Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

Practical Security of Counterfactual Quantum Cryptography against General Intercept-resend Attacks

Sheng Zhang, Jian Wang, Chaojing Tang, Quan Zhang

Published Mar 3, 2011• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

Counterfactual quantum cryptography (CQC), recently proposed by Noh, is featured with no transmission of signal particles. This exhibits evident security advantage, such as its immunity to the well known PNS attack. In this paper, the theoretical security of CQC protocol against the general intercept-resend attacks is proved by bounding the information of an eavesdropper Eve more tightly than in Yin's proposal[Phys. Rev. A 82, 042335 (2010)]. It is also showed that practical CQC implementations may be vulnerable when equipped with imperfect apparatuses, by proving that a negative key rate can be achieved when Eve launches a time-shift attack based on imperfect detector efficiency.

Related papers

Security proof of Counterfactual Quantum Cryptography against General Intercept-resend Attacks and Its Vulnerability

Sheng Zhang, Jian Wang, Chaojing Tang +1 more

Counterfactual quantum cryptography, recently proposed by Noh, is featured with no transmission of signal particles. This exhibits evident security advantages, such as its immunity to the well-known photon-number-splitting attack. In this paper, the theoretical security of counterfactual quantum cryptography protocol against the general intercept-resend attacks is proved by bounding the information of an eavesdropper Eve more tightly than in Yin's proposal [Phys. Rev. A 82 042335 (2010)]. It is also shown that practical counterfactual quantum cryptography implementations may be vulnerable when equipped with imperfect apparatuses, by proving that a negative key rate can be achieved when Eve launches a time-shift attack based on imperfect detector efficiency.

•Aug 18, 2016•10 citations

Security proof of counterfactual quantum cryptography against general intercept-resend attacks and its vulnerability

Sheng Zhang, Jian Wang, Chao-Jing Tang

Counterfactual quantum cryptography, recently proposed by Noh, is featured with no transmission of signal particles. This exhibits evident security advantages, such as its immunity to the well-known photon-number-splitting attack. In this paper, the theoretical security of counterfactual quantum cryptography protocol against the general intercept-resend attacks is proved by bounding the information of an eavesdropper Eve more tightly than in Yin's proposal [ Phys. Rev. A 82 042335 (2010) ]. It is also shown that practical counterfactual quantum cryptography implementations may be vulnerable when equipped with imperfect apparatuses, by proving that a negative key rate can be achieved when Eve launches a time-shift attack based on imperfect detector efficiency.

arXiv:1103.0601•Chinese Physics B•Jun 1, 2012•12 citations

Security proof of counterfactual quantum cryptography against general intercept-resend attacks and its vulnerability

张盛, 王剑, 唐朝京

Counterfactual quantum cryptography,recently proposed by Noh,is featured with no transmission of signal particles.This exhibits evident security advantages,such as its immunity to the well-known photon-number-splitting attack.In this paper,the theoretical security of counterfactual quantum cryptography protocol against the general interceptresend attacks is proved by bounding the information of an eavesdropper Eve more tightly than in Yin’s proposal [Phys.Rev.A 82 042335(2010)].It is also shown that practical counterfactual quantum cryptography implementations may be vulnerable when equipped with imperfect apparatuses,by proving that a negative key rate can be achieved when Eve launches a time-shift attack based on imperfect detector efficiency.

中国物理B：英文版•Jan 1, 2012•0 citations

Counterfactual quantum cryptography based on weak coherent states

Zhen−Qiang Yin, Hong-Wei Li, Yao Yao +5 more

In the ``counterfactual quantum cryptography'' scheme [T.-G. Noh, Phys. Rev. Lett. 103, 230501 (2009)], two legitimate distant peers may share secret-key bits even when the information carriers do not travel in the quantum channel. The security of this protocol with an ideal single-photon source has been proved by Yin et al. [Z.-Q. Yin, H. W. Li, W. Chen, Z. F. Han, and G. C. Guo, Phys. Rev. A 82, 042335 (2010)]. In this paper, we prove the security of the counterfactual-quantum-cryptography scheme based on a commonly used weak-coherent-laser source by considering a general collective attack. The basic assumption of this proof is that the efficiency and dark-counting rate of a single-photon detector are consistent for any $n$-photon Fock states. Then through randomizing the phases of the encoding weak coherent states, Eve's ancilla will be transformed into a classical mixture. Finally, the lower bound of the secret-key-bit rate and a performance analysis for the practical implementation are both given.

Physical Review A•Aug 13, 2012•37 citations

Counterfactual quantum key distribution with untrusted detectors

Ya-Qian Lin, Meng Wang, Xiuqing Yang +1 more

Compared with the traditional BB84 protocol, the counterfactual quantum key distribution (QKD) does not rely on any signal travelling in the quantum channel, and therefore can present a security advantage where Eve cannot fully access signal. However, the practical system may be damaged in a scenario where the devices are untrusted. In this paper, we analyze the security of counterfactual QKD in untrusted detectors scenario. We show that the requirement to disclose "which detector clicked" has become the main loophole in all counterfactual QKD versions. An eavesdropping scheme which is similar to the memory attack on device-independent QKD could break its security by exploiting detectors' imperfections. We consider two different counterfactual QKD protocols and analyze their security against this major loophole. One is a modified Noh09 protocol, which would be secure in untrusted detectors context. Another is a variant of counterfactual QKD with high efficiency (Phys. Rev. A 104 (2021) 022424) against a series of detectors side-channel attacks as well as against other attacks that exploit detectors imperfections.

