Abstract Transforming any circuit into a circuit with the same functionality but resilience against well-defined classes of leakage is an essential subject of cryptography. Whereas, according to the relationship between $VBB$ and simulated leakage-resilient circuit compiler, the compiling needs a specific mechanism to guarantee that its input is free of any leakage. Unfortunately, it makes it tough to implement this strategy in the context of actual leaks. In this work, we formally propose the indistinguishable bounded leakage-resilient circuit compiler $\bar{C}$ to solve the problem mentioned above. Specifically, it specifies that any polynomial-time adversary who derives the bound secret information from the circuit compiler can not distinguish an equivalent compiled circuit $\bar{C}^{\prime}$ with the same output. To achieve this goal, first, we utilize the leakage-resilient indistinguishable encoding as its input. Second, it takes advantage of the indistinguishability obfuscation $(IO)$ program to construct an obfuscated circuit that removes the random coins of the input encoding . Its total running time is the original circuit $C$ running time plus $poly(\kappa )$ , and the size is independent of the original $C$ . As this new compiler overcomes the restriction of the simulated-based leakage resilient circuit compiler,it will bring an independent interest result in leakage-resilient cryptography.Abstract Transforming any circuit into a circuit with the same functionality but resilience against well-defined classes of leakage is an essential subject of cryptography. Whereas, according to the relationship between $VBB$ and simulated leakage-resilient circuit compiler, the compiling needs a specific mechanism to guarantee that its input is free of any leakage. Unfortunately, it makes it tough to implement this strategy in the context of actual leaks. In this work, we formally propose the indistinguishable bounded leakage-resilient circuit compiler $\bar{C}$ to solve the problem mentioned above. Specifically, it specifies that any polynomial-time adversary who derives the bound secret information from the circuit compiler can not distinguish an equivalent compiled circuit $\bar{C}^{\prime}$ with the same output. To achieve this goal, first, we utilize the leakage-resilient indistinguishable encoding as its input. Second, it takes advantage of the indistinguishability obfuscation $(IO)$ program to construct an obfuscated circuit that removes the random coins of the input encoding . Its total running time is the original circuit $C$ running time plus $poly(\kappa )$, and the size is independent of the original $C$. As this new compiler overcomes the restriction of the simulated-based leakage resilient circuit compiler,it will bring an independent interest result in leakage-resilient cryptography.

The Computer JournalMar 17, 20220 citations

Towards Leakage-Resilient Ratcheted Key Exchange

Daniel E. Collins, Simone Colombo, Sina Schaeffler

Lecture notes in computer scienceJan 1, 20250 citations

On Leakage-Resilient Secret Sharing.

Hemanta K. Maji, Anat Paskin-Cherniavsky, Tom Suad +1 more

Jan 1, 20204 citations

Obfuscation of Unitary Quantum Programs

Mi-Ying Huang, Er-Cheng Tang

Program obfuscation aims to hide the inner workings of a program while preserving its functionality. In the quantum setting, recent works have obtained obfuscation schemes for specialized classes of quantum circuits. For instance, Bartusek, Brakerski, and Vaikuntanathan (STOC 2024) constructed a quantum state obfuscation scheme, which supports the obfuscation of quantum programs represented as quantum states for pseudo-deterministic quantum programs with classical inputs and outputs in the classical oracle model. In this work, we improve upon existing results by constructing the first quantum state obfuscation scheme for unitary (or approximately unitary) quantum programs supporting quantum inputs and outputs in the classical oracle model. At the core of our obfuscation scheme are two novel ingredients: a functional quantum authentication scheme that allows key holders to learn specific functions of the authenticated quantum state with simulationbased security, and a compiler that represents an arbitrary quantum circuit as a projective linear-plus-measurement quantum program described by a sequence of non-adaptive Clifford gates interleaved with adaptive and compatible measurements.Program obfuscation aims to hide the inner workings of a program while preserving its functionality. In the quantum setting, recent works have obtained obfuscation schemes for specialized classes of quantum circuits. For instance, Bartusek, Brakerski, and Vaikuntanathan (STOC 2024) constructed a quantum state obfuscation scheme, which supports the obfuscation of quantum programs represented as quantum states for pseudo-deterministic quantum programs with classical inputs and outputs in the classical oracle model. In this work, we improve upon existing results by constructing the first quantum state obfuscation scheme for unitary (or approximately unitary) quantum programs supporting quantum inputs and outputs in the classical oracle model. At the core of our obfuscation scheme are two novel ingredients: a functional quantum authentication scheme that allows key holders to learn specific functions of the authenticated quantum state with simulationbased security, and a compiler that represents an arbitrary quantum circuit as a projective linear-plus-measurement quantum program described by a sequence of non-adaptive Clifford gates interleaved with adaptive and compatible measurements.

arXiv:2507.11970Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer ScienceDec 14, 20252 citations

VBB

and simulated leakage-resilient circuit compiler, the compiling needs a specific mechanism to guarantee that its input is free of any leakage. Unfortunately, it makes it tough to implement this strategy in the context of actual leaks. In this work, we formally propose the indistinguishable bounded leakage-resilient circuit compiler

\bar{C}

to solve the problem mentioned above. Specifically, it specifies that any polynomial-time adversary who derives the bound secret information from the circuit compiler can not distinguish an equivalent compiled circuit

\bar{C}^{\prime}

with the same output. To achieve this goal, first, we utilize the leakage-resilient indistinguishable encoding as its input. Second, it takes advantage of the indistinguishability obfuscation

(IO)

program to construct an obfuscated circuit that removes the random coins of the input encoding . Its total running time is the original circuit

C

running time plus

poly(\kappa )

, and the size is independent of the original

C

. As this new compiler overcomes the restriction of the simulated-based leakage resilient circuit compiler,it will bring an independent interest result in leakage-resilient cryptography.