Two distinct puzzles, which are both known as Gibbs' paradox, have interested physicists since they were first identified in the 1870s. They each have significance for the foundations of statistical mechanics and have led to lively discussions with a wide variety of suggested resolutions. Most proposed resolutions had involved quantum mechanics, although the original puzzles were entirely classical and were posed before quantum mechanics was invented. In this paper, I show that contrary to what has often been suggested, quantum mechanics is not essential for resolving the paradoxes. I present a resolution of the paradoxes that does not depend on quantum mechanics and includes the case of colloidal solutions, for which quantum mechanics is not relevant.
Two distinct puzzles, which are both known as Gibbs' paradox, have interested physicists since they were first identified in the 1870s. They each have significance for the foundations of statistical mechanics and have led to lively discussions with a wide variety of suggested resolutions. Most proposed resolutions had involved quantum mechanics, although the original puzzles were entirely classical and were posed before quantum mechanics was invented. In this paper, I show that contrary to what has often been suggested, quantum mechanics is not essential for resolving the paradoxes. I present a resolution of the paradoxes that does not depend on quantum mechanics and includes the case of colloidal solutions, for which quantum mechanics is not relevant.
The “Gibbs Paradox” refers to several related questions concerning entropy in thermodynamics and statistical mechanics: whether it is an extensive quantity or not, how it changes when identical particles are mixed, and the proper way to count states in systems of identical particles. Several authors have recognized that the paradox is resolved once it is realized that there is no such thing as the entropy of a system, that there are many entropies, and that the choice between treating particles as being distinguishable or not depends on the resolution of the experiment. The purpose of this note is essentially pedagogical; we add to their analysis by examining the paradox from the point of view of information theory. Our argument is based on that ‘grouping’ property of entropy that Shannon recognized, by including it among his axioms, as an essential requirement on any measure of information. Not only does it provide the right connection between different entropies but, in addition, it draws our attention to the obvious fact that addressing issues of distinguishability and of counting states requires a clear idea about what precisely do we mean by a state.
The Gibbs paradox is a conventional paradox in classical statistical mechanics, typically resolved by invoking quantum indistinguishability through the 1/N! correction. In this letter, we present a resolution within classical ensemble theory, which relies solely on the equal probability principle and does not invoke the 1/N! correction. Our resolution can be naturally interpretated from a purely informational perspective, where the Gibbs entropy is explicitly regarded as the Shannon entropy, quantifying ignorance rather than disorder. From this informational perspective, we also clarify the connection between information and extractable work in the gas mixing processes. Our work opens a new avenue to reconsider the role of information in statistical mechanics.
The issue of the Gibbs paradox is that when considering the mixing of two gases within classical thermodynamics, the entropy of mixing is a discontinuous function of the difference between the gases: it is finite for no matter how small difference, but vanishes for identical gases. The resolution offered in literature with help of quantum mixing entropy was later on shown to be unsatisfactory precisely where it sought to resolve the paradox. Within quantum thermodynamics entropy looses its dominant place. It is argued that the target of the paradox is shifted to the decrease of the available work upon mixing (mixing work), which in contrast to entropy is an unambiguous quantity. For almost identical gases the mixing work continuously goes to zero, thus resolving the paradox. In this approach the concept of ``difference between the gases'' attains a clear operational meaning related to possibilities of controlling the involved quantum states. The difficulties which prevent the resolution of the paradox in its entropic formulation do not arise here. The mixing work can increase when less precise operations are allowed. In contrast to the classical situation, in the quantum case the amount of mixing work can also increase when decreasing the degree of mixing between the gases, or when decreasing their distinguishability. These points go against a direct quantitative association of physical irreversibility with lack of information.
A consensus seems to have developed that the Gibbs paradox in classical thermodynamics (the discontinuous drop in the entropy of mixing when the mixed gases become equal to each other) is unmysterious: in any actual situation, two gases can be separated or not, and the associated harmless discontinuity from “yes” to “no” is responsible for the discontinuity. By contrast, the Gibbs paradox in statistical physics continues to attract attention. Here, the problem is that standard calculations in statistical mechanics predict a non-vanishing value of the entropy of mixing even when two gases of the same kind are mixed, in conflict with thermodynamic predictions. This version of the Gibbs paradox is often seen as a sign that there is something fundamentally wrong with either the traditional expression S=klnW or with the way W is calculated. It is the aim of this article to review the situation from the orthodox (as opposed to information theoretic) standpoint. We demonstrate how the standard formalism is not only fully capable of dealing with the paradox, but also provides an intuitively clear picture of the relevant physical mechanisms. In particular, we pay attention to the explanatory relevance of the existence of particle trajectories in the classical context. We also discuss how the paradox survives the transition to quantum mechanics, in spite of the symmetrization postulates.
The Gibbs Paradox is essentially a set of open questions as to how sameness of gases or fluids (or masses, more generally) are to be treated in thermodynamics and statistical mechanics. They have a variety of answers, some restricted to quantum theory (there is no classical solution), some to classical theory (the quantum case is different). The solution offered here applies to both in equal measure, and is based on the concept of particle indistinguishability (in the classical case, Gibbs’ notion of ‘generic phase’). Correctly understood, it is the elimination of sequence position as a labelling device, where sequences enter at the level of the tensor (or Cartesian) product of one-particle state spaces. In both cases it amounts to passing to the quotient space under permutations. ‘Distinguishability’, in the sense in which it is usually used in classical statistical mechanics, is a mathematically convenient, but physically muddled, fiction.
The Gibbs Paradox is essentially a set of open questions as to how sameness of gases or fluids (or masses, more generally) are to be treated in thermodynamics and statistical mechanics. They have a variety of answers, some restricted to quantum theory (there is no classical solution), some to classical theory (the quantum case is different). The solution offered here applies to both in equal measure, and is based on the concept of particle indistinguishability (in the classical case, Gibbs' notion of 'generic phase'). Correctly understood, it is the elimination of sequence position as a labelling device, where sequences enter at the level of the tensor (or Cartesian) product of one-particle state spaces. In both cases it amounts to passing to the quotient space under permutations. 'Distinguishability', in the sense in which it is usually used in classical statistical mechanics, is a mathematically convenient, but physically muddled, fiction.