Heliyon•Feb 1, 2023•5 citations

Security flaw of counterfactual quantum cryptography in practical setting

Yanbing Li, Qiaoyan Wen, Li, Zi-Chen

Recently, counterfactual quantum cryptography proposed by T. G. Noh [Phys. Rev. Lett. 103, 230501 (2009)] becomes an interesting direction in quantum cryptography, and has been realized by some researchers (such as Y. Liu et al's [Phys. Rev. Lett. 109, 030501 (2012)]). However, we find out that it is insecure in practical high lossy channel setting. We analyze the secret key rates in lossy channel under a polarization-splitting-measurement attack. Analysis indicates that the protocol is insecure when the loss rate of the one-way channel exceeds $50%$.

arXiv:1312.1436•Dec 5, 2013•2 citations
Counterfactual quantum cryptography (CQC), recently proposed by Noh, is featured with no transmission of signal particles. This exhibits evident security advantage, such as its immunity to the well known PNS attack. In this paper, the theoretical security of CQC protocol against the general intercept-resend attacks is proved by bounding the information of an eavesdropper Eve more tightly than in Yin's proposal[Phys. Rev. A 82, 042335 (2010)]. It is also showed that practical CQC implementations may be vulnerable when equipped with imperfect apparatuses, by proving that a negative key rate can be achieved when Eve launches a time-shift attack based on imperfect detector efficiency.
Counterfactual quantum cryptography, recently proposed by Noh, is featured with no transmission of signal particles. This exhibits evident security advantages, such as its immunity to the well-known photon-number-splitting attack. In this paper, the theoretical security of counterfactual quantum cryptography protocol against the general intercept-resend attacks is proved by bounding the information of an eavesdropper Eve more tightly than in Yin's proposal [Phys. Rev. A 82 042335 (2010)]. It is also shown that practical counterfactual quantum cryptography implementations may be vulnerable when equipped with imperfect apparatuses, by proving that a negative key rate can be achieved when Eve launches a time-shift attack based on imperfect detector efficiency.
Counterfactual quantum cryptography, recently proposed by Noh, is featured with no transmission of signal particles. This exhibits evident security advantages, such as its immunity to the well-known photon-number-splitting attack. In this paper, the theoretical security of counterfactual quantum cryptography protocol against the general intercept-resend attacks is proved by bounding the information of an eavesdropper Eve more tightly than in Yin's proposal [ Phys. Rev. A 82 042335 (2010) ]. It is also shown that practical counterfactual quantum cryptography implementations may be vulnerable when equipped with imperfect apparatuses, by proving that a negative key rate can be achieved when Eve launches a time-shift attack based on imperfect detector efficiency.
Counterfactual quantum cryptography,recently proposed by Noh,is featured with no transmission of signal particles.This exhibits evident security advantages,such as its immunity to the well-known photon-number-splitting attack.In this paper,the theoretical security of counterfactual quantum cryptography protocol against the general interceptresend attacks is proved by bounding the information of an eavesdropper Eve more tightly than in Yin’s proposal [Phys.Rev.A 82 042335(2010)].It is also shown that practical counterfactual quantum cryptography implementations may be vulnerable when equipped with imperfect apparatuses,by proving that a negative key rate can be achieved when Eve launches a time-shift attack based on imperfect detector efficiency.
In the ``counterfactual quantum cryptography'' scheme [T.-G. Noh, Phys. Rev. Lett. 103, 230501 (2009)], two legitimate distant peers may share secret-key bits even when the information carriers do not travel in the quantum channel. The security of this protocol with an ideal single-photon source has been proved by Yin et al. [Z.-Q. Yin, H. W. Li, W. Chen, Z. F. Han, and G. C. Guo, Phys. Rev. A 82, 042335 (2010)]. In this paper, we prove the security of the counterfactual-quantum-cryptography scheme based on a commonly used weak-coherent-laser source by considering a general collective attack. The basic assumption of this proof is that the efficiency and dark-counting rate of a single-photon detector are consistent for any nnn-photon Fock states. Then through randomizing the phases of the encoding weak coherent states, Eve's ancilla will be transformed into a classical mixture. Finally, the lower bound of the secret-key-bit rate and a performance analysis for the practical implementation are both given.
Compared with the traditional BB84 protocol, the counterfactual quantum key distribution (QKD) does not rely on any signal travelling in the quantum channel, and therefore can present a security advantage where Eve cannot fully access signal. However, the practical system may be damaged in a scenario where the devices are untrusted. In this paper, we analyze the security of counterfactual QKD in untrusted detectors scenario. We show that the requirement to disclose "which detector clicked" has become the main loophole in all counterfactual QKD versions. An eavesdropping scheme which is similar to the memory attack on device-independent QKD could break its security by exploiting detectors' imperfections. We consider two different counterfactual QKD protocols and analyze their security against this major loophole. One is a modified Noh09 protocol, which would be secure in untrusted detectors context. Another is a variant of counterfactual QKD with high efficiency (Phys. Rev. A 104 (2021) 022424) against a series of detectors side-channel attacks as well as against other attacks that exploit detectors imperfections.
Recently, counterfactual quantum cryptography proposed by T. G. Noh [Phys. Rev. Lett. 103, 230501 (2009)] becomes an interesting direction in quantum cryptography, and has been realized by some researchers (such as Y. Liu et al's [Phys. Rev. Lett. 109, 030501 (2012)]). However, we find out that it is insecure in practical high lossy channel setting. We analyze the secret key rates in lossy channel under a polarization-splitting-measurement attack. Analysis indicates that the protocol is insecure when the loss rate of the one-way channel exceeds 5050%50.