic protocol. We then concentrate on enhancing the security of one-round GKE protocols. A new model of security for forward secure GKE protocols is introduced and a generic one-round GKE protocol with forward security is then presented. The security of this protocol is also proven in the standard model. We also propose an efficient forward secure encryption scheme that can be used to instantiate the generic GKE protocol. Our next contributions are to the security models of GKE protocols. We observe that the analysis of GKE protocols has not been as extensive as that of two-party key exchange protocols. Particularly, the security attribute of key compromise impersonation (KCI) resilience has so far been ignored for GKE protocols. We model the security of GKE protocols addressing KCI attacks by both outsider and insider adversaries. We then show that a few existing protocols are not secure against KCI attacks. A new proof of security for an existing GKE protocol is given under the revised model assuming random oracles. Subsequently, we treat the security of GKE protocols in the universal composability (UC) framework. We present a new UC ideal functionality for GKE protocols capturing the security attribute of contributiveness. An existing protocol with minor revisions is then shown to realize our functionality in the random oracle model. Finally, we explore the possibility of constructing GKE protocols in the attribute-based setting. We introduce the concept of attribute-based group key exchange (AB-GKE). A security model for AB-GKE and a one-round AB-GKE protocol satisfying our security notion are presented. The protocol is generically constructed from a new cryptographic primitive called encapsulation policy attribute-based KEM (EP-AB-KEM), which we introduce in this thesis. We also present a new EP-AB-KEM with a proof of security assuming generic groups and random oracles. The EP-AB-KEM can be used to instantiate our generic AB-GKE protocol.
Attribute-based authenticated key exchange (AB-AKE) is a useful primitive that allows a group of users to establish a shared secret key and at the same time enables fine-grained access control. A straightforward approach to design an AB-AKE protocol is to extend a key exchange protocol using an attribute-based authentication technique. However, insider security is a challenge security issue for AB-AKE in the multi-party setting and cannot be solved using the straightforward approach. In addtion, many existing key exchange protocols for the multi-party setting (e.g., the well-known Burmester-Desmedt protocol) require multiple broadcast rounds to complete the protocol. In this paper, we propose a novel one-round attribute-based key exchange (OAKE) protocol in the multi-party setting. We define the formal security models, including session key security, insider security and user privacy, for OAKE, and prove the security of the proposed protocol under some standard assumptions in the random oracle model.
Attribute-based encryption (ABE) is an extension scheme of identity-based encryption and public-key encryption. It can achieve fine-grained access control and one-to-many encryption mode, suitable for practical applications. In addition to mathematical proofs, it is essential to verify its security properties using different protocols. This paper proposes two key exchange protocols to securely exchange the user secret keys in ABE. ProVerif is an automated cryptographic protocol verifier that we have used during protocol verification. We specifically aim to protect the confidentiality of the generated keys. The proposed protocols are formally analysed and their security property has been formally proved.
We treat the security of group key exchange (GKE) in the universal composability (UC) framework. Analyzing GKE protocols in the UC framework naturally addresses attacks by malicious insiders. We define an ideal functionality for GKE that captures contributiveness in addition to other desired security goals. We show that an efficient two-round protocol securely realizes the proposed functionality in the random oracle model. As a result, we obtain the most efficient UC-secure contributory GKE protocol known.