International Symposium on Digital Forensics and Security (ISDFS)

New quantum secure key exchange protocols based on MaTRU

Sedat Akleylek, Nurşah Kaya

Published Mar 1, 2018• 11 citations

Abstract

In this paper, we propose two new quantum secure key exchange protocols based on MaTRU. These protocols differ on the key agreement phase. They use ephemeral keys, i.e., they satisfy perfect forward secrecy property. We also give the parameter choices for the proposed key exchange protocols for different security levels. Then, we compare them with NTRU-KE in view of the number of required arithmetic operations.

DOI: 10.1109/isdfs.2018.8355362

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