New results on symmetric quantum cryptanalysis

María Naya‐Plasencia

Published Oct 1, 2017• 0 citations

Abstract

The security of symmetric cryptography is completely based on cryptanalysis: we only gain confidence in the security of a symmetric primitive through extensive and continuous scrutiny. It is therefore not possible to determine whether a symmetric primitive might be secure or not in a post-quantum world without first understanding how a quantum adversary could attack it. In this talk I will provide an overview of the subject and present some recent results on symmetric quantum cryptanalysis: a new efficient quantum collision search algorithm (joint work with A. Chailloux and A. Schrottenloher), and new efficient quantum algorithms for solving the K-xor problem (joint work with L. Grassi and A. Schrottenloher). We will discuss some implications of these results in quantum-safe symmetric cryptography.

